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Abstract: 
 
My thesis examines the significance of Theodor W. Adorno’s recurrent reference to the Old 
Testament ban on making images of God: the ‘Bilderverbot’. In particular I focus on three 
facets of this figure that occur at prominent junctures of Adorno’s work: his ‘imageless 
materialism’ (Chapter One), his ‘inverse theology’ (Chapter Two) and his ‘negative 
aesthetics’ (Chapter Three). In each case I argue that Adorno strips the image ban of its 
religious associations and enlists it in the service of a broadly Marxian critique of capitalist 
modernity. The ban on picturing the absolute is rendered as a ban on pre-determining a future 
in which all historical antagonisms are reconciled. As Adorno argues, only an unflinching 
criticism of the present can throw into relief the contours of an ‘imageless’ Utopia. I approach 
Adorno’s writings with a view to his sources, many of which contain notable references to the 
image ban that span the history of modern German thought. They include: Marx and Lukács, 
Benjamin and Bloch, Kant and Hegel, as well as Hölderlin, Kafka and Schoenberg. By 
emphasising these elective affinities, I aim to shed light on Adorno’s singular application of 
the figure of the image ban to his critical project. In this regard, I hope to dispense with 
certain prevalent characterisations of Adorno as a quietistic aesthete advanced by critics such 
as Habermas, Taubes and Agamben. Far from designating a merely historical curio, I argue 
that Adorno’s singular appropriation of the image ban serves as a potent model for thinking 
an aesthetics of resistance in the present.  
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Prelude: 
Adorno and the Ban on Images 
 
“Die Kinder haben keine Zukunft. Sie fürchten sich vor der ganzen Welt. Sie machen 
sich kein Bild von ihr, nur von dem Hüben und Drüben, denn es läßt sich mit 
Kreidestrichen begrenzen.”1 
Ingeborg Bachmann 
 
In an essay titled ‘Sacred Fragment’ (1963), Theodor W. Adorno gestures towards an 
irreducible iconoclasm at the heart of Arnold Schoenberg’s unfinished opera Moses und Aron 
(1932).2 Schoenberg’s Exodus-adaptation “is in pieces”, we are told; it is “fragmentary, like the 
tables of the law which Moses smashed”.3 This sense of fragmentation is thematised in Act 
Two, Scene Four of Schoenberg’s libretto – an episode that has been memorably committed to 
film by the French directors Jean-Marie Straub and Danièle Huillet.4 It portrays Moses’ descent 
from Mount Sinai where he had received the tables with the Ten Commandments “written with 
the finger of God”.5 Upon returning, Moses finds that the Israelites had grown restless during 
his forty-day absence. They had urged his brother Aron to reinstate their old religious ways: 
“[g]ive us back our Gods to worship; let them bring us order”.6 Under the threat of death, Aron 
had relented. “O Israel, I return your gods to you, and also give you to them, just as you have 
demanded”.7 Famously, Aron had proceeded to fashion an effigy in the form of a golden calf: 
“common and visible, imaged in gold”.8 The Israelites, in turn, had frenziedly worshipped this 
idol. Schoenberg’s stage notes laconically sum up the action: “[b]urnt offerings are brought to 
                                                
1 “The children have no future. They are afraid of the whole world. They do not make themselves an image of it; 
they only picture hopscotch squares, for they can be delimited in chalk.” Ingeborg Bachmann, “Jugend in einer 
österreichischen Stadt”, in Werke, Bd. 2: Erzählungen, ed. Christine Koschel, Inge von Weidenbaum & Clemens 
Münster (Munich: Piper, 1980), 86-87 [My translation] 
2 Schoenberg composed the first two acts of his opera between 1930-32, i.e. before his re-conversion to Judaism 
and his forced emigration to the United States in 1933. Schoenberg omitted the second ‘a’ in his spelling of Aron 
because the amount of letters in the title would have otherwise tallied 13 – a bad omen, in his view. The English 
translators of Schoenberg’s libretto apparently did not share his concern. Cf. Allen Shaw, Arnold Schoenberg’s 
Journey (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 148 
3 Theodor W. Adorno, “Sacred Fragment: Schoenberg’s ‘Moses und Aron’”, in Quasi Una Fantasia: Essays on 
Modern Music, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: Verso, 1992), 225 
4 Cf. Barton Bryg, “Musical Modernism and the Schoenberg Films”, in Landscapes of Resistance: The German 
Films of Danièle Huillet and Jean-Marie Straub (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 139-163 
5 Exodus, 31:18 
6 Arnold Schoenberg, “Moses and Aaron (Act Two, Scene Two)”, in Schoenberg’s ‘Moses and Aaron’, with the 
Complete Libretto in German and English, ed. Karl Wörner, trans. Paul Hamburger (London: Faber & Faber, 
1963), 161 
7 Ibid 
8 Ibid [My emphasis] 
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the altar”; 9  “wild drunkenness overtakes everyone”; 10  “extravagant dancing”; 11  “blood 
off’rings”;12  “Destruction and Suicide”; 13  “Erotic Orgy”.14  Upon witnessing the Israelites’ 
idolatrous excesses, Moses furiously smashes the tables with the law: “[a]nd it came to pass, as 
soon as he came nigh unto the camp, that he saw the calf, and the dancing: and Moses’ anger 
waxed hot, and he cast the tables out of his hands, and brake them beneath the mount. And he 
took the calf which they had made, and burnt it in the fire, and ground it to powder, and 
strawed it upon the water, and made the children of Israel drink of it.”15 As is well known, the 
Book of Exodus proceeds to detail how Moses and the sons of Levi go on to slay all those who 
had partaken in the dance around the golden calf as punishment for their “great sin”.16 The law 
is rewritten in Moses’ hand and God’s authority is restored. Schoenberg, however, omits these 
occurrences, choosing instead to draw out the confrontation between the two brothers in order 
to illuminate the fundamental stakes of their conflict: “God’s eternity opposes idol’s 
transience”;17 “[n]o folk can grasp more than just a partial image, the perceivable part of the 
whole idea”.18 God cannot be pictured; God must be pictured – if only for pedagogical reasons. 
This designates the “tragic” dimension of Moses und Aron: “the insoluble conflict between the 
finite and the infinite inherent in the subject matter Schoenberg chose.”19 Against this backdrop, 
the Viennese composer’s “biblical opera” invites two preliminary observations.20 
 
i.) Insofar as the origin of the law cannot be dissociated from Moses’ breaking of the tables, the 
source of its authority remains obscure. That is, the relation between law, authority and 
scripture remains somewhat under-determined – a considerable stumbling block for any 
subsequent effort to ground binding behavioural guidelines on the basis of scripture.21 At the 
same time, though, inasmuch as Moses acts in response to the Israelites’ effort to supplant God 
with an intermediary – an idol – the breaking of the tables is supposed to substantiate the very 
law whose physical trace it obliterates, namely: the “Jewish prohibition on making images”.22 
                                                
9 Ibid, 169 
10 Ibid, 173 
11 Ibid, 174 
12 Ibid, 177 [My emphasis] 
13 Ibid 
14 Ibid, 179 
15 Exodus, 32:19-20 
16 Exodus, 32: 31 
17 Schoenberg, “Moses und Aron (Act Two, Scene Five)”, 187 
18 Ibid, 189 
19 Adorno, “Sacred Fragment”, 226 
20 Ibid, 225 
21 I derive this point from a talk by Andrew Benjamin titled ‘Images, Iconoclasm and the Founding of the Law’, 
held at Kingston University on 27 October 2015. 
22 Adorno, “Sacred Fragment”, 230 
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This peculiar incongruity extends into the manifest motivations that underlie the biblical 
injunction “[t]hou shalt not make unto thee any graven image”.23 For one thing, we are told, the 
God of Israel is a “jealous” God; he demands an exclusive commitment.24 Yet Moses’ 
destruction of the golden calf seems only to confirm “the charismatic power of the idol”.25 In 
other words, if the golden calf poses a threat to God’s authority – if it rouses His jealousy – 
then surely the primacy of the monotheistic worldview is ultimately compromised. At the same 
time, we are assured, the ban on using earthly means for picturing the absolute is not simply a 
way to manage God’s jealousy; rather, it is supposed to guard against the gravest of hubristic 
errors: the attempt to determine that which eludes all determination. Thus “[t]he central effort 
of philosophical religion”, as Moshe Halbertal and Avishai Margalit observe, “is the attempt to 
attain a proper metaphysical conception of God.”26 Not only is such a conception necessary for 
the purposes of proper worship – after all, the ban on idol worship is nothing if not a practical 
directive – it also constitutes the “high point of religious life.”27 This ‘high point’, however, is 
marked by a double bind. For if the outlawing of idolatry goes hand in hand with Moses’ 
smashing of the law, if the pronouncement of this prohibition thus assumes an ill-founded 
legislative authority – “to act as the mouthpiece of the Almighty is blasphemy for mortal man” 
– might it not be objected that the ‘Jewish prohibition on making images’ is essentially self-
transgressive; that the commandment against idol worship contains its own infraction as an 
ineluctable condition of its formulation?28 
 
ii.) As we have noted, Schoenberg’s libretto stops short of covering the events outlined in 
Exodus 34 – the passage that describes how God summons Moses to Mount Sinai a second 
time, in order to have him write a set of replacement tables. Schoenberg’s omission is striking 
because the episode instantiates the very contradiction that he seeks to stage: the replacement 
tables are “no longer identified as ‘God’s handiwork’”, as Rebecca Comay highlights; they are 
“inexorably marked as substitute or simulacrum”.29 But if we concede this point, might it not be 
objected that the re-drawing of the tables relies on the very self-transgression of the law that we 
                                                
23 Exodus, 20: 4 
24 Exodus, 20: 5 
25 Rebecca Comay, “Materialist Mutations of the Bilderverbot”, in Sites of Vision, ed. David Michael Levin 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 342 [My emphasis]. Sigmund Freud observes an analogous mechanism in 
animistic practices. Cf. Sigmund Freud, Totem & Taboo: Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of 
Savages and Neurotics, trans. James Strachey (London: Routledge, 1966) 
26 Moshe Halbertal & Avishai Margalit, Idolatry, trans. Naomi Goldblum (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1998), 2 [My emphasis] 
27 Ibid 
28 Adorno, “Sacred Fragment”, 225. The fact that Aron acts as Moses’ spokesman and that Moses, in turn, relays 
the word of God is significant in this regard. 
29 Ibid, 344 
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outlined above – an act of second-degree idolatry? In other words, does the fact that Moses’ re-
writes a law that originally appeared as God’s ‘handiwork’ not mark out the replacement tables 
as idols in their own right?  
 
To begin with, these two preliminary observations concerning Schoenberg’s biblical subject 
matter serve to frame the subsequent discussion in a double sense. With regards to the former 
point – Exodus 32 – this means the following: if the image ban chiefly concerns an 
immeasurable excess of absolute ideas over their limited representations, then Judaism’s 
‘metaphysical conception of God’ – invoked above by Halbertal and Margalit – points beyond 
the sphere of Exodus. In other words: if the outlawing of images principally follows from a 
desire to attain a ‘metaphysical conception’ of God – rather than, say, from a fear of His jealous 
retribution – then it follows that Judaism appears above all as a ‘philosophical religion’. In this 
regard, Moses’ destruction of the golden calf is supposed to signal the triumph of a certain 
metaphysical-philosophical understanding of the absolute over the fateful-mythical model that 
undergirds iconophilic paganism. God is intellectualised. To be sure, such a portrayal of 
Judaism runs the danger of equating the history of biblical monotheism with that of reason tout 
court. This premise resounds in various ways throughout the work of early 20th century thinkers 
from the orbit of the so-called Wissenschaft des Judentums (Abraham Geiger, Leo Baeck, 
Hermann Cohen).30 It is of interest in the present context because the Wissenschaft account of a 
religion of reason is, in turn, taken up and critically recast in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947) 
– the speculative pre-history of subjectivity co-authored by Adorno and Max Horkheimer 
during their American exile. “The disenchanted world of Judaism”, we are told, “propitiates 
magic by negating it in the idea of God. (…) It places all hope in the prohibition on invoking 
falsity as God, the finite as the infinite, the lie as truth. The pledge of salvation lies in the 
rejection of any faith which claims to depict it, knowledge in the denunciation of illusion.”31 
But Adorno and Horkheimer do not endorse this view as such. They quickly qualify their 
apparent equation of Judaism and enlightenment by arguing that “[m]yth” – the fateful realm of 
paganism – is already a form of “enlightenment” and that, in turn, subsequent forms of 
“enlightenment” – including monotheism – revert to “mythology”.32 What is at stake here is an 
immanent un-working of a seamless history of reason in the singular. As in the case of 
Sigmund Freud’s Moses & Monotheism (1939), the speculative pre-history of Judaism serves 
                                                
30 Cf. Irene Kaufmann, Die Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums: 1872-1942 (Berlin: Hentrich & 
Hentrich, 2006) 
31 Theodor W. Adorno & Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. Edmund Jephcott, ed. Gunzelin 
Schmid Noerr (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 17  
32 Ibid, xviii 
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as a case in point. We will return to these matters in due course. For now it suffices to note the 
following: what interests us here is less what Adorno and Horkheimer may have had to say 
about the chief proponents of reform Judaism in Weimar Germany (presumably their support 
for the broadly Neo-Kantian progressivism of early 20th century Social Democracy would have 
been met with some suspicion); rather, what concerns us is that in both cases – for better or 
worse – the image ban appears as a philosophical-historical trope: a figure of rationalisation. 
Inasmuch as Adorno and Horkheimer insist that such rationalisation perpetually risks reverting 
into its opposite, however, we must ask: is it possible to challenge the ills of a civilisational 
meta-narrative that places the image ban at its centre, by mobilising this figure and turning it 
against itself? 
 With regards to the latter point – Exodus 34 – Comay’s allusion to a tension between 
‘original’ and ‘simulacrum’ similarly points to a wider philosophical issue. In this regard it 
might be said that Moses’ smashing and rewriting of the law is echoed in the fundamental 
bifurcations that span the longue durée of “Western metaphysics”:33 essence vs. appearance, 
form vs. content, subject vs. object. This is borne out etymologically. Plato famously 
distinguishes the world of eternal and unchanging Forms (eidoi, ‘ideas’) from that of mere 
representations (eikones, ‘images’).34 Sensible objects are mere shadows of the truth, partial and 
inadequate copies. Accordingly, the task of philosophy is to perforate the world of appearances, 
to determine the relationship between true ideas and deceitful images. Notwithstanding 
Nietzsche’s consequential attack on such Hinterwelt metaphysics,35 Alain Besançon, Horst 
Bredekamp and others argue that iconoclasm – at least as it has come to be associated with the 
various strands of Exodus-reception, from the Babylonian Talmud (Avodah Zara) to the 
Byzantine Eikonomachía; from the Council of Trent to Islamic aniconism – is an eminently 
philosophical undertaking: the clearing away of eidola (‘apparitions’) that obscure the true 
relation between the finite and the infinite.36 (In this regard, the role of Neo-Platonism in 
                                                
33 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol. 1: The Will to Power as Art, trans. D.F. Krell (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1981), 10. On the remarkable commonalities between Heidegger and his self-avowed antipode Adorno, 
see: Alexander García Düttmann, The Memory of Thought: An Essay on Heidegger and Adorno, trans. Nicholas 
Walker (London: Continuum, 2002) 
34 Cf. Plato, “Book VII (514a-517a)”, The Republic, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 193-
196 
35 Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, “‘Reason’ in Philosophy” & “How the ‘Real World’ at Last Became a Myth”, in 
Twilight of the Idols & The Anti-Christ, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin Classics, 1989), 45-49 & 50-
51; Friedrich Nietzsche, “Of the Afterworldsmen”, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (London: 
Penguin Classics, 1969), 58-60 
36 Cf. Alain Besançon, The Forbidden Image: An Intellectual History of Iconoclasm, trans. Jane Marie Todd 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000); Horst Bredekamp, Theorie des Bildakts (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 2010); Marie-Jose Mondzain, Image, Icon, Economy: The Byzantine Origins of the Contemporary 
Imaginary (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); Carlos M.N. Eire, War against the Idols: The 
Reformation of Worship from Erasmus to Calvin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) 
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shaping Jewish, Christian and Islamic thought from Maimonides to Augustine and Avicenna 
can hardly be overstated.)37 As above, the iconoclastic impulse is effectively identified with the 
triumph of reason: ‘the denunciation of illusion’. By that token it is unsurprising that the image 
ban should survive into the present as a discourse of sublimity – from Immanuel Kant’s 
Critique of Judgement (1790) to Jean-François Lyotard’s The Inhuman (1988).38 Is it the case, 
then, that the biblical interdiction against idol worship has come to designate – above all – an 
entrenched philosophical topos? 
 It is not our aim here to dissolve the far-flung history of the image ban into the annals of 
philosophy. Rather, the genealogy of iconoclasm outlined by Comay, Halbertal, Margalit, 
Besançon, Bredekamp and others forces a narrower question: in what sense can the tension that 
is designated by the Old Testament ban on making images of God help to critically interrogate 
the historical narrative that connects the sequence of transpositions outlined above – from 
Aron’s rendering of God in the form of an image to Schoenberg’s portrayal of Aron’s ‘sin’ in 
the form of an opera; from Adorno’s essay on Schoenberg’s musical adaptation to Straub and 
Huillet’s filmic rendition thereof? Put differently: is it possible to call upon the image ban – in 
its capacity as a philosophico-historical marker, rather than a theological edict – to formulate 
a critical theory of the present? 
 
*** 
 
The present study aims to explore the conspicuous recurrence of the Old Testament ban on 
making images of God throughout Adorno’s writings: from his musical works on Beethoven, 
Mahler and Schoenberg to his literary analyses of Hölderlin, Kafka and Beckett; from his 
political musings on Marx, Engels and Lenin to his sporadic reflections on painting (Corot). To 
be sure, Adorno’s references to the image ban recall this figure’s prominent place in the history 
of modern German thought – a lineage that extends from Mendelssohn to Kant, Hegel, Cohen 
and beyond. Adorno’s intimate familiarity with this tradition, in addition to his well-
documented ignorance of theological sources,39 indicate that his outwardly biblical lexicon in 
fact owes more to a deep engagement with the history of philosophy than to the concerted study 
of scripture. In any case, Adorno openly heeds the verdicts of his intellectual forerunners 
                                                
37 Cf. Dermot Moran, “Neoplatonism and Christianity in the West” & Sarah Pessin “Islamic and Jewish 
Neoplatonism”, in The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism, eds. Svetla Slaveva-Griffin, Paulina Remes 
(London: Routledge, 2014), 508-524 & 541-558 
38 The ban on images might equally be used to tell a certain history of modern art from Kasimir Malevich to Ad 
Reinhardt. However, no such effort can be accommodated here. 
39 Cf. Stefan Müller-Doohm, Adorno: A Biography, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 
19ff 
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Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud and Karl Marx, arguing that “positive religion has lost its 
(…) validity”; 40  that “[t]raditional theology is not restorable.” 41  Far from lamenting the 
displacement of traditional religion in the present, though, Adorno turns the waning of 
ecclesiastical authority into an opportunity: by dint of its perceived redundancy, the image ban 
is transformed into a potent philosophical device. It signifies a refusal of the sense that that 
“which merely is”,42 is in fact everything. Despite his much-maligned verdict that the moment 
for a Marxian actualisation of philosophy has been “missed”,43 Adorno’s abidance by the image 
ban is supposed to signal his commitment to a mode of philosophical critique which aims to 
hold open the possibility that things might yet be otherwise. A discourse of Utopia displaces 
that of transcendence: “Utopia as the harmony between man and nature”,44 Utopia as the 
longing for “undeluded happiness, including bodily pleasure, the wish for an end to 
suffering”.45 Nevertheless, Adorno is aware that “one may not cast a picture of Utopia in a 
positive manner”; “one can only talk about Utopia in a negative way”.46 To form an image of 
Utopia is to render it in terms of the present situation and thus “to garnish the status quo with 
its ultimate apologia.”47 The stakes are high. In the “administered world” even utopian longing 
– the longing for a drastically different future – constantly risks reverting into its opposite.48 
Accordingly, the central aim of the present study is to illuminate the sense in which the image 
ban informs Adorno’s effort to safeguard the minimal space within which something like a 
radical societal transformation might yet be thought. 
 In aiming to respond to these issues, I focus on three aspects of Adorno’s thinking: his 
‘imageless materialism’ (Chapter One), his ‘inverse theology’ (Chapter Two) and his ‘negative 
aesthetics’ (Chapter Three). Broadly speaking, each of these chapters concerns a seemingly 
discrete field of inquiry: the immanent critique of materialism (Chapter One), the paradoxical 
recovery of metaphysics (Chapter Two) and the bearing out of their tension in aesthetic theory 
(Chapter Three). This tension, for its part, attests to the mutual implication of these seemingly 
                                                
40 Theodor W. Adorno, “Theses Upon Art and Religion Today”, in Noten zur Literatur (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1974), 647 
41 Theodor W. Adorno, “Theologie, Aufklärung und die Zukunft der Illusion”, in Frankfurter Adorno Blätter 
VIII, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Munich: Edition Text + Kritik, 2003), 235 [My translation] 
42 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton (London: Routledge, 1973), 19 [Translation 
altered]  
43 Ibid, 3 
44 Alfred Schmidt, “Der Begriff des Materialismus bei Adorno”, in Adorno Konferenz 1983, eds. Ludwig v. 
Friedenburg & Jürgen Habermas (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984), 25 [My translation] 
45 Simon Jarvis, “Adorno, Marx, Materialism”, in The Cambridge Companion to Adorno, ed. Tom Huhn 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 80 
46 Theodor W. Adorno & Ernst Bloch, “Something’s Missing: A Discussion between Ernst Bloch and Theodor 
W. Adorno on the Contradictions of Utopian Longing (1964)”, in The Utopian Function of Art and Literature, 
trans. Jack Zipes & Frank Mecklenburg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), 9 
47 Comay, “Materialist Mutations of the Bilderverbot”, 348 
48 Adorno & Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, xi 
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divergent registers: a meta-critique of philosophy whose material correlate is supposed to lie in 
the history of man’s (self) domination; a declared solidarity with metaphysics in the face of its 
purported fall; and an aesthetics that is thought to bear the weight of a displaced hope for 
something beyond the spell-bound sphere of existence. In a letter to Gershom Scholem, dated 
14 March 1967, Adorno schematises these connections with reference to Negative Dialectics: 
“[i]n the immanent epistemological debate” – the opening sections of the book – “once one has 
escaped from the clutches of idealism, what I call the primacy of the object (…) seems to me an 
attempt to do justice to the concept of materialism. (…) But the materialism involved here is no 
conclusive, fixed thing; it is not a worldview. This path to materialism is totally different from 
dogma, and it is this fact that seems to me to guarantee an affinity with metaphysics, I might 
almost have said, theology.”49 To the extent that Adorno’s question about the possibility of a 
properly materialist metaphysics – not to say ‘theology’ – is finally reformulated as a question 
concerning the possibility of modern art, however, the singular outline of his “imageless image 
of Utopia” comes into focus.50 All three chapters, then, are couched in the historical narrative 
outlined in Dialectic of Enlightenment whose credo, we have already seen, proclaims that 
‘myth is already enlightenment’ and that ‘all enlightenment reverts to mythology’. With respect 
to this maxim, each chapter places Adorno into a dialogue with an array of authors, whose 
work orients his argument: Marx vs. Engels and Lenin (Chapter One), Kafka and Benjamin vs. 
Schmitt (Chapter Two), Hegel vs. Kant (Chapter Three). In each case, a recent voice is 
introduced to complement the historical exposition: Meillassoux (Chapter One), 
Agamben/Taubes (Chapter Two), Lyotard (Chapter Three). These voices are intended to show 
that Adorno’s concerns continue to polarise opinion even almost fifty years after his death. By 
centring each chapter around a prominent reference to the image ban or another related figure, I 
propose to reorganise Adorno’s uneasily systematic “anti-system” around the notion of 
imagelessness:51 a “thinking beyond itself”, a thinking “into openness”.52 I take it that this is a 
timely task for at least two reasons: first, if Adorno’s bleak assessment of his own historical 
situation has only been confirmed by subsequent events, then his echo of the Marxian claim 
that only a “ruthless criticism of all that exists” can hold open the possibility of historical 
                                                
49 Theodor W. Adorno & Gershom Scholem, Der Liebe Gott wohnt im Detail: Briefwechsel, 1939-1969, ed. 
Asaf Angermann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2015), 414 [My translation]  
50 Theodor W. Adorno, Ästhetik (1958/59), ed. Eberhard Ortland (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2009), 52 [My 
translation] 
51 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, xx 
52 Theodor W. Adorno, Metaphysics: Concept and Problems, trans. Edmund Jephcott, ed. Rolf Tiedemann  
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 68 
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change gains poignancy.53 Second, and more modestly, if the reception of Adorno’s work has 
long been dominated by a somewhat incongruous effort to read the negative dialectic as a 
“guide on how to live less wrongly” (beneath all the layers of supposed hyperbole), then 
insisting on the uncompromising negativity of Adorno’s thinking means nothing less than 
defending his thought against its self-avowed defenders: from Jürgen Habermas to Seyla 
Benhabib.54 The dual motivation of this study is thus at once to foreground the iconoclastic 
tendencies of Adorno’s thought and to free him from the yoke of certain liberal misreadings. 
(How and why exactly will become apparent as we go along.) Certainly, this effort is not 
exhaustive. My aim here has been neither to comprehensively reconstruct, nor to complete 
Adorno’s philosophical project against the backdrop of its reception. Certainly, the sense of 
fragmentation that is thematised in Schoenberg’s Moses und Aron applies equally to Adorno’s 
suspicion of totality. Rather, I have sought to single out the image ban as a leitmotif of 
Adorno’s thought, whose significance – both critical and heuristic – has been largely 
overlooked. Under this aspect it remains to ask: what is the significance of the image ban for 
the overall architectonic of Adorno’s thought? 
                                                
53 Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, Marx & Engels Collected Works, Vol. 3: 1843-1844 (London: Lawrence & 
Wishart, 1975), 142 
54 Fabian Freyenhagen, Adorno’s Practical Philosophy: How to Live Less Wrongly (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 75 
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Chapter 1: 
Imageless Materialism 
 
“Quelle que soit la valeur, la puissance de pénétration d’une explication, 
c’est encore et encore la chose à expliquer qui est la plus réelle – et parmi sa 
réalité figure précisément ce mystère que l’on a voulu dissiper.”1 
Paul Valéry 
 
“What could be at work in the Marxist rendition of the theological prohibition of images?”2 This 
question posed by the philosopher Rebecca Comay at the beginning of her essay ‘Materialist 
Mutations of the Bilderverbot’ (1997) addresses itself to the unlikely pairing of an ostensibly 
biblical motif – the Old Testament ban on making images of God – with an emphatically worldly 
disposition: historical materialism. Comay alludes here to the conspicuous recurrence of the 
image ban in certain articulations of what has come to be known – for better or worse – as 
‘Western Marxism’: a critical re-imagination of the materialist philosophy of history outlined in 
works such as Karl Korsch’s Marxism and Philosophy (1923) and Georg Lukács’ History and 
Class-Consciousness (1923).3 As Comay notes, the improbable tension between ‘materialism’ 
and ‘theology’ that characterises particular strands of this tradition – from Ernst Bloch to Walter 
Benjamin – is discernible, not least, in the work of Theodor W. Adorno.4 In fact, Comay’s 
question is occasioned by a striking passage from Adorno’s magnum opus Negative Dialectics, 
(1966) fittingly titled ‘Materialism Imageless’. There Adorno writes the following: 
 
Representational thinking would be without reflection – an undialectical contradiction, for without 
reflection there is no theory. A consciousness interpolating images, a third element, between itself 
and that which it thinks would unwittingly reproduce idealism. A body of ideas would substitute for 
the object of cognition, and the subjective arbitrariness of such ideas is that of the authorities. The 
                                                
1 “Whatever the value and penetrative power of an explanation, the thing being explained is still and always the most 
real, and within its reality figures precisely the mystery that we have been trying to dissipate.” Paul Valéry, Valéry’s 
Oeuvres, Vol. II, ed. Jean Hytier (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), 738 [My translation] 
2 Rebecca Comay, “Materialist Mutations of the Bilderverbot”, in Sites of Vision, ed. David Michael Levin 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 339 
3 For a useful historiography of the term ‘Western Marxism’, see: Perry Anderson, Considerations on Western 
Marxism (London: Verso, 1976) 
4 For an influential overview of the ‘theological’ streak running through the works of Bloch, Benjamin et al, see: 
Michael Löwy, Redemption & Utopia – Jewish libertarian Thought in Central Europe, trans. Hope Heaney (London: 
Athlone Press, 1992) 
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materialist longing to grasp the thing aims at the opposite: it is only in the absence of images that 
the full object could be conceived. Such absence concurs with the theological ban on images. 
Materialism brought that ban into secular form by not permitting Utopia to be positively pictured; 
this is the substance of its negativity. At its most materialistic, materialism comes to agree with 
theology. Its great desire would be the resurrection of the flesh, a desire utterly foreign to idealism, 
the realm of the absolute spirit. The perspective vanishing point of historic materialism would be its 
self-sublimation, the spirit’s liberation from the primacy of material needs in their state of 
fulfilment. Only if the physical urge were quenched would the spirit be reconciled and would 
become that which it only promises while the spell of material conditions will not let it satisfy 
material needs.5 
 
Above all, this passage seems to stake an epistemological claim: that a purportedly materialist 
form of cognition which interpolates images – ‘a third element’ – between consciousness and 
‘that which it thinks’ in fact ‘unwittingly reproduces idealism.’ Adorno’s phrasing thus recalls the 
traditional opposition of materialism and idealism – the realm of ‘material needs’ vs. that of 
‘absolute spirit’.6 It acknowledges a “risk that supposedly materialist thinking will involuntarily 
turn into its opposite”,7 namely: into a form of subjective domination that – according to the 
terms laid out in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947) – Adorno associates with certain unnamed 
‘authorities’. But which ‘authorities’ are envisaged here? To be sure, Adorno’s reference to 
‘representational thinking’ (Abbildendes Denken) calls to mind the various forms of ‘reflection 
theory’ (Abbildtheorie) that punctuate the history of materialism from Democritus to Locke.8 In 
this respect, the German term Abbild – ‘image’, ‘depiction’ – takes centre stage.9 Yet Adorno’s 
formulation suggests that the locus of the problem lies elsewhere – in “the Eastern countries” – as 
                                                
5 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton (London: Routledge, 1973), 207 
6 It is worth noting that Adorno’s 1931 inaugural address as Privatdozent at the University of Frankfurt begins by 
outlining a motive that will remain decisive for all of his subsequent work: the rejection of idealism, broadly 
conceived of as the view that “the power of thought is sufficient to grasp the totality of the real”. Cf. Theodor W. 
Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy”, trans. Benjamin Snow, Telos, No. 31 (Spring 1977): 120 
7 Simon Jarvis, “Adorno, Marx, Materialism”, in The Cambridge Companion to Adorno, ed. Tom Huhn (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 96 [My emphasis] 
8 Certainly Adorno views Lukács’ defence of ‘reflection theory’ in his account of literary realism as an extension of 
this problem. However, for reasons of brevity we must sidestep this issue here. Cf. Georg Lukács, Realism in Our 
Time: Literature and the Class Struggle, trans. John & Necke Mander (New York: Harper and Row, 1964); Theodor 
W. Adorno, “Extorted Reconciliation: On Georg Lukács’ Realism in Our Time”, in Notes to Literature, Vol. 2, trans. 
Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 216-240 
9 The prefix Ab – roughly translatable as ‘of’ – already implies that an Ab-bild is an image of an image so to speak: 
an impermissible tautology if nothing else. 
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he puts it.10 Notwithstanding this somewhat indelicate derision of the so-called ‘East’, it is 
striking that Adorno speaks here of a “materialism come to political power”, of “governmental 
terror machines” that “entrench themselves as permanent institutions, mocking the theory they 
carry on their lips”.11 Accordingly, his invective appears to be directed chiefly against the official 
materialist doctrines of the Soviet sphere, not least perhaps Vladimir Ilyich Lenin’s meta-
scientific opus Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1908). This suspicion is confirmed by the 
fact that Adorno explicitly names Lenin in the paragraph preceding the one from which the long 
citation above is drawn.12 But if Adorno’s objections are in fact directed against the official 
materialisms of the ‘Eastern Countries’, then Comay’s question – ‘what could be at work in the 
Marxist rendition of the theological prohibition of images’ – bifurcates: what kind of ‘Marxism’ 
is at issue here? What kind of materialism does it presuppose? 
Certainly, any effort to answer these questions today cannot go unqualified. That is to say, 
inasmuch as the theoretical and political sway of the Soviet Union has been all but consigned to 
the history books, Adorno’s objections to the functionaries of ‘Diamat’ may appear to have lost 
much of their currency. However, as I will argue, ‘Materialism Imageless’ points beyond its 
immediate context, raising wider questions about a ‘state of fulfilment’ whose ‘promise’ 
(frustrated in both ‘East’ and ‘West’ alike) continues to haunt a present whose definitive feature 
appears to be the relinquishment of any sense “that things should be different”.13 Revisiting 
Adorno’s interrogation of ‘representational thinking’, then, is no mere exercise in the history of 
ideas; rather, it holds fast to what he describes elsewhere as a “Utopia of cognition”.14 We will 
return to this point below. For now it suffices to note that in Adorno’s view ‘the materialist 
longing to grasp the thing’ means nothing less than a radical reconfiguration of the relationship 
between the ‘subject’ and ‘object’ of thought with respect to their socio-historical analogue – the 
                                                
10 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 206 
11 Ibid, 204 
12 As Adorno writes: “When Lenin, rather than go in for epistemology, opposed it in compulsively reiterated avowals 
of the noumenality of cognitive objects, he meant to demonstrate that subjective positivism is conspiring with the 
powers that be.” Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 205-206. This is further borne out in a lecture, dated 17 January 1963, 
where Adorno describes “the big book by Lenin about ‘Empirio-Criticism’, which through a sort of dogmatic 
repetition declares the objective reality of the world vis-à-vis its reduction to subjective givens.” Theodor W. 
Adorno, Philosophische Terminologie, Bd. 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974), 200 [My translation] 
13 Ibid, 203 [My emphasis] Despite his misgivings about the concept of Utopia, Jacques Derrida’s discussion of the 
forfeiture of the emancipatory impulse underlying Marx’s thought (especially in the context of Francis Fukuyama’s 
declaration of ‘the end of history’ in 1989) appears to chime with Adorno’s considerations. Cf. Jacques Derrida, 
Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf 
(London: Verso, 1993) 
14 Ibid, 10 [Translation altered] 
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relationship between ‘man’ and ‘nature’ in the administered world. Accordingly, elaborating a 
concept of materialism means not least a “reinterpretation of the meaning of ‘thinking’ itself”,15 
albeit not without certain caveats. For what can we really say about a “cognition that neither 
merely depicts nor constitutes things – how is it to be thought?”16 This query raised by Adorno’s 
erstwhile student Alfred Schmidt concerns precisely the requisite conditions for articulating a 
mode of materialist cognition that staves off the sacrificial logic which Adorno associates with 
‘identity thinking’. The leitmotif of this effort is the ‘theological ban on images’; its locus is the 
moment when materialism and theology come to ‘agree’. But what is the nature of this 
agreement? In other words, “[h]ow can a materialist prohibition against images be enunciated” 
without transgressing against itself?17 After all, the ‘Utopia’ intended by Adorno’s ‘imageless’ 
materialism – “harmony between man and nature”, as Schmidt puts it – is itself subject to the ban 
on images.18 As he insists, “one may not cast a picture of Utopia in a positive manner”; “one can 
only talk about Utopia in a negative way”.19 To form any image of Utopia is to predetermine it 
from the standpoint of the present situation and thus “to garnish the status quo with its ultimate 
apologia.”20 How, then, are we to make sense of Adorno’s utopianism with respect to the two 
outwardly incongruent motifs under investigation: materialism and the image ban? 
In order to answer these questions we must clarify two issues: firstly, what does Adorno 
mean when he speaks of ‘materialism’? And secondly, what prompts him to invoke the 
‘theological ban on images’ in the course of elaborating his views? Accordingly, the first part of 
this chapter aims to contextualise these efforts by considering the following: i.) What does 
Adorno mean by the mode of ‘representational thinking’ that he attacks in ‘Materialism 
Imageless’? ii.) In what terms does he criticise this intellectual modality? iii.) How do his 
criticisms apply to certain recent developments in philosophical materialism, particularly those 
collected under the banner of ‘Speculative Realism’ – a current whose precepts have frequently 
been likened to those of dialectical materialism? What does this say about the actuality of 
Adorno’s thought? 
                                                
15 Jarvis, “Adorno, Marx, Materialism”, 97 
16 Alfred Schmidt, “Der Begriff des Materialismus bei Adorno”, in Adorno Konferenz 1983, eds. Ludwig v. 
Friedenburg, & Jürgen Habermas (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984), 25 [My translation] 
17 Comay, “Materialist Mutations of the Bilderverbot”, 342 
18 Schmidt, “Der Begriff des Materialismus bei Adorno”, 25 [My translation] 
19 Theodor W. Adorno & Ernst Bloch, “Something’s Missing: A Discussion between Ernst Bloch and Theodor W. 
Adorno on the Contradictions of Utopian Longing (1964)”, in The Utopian Function of Art and Literature, trans. 
Jack Zipes & Frank Mecklenburg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), 9 
20 Comay, “Materialist Mutations of the Bilderverbot”, 348 
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Having thus laid the contextual grounds for our subsequent discussion, the second part of 
this chapter considers two central questions: i.) What is the relationship between the entwined 
concepts of ‘image’ and ‘imagelessness’ that Adorno’s criticisms yield? (After all, the notion of 
an image ban presupposes a conception of the image.) ii.) What are the somatic, affective and 
rhetorical features of the ‘imageless’ materialism that is thrown into relief by Adorno’s objections 
to Lenin et al? By considering these questions I aim to discern the contours of Adorno’s concept 
of materialism under the aegis of the image ban with a view to weighing it up against both his 
‘inverse theology’ and his aesthetic theory in subsequent chapters. All the while, the goal is to 
illuminate the critical impetus that motivates Adorno’s singular recourse to an Old Testament 
motif in the elaboration of his critical theory. 
 
I: Adorno & Materialism 
 
i.) The Theory of Reflection: 
 
We have suggested above that in ‘Materialism Imageless’ Adorno’s intimation of the ‘theological 
ban on images’ follows from a critique of what he describes laconically as ‘representational 
thinking’. Citing Adorno’s references to Lenin, we asserted that such a mode of thinking refers – 
above all – to certain theories of reflection that gained traction during the early part of the 20th 
century as part of the official Soviet codification of Marx’s critique of political economy. 
Although we will find that the origins of reflection theory can be traced back to Pre-Socratic and 
Hellenic Atomism, its specifically Soviet variants are couched in a self-avowedly scientific 
materialist worldview (complete with a fully-fledged epistemology) which is derived largely 
from Friedrich Engels’ particular portrayal of his and Marx’s common efforts laid out in works 
including Anti-Dühring (1878), Dialectics of Nature (1883) and Ludwig Feuerbach and the End 
of Classical German Philosophy (1886).21 Without presuming to summarise the sense in which 
early Marx-reception depends on certain tropes that are distinctly Engels’ own – a task that is, in 
any case, tangential inasmuch as Adorno appears to have only a passing familiarity with these 
                                                
21 It goes beyond the remit of the present chapter to outline the differences between Marx and Engels’ respective 
approaches. Suffice it to note that the identity of their positions was assumed by many Soviet readers, not least 
amongst them Lenin. An important discussion of this theme can be found in the doctoral thesis of Alfred Schmidt, 
which was written under the supervision of Adorno and Horkheimer. Cf. Alfred Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in 
Marx, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: New Left Books, 1971) 
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texts – the present effort to unpack the concept of an ‘imageless’ materialism must nonetheless 
take stock of at least some characteristic features of the “traditional Marxism” that gives rise to 
the aforementioned theories of reflection, if only to establish them as a foil for our subsequent 
discussion.22 As will become apparent, Adorno’s conceit is that his critique of such a ‘Marxism’ 
brings into focus the proper object of historical materialism: the alleviation of bodily suffering. In 
order to grasp this, though, we must begin by considering the following: a.) What are the 
epistemological precepts of Engels’ concept of materialism? b.) In what sense does Lenin 
elaborate a theory of reflection on the basis of Engels’ views? 
 
a.) In the present context the salient point regarding Engels’ concept of materialism is twofold: 
firstly, the characterisation of his and Marx’s project – taken up in different ways by figureheads 
of the Second Socialist International (e.g. Karl Kautsky, Eduard Bernstein), on the one hand, and 
leading Bolsheviks (e.g. Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin), on the other – yields a “general law of 
development of nature, society, and thought” which is essentially ontological.23 That is to say, in 
Dialectics of Nature Engels postulates a general correspondence between socio-political, 
philosophical and natural processes whose significance for the development of ‘traditional 
Marxism’ can hardly be overstated: “what is valid for nature” – the material world as such – 
“must also be valid for history”; “[p]olitical praxis is (…) the consummation of historical” and – 
by extension – natural “laws”.24 Broadly speaking, then, Engels’ construct depends on a reversal 
of G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophy of nature.25 That is to say, Engels follows Hegel in portraying the 
dialectic as the fundamental ‘law’ of nature, whilst refusing this law’s deduction from 
philosophical first principles, i.e. its subjective anchoring. Whereas the dialectic is believed to be 
at work “in the external world”, it is supposed to be merely “mirrored by human thought”.26 As 
Ingo Elbe explains, for Engels the ‘law’ of the dialectic is thus “split into ‘two sets of laws’”: into 
“the dialectic of ‘the external world’”, on the one hand, “and the dialectic of ‘human thought’”, 
on the other.27 The latter is thus understood to provide “merely a passive mental image of the 
                                                
22 Ingo Elbe, “Between Marx, Marxism and Marxisms – Ways of Reading Marx’s Theory”, Viewpoint Mag, last 
altered October 2013, accessed 20/10/2015: https://viewpointmag.com/2013/10/21/between-marx-marxism-and-
marxisms-ways-of-reading-marxs-theory/#rf43-2941 [My emphasis] 
23 Friedrich Engels, Dialectics of Nature, trans. Clemens Dutt (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1940), 34 
24 Ingo Elbe, “Between Marx, Marxism and Marxisms – Ways of Reading Marx’s Theory”  
25 Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Nature, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 
26 J.B.S. Haldane “Preface”, in Friedrich Engels, Dialectics of Nature, vii [My emphasis] 
27 Ingo Elbe, “Between Marx, Marxism and Marxisms – Ways of Reading Marx’s Theory” 
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former”, rather than acting as its active arbitrator.28 Engels fleshes out this claim in a letter to his 
friend Conrad Schmidt, dated 01 November 1891: “[t]he inversion of the dialectic in Hegel rests 
on this, that it is supposed to be the ‘self-development of thought’, of which the dialectic of facts 
is (…) only a reflection, whereas the dialectic in our heads is in reality the reflection of the actual 
development going on in the world of nature and of human history in obedience to dialectical 
forms.”29 By dislodging the dialectic from ‘human thought’ and locating it in the ‘external world’, 
Engels purports to place its locus in matter itself. He thus “‘applies’ Hegelian categories to” e.g. 
“the biological concept of the cell” in order to demonstrate their operation in nature – an 
operation for which empirical science is, in turn, supposed to offer tangible proofs.30 Engels thus 
suggests that Hegel’s dialectic is marked by a simple mind-matter dichotomy that is unduly 
weighted in favour of thought. Undoing this supposed confusion means chiefly a reversal of these 
terms – putting the dialectic back on its feet. Sidestepping for a moment the sense in which this 
reading underestimates the tensions between ‘thought’ and ‘matter’ – subject and object – in the 
Hegelian dialectic, Engels’ contention appears to be two-pronged: on the one hand, he aims to 
demonstrate the interconnectedness of all fields of intellectual inquiry (philosophy, political 
economy and the natural sciences are all seen as evincing the same historical tendency whose law 
is supposed to be dialectical in the materialist sense described above); on the other hand, this 
unifying endeavour is thought to put his political project on a firm footing – the authoritative 
ground of empirical science. 
However, the consequence of this scheme escapes Engels’ intentions. His view that ‘the 
dialectic in our heads’ is merely a ‘reflection of the actual development going on in the world’, 
tends to portray man as a mere “product of evolution and a passive reflection of the process of 
nature, not however as a productive force”.31 This occurs at the expense of Engels’ foremost 
concern – the affirmation of praxis – a point that is at odds with the declared intentions of older 
works, such as Marx’s famous ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ (1845). After all, the ‘Theses’ open with 
the well known estimation that “[t]he chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism (…) is” 
precisely that “the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of 
                                                
28 Ibid 
29 Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, Selected Correspondence (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 520 
30 Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, 52 [My emphasis] 
31 Ibid, 55-56 [My emphasis] 
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contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively.”32 Might it not be 
said, then, that Engels’ later judgement that “the dialectical laws are really laws of the 
development of nature” leaves little room for such ‘activity’?33 Does his argument not entail that 
the ‘external world’ appears as a mere fact, a rigid ontological system wherein man is “limited to 
a mere mirroring of the factual”, i.e. the “uncritical reproduction of existing relationships in 
consciousness”?34 
 We will return to this point in due course. For now let us note that – secondly – Engels’ 
assertion that history is coterminous with certain natural processes, and that man merely mirrors 
these parallels in consciousness, leads him to unwittingly endorse a form of historical 
determinism. That is to say, if in Engels’ view the natural sciences prove that the dialectic lies ‘in 
the external world’ – e.g. in the development of cells – and history as such is presented as the 
analogue of this process; if man, in turn, merely ‘mirrors’ these developments in consciousness at 
the expense of any sense of praxis, then it follows that history is imbued with a sense of 
inevitability. A deterministic concept of development thus comes to occupy a central place in 
“Marxist doctrine”.35 On this reading, socialism is effectively hypostatised as the inevitable telos 
of history. 36  Accordingly, the broadly neo-Kantian evolutionism of Social Democrats like 
Bernstein faces a similar theoretical impasse as the revolutionary materialism of Lenin, despite 
their well-documented differences. Leaving these entanglements to one side, it warrants 
emphasising only the following: if we agree to the terms of this reconstruction, then the mode of 
‘representational thinking’ derided by Adorno appears to mean precisely the epistemological 
precepts of Engels’ materialist dialectic, which are – in turn – taken up and elaborated by Lenin. 
The question thus arises as to what the consequences are of arguing that dialectics lies in things 
and that man merely mirrors their seemingly inevitable developments in consciousness. 
 
b.) In order to answer this question we must briefly sketch the outlines of the argument laid out in 
Lenin’s Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1908). Accordingly we should note that Lenin’s 
book was written in the wake of the failed revolution of 1905. It is couched in a string of factional 
                                                
32 Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, “Theses on Feuerbach”, in Marx & Engels Collected Works, Vol. 5: 1845-
1847 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1976), 3 
33 Engels, Dialectics of Nature, 27 
34 Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, 56 
35 Ingo Elbe, “Between Marx, Marxism and Marxisms – Ways of Reading Marx’s Theory” [My emphasis] 
36 As Adorno sarcastically observes, “in the mightiest, most differentiated didactic edifices of dialectical materialism, 
a conception of the world is developed in which hunger, fear and self-denial actually cannot exist”. Adorno, 
Philosophische Terminologie, Bd. 2, 179 [My translation and emphasis] 
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debates within the Bolshevik Party, which ostensibly concern certain developments in the natural 
sciences. The backdrop to this intra-Bolshevik conflict is the prevalent sense that a “crisis” has 
occurred in modern physics that threatens the primacy of ‘matter’, which – in Lenin’s view – 
ensures the very grounding of materialism.37 Above all, the discovery of radioactivity is supposed 
to have led to a widespread rejection amongst both physicist and philosophers “of an objective 
reality existing outside the mind”; a sentiment that – in turn – provokes “the replacement of 
materialism” (at least as Lenin sees it) “by idealism and agnosticism”:38 a relapse of scientific 
Marxism into bourgeois complacency. Without wishing to reconstruct the intricacies of these 
debates, it suffices to note that Lenin’s misgivings are directed chiefly at Alexander Bogdanov’s 
major three-volume work Empirio-Monism (1904-1906), which for its part draws extensively on 
theories developed by the Austrian physicist Ernst Mach.39 In brief: if Mach argues that physics 
proceeds not from the study of ‘matter’, but rather from the study of sense-experience – “[n]ot 
bodies produce sensations, but element-complexes (sensation-complexes) constitute the bodies”40 
– then Bogdanov’s effort to ensure the scientific grounding of Marxism must be understood along 
similar lines. Like Mach, “Bogdanov espoused a strict empiricism and denied the possibility of a 
priori knowledge of any sort at all”.41 Instead, he “defined reality in terms of experience: The real 
world is identical with human experience of it.”42 Bogdanov’s specifically Marxist manoeuvre, 
then, is to recast the individual experiences described by Mach into those of a collective subject, 
namely: the proletarian class itself. As he contends, “[t]he basis of ‘objectivity’ must lie” not in 
matter, but “in the sphere of collective experience”.43 That is, “[t]he objective character of the 
physical world consists in the fact that it exists not for me individually but for everyone, and for 
everyone has a definite meaning, exactly (…) as it does for me.”44 Accordingly, knowledge of the 
external world – and, moreover, the ability to change it – is not based on the merely subjective 
                                                
37  Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14: Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (Moscow: Foreign 
Languages Publishing House, 1961), 252 
38 Ibid, 258 
39 Mach’s presence at this juncture opens up another possible avenue of inquiry in connection with the so-called 
‘imageless thought controversy’ surrounding Oswald Külpe – a psychologist whose theories drew extensively on 
both Mach and Husserl. However, given our present focus we must sidestep this issue here. Cf. Oswald Külpe, 
Outlines of Psychology, Based Upon the Result of Experimental Investigation, trans. Edward Bradford Titchener 
(London: Swann, Sonnenschein & Co., 1901) 
40 Ernst Mach, The Analysis of Sensations and the Relation of the Physical to the Psychical, trans. C.M. Williams & 
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whims of individuals. Rather, “‘[r]eality’ is made up of the shared perceptions of the collective 
consciousness of a society.”45 
Despite the prominent invocation of a proletarian consciousness, Lenin charges that 
Bogdanov’s idiosyncratic adaptation of Mach cannot escape its rooting in a fundamentally 
subject-centred outlook. Accordingly, the prioritisation of sense-experience is said to displace the 
primacy of mind-independent matter. The political consequence of this displacement is taken to 
mean that the materialist imperative to political praxis is transformed into an academic exercise, 
which Lenin associates with bourgeois quietism. To bolster this claim, Lenin outlines a highly 
polemical account of the history of philosophy in terms of a dichotomy between ‘idealism’ and 
‘materialism’. In a characteristically sweeping gesture, he charges that “the idealism and 
agnosticism which characterized not only the Russian Machists but also Berkeley and Kant was 
the result of an (…) erroneous philosophical decision by all of them to adopt an empiricist 
epistemology.”46 That is to say, the purportedly bourgeois “belief that our knowledge of the world 
is constructed out of a field of sense-data resulted in this sense-data becoming an insuperable 
barrier between human consciousness and the external world”.47 This ‘belief’ in turn gives rise to 
all manner of sceptical attitudes that forestall political action by effectively prioritising mind over 
matter. The glaring fallaciousness of Lenin’s identification of Mach with Kant and Berkeley 
hardly needs pointing out. Suffice it to note that all the while his aim is to defend a broadly 
Engelsian concept of materialism in the face of the supposed threat posed to it by the ‘crisis’ in 
modern physics. It is the character of this defence that interests us here. If the ‘insuperable 
barrier’ between ‘human consciousness’ and ‘the external world’ is the consequence of an 
‘erroneous … decision’ to ‘adopt’ certain allegedly quietistic forms of ‘empiricism’, then any 
effort to defend the concept of ‘matter’ requires – above all – an alternative epistemology. 
Significantly, Lenin provides this by way of a theory of reflection. How so? 
In Lenin’s estimation, “sensation”, rather than ‘constituting bodies’, appears as “the direct 
connection between consciousness and the external world.”48 The world is above all material and 
consciousness is determined by it, not vice versa. Sense data is said to mirror the world as-it-
really-is existing independently of and external to consciousness. Accordingly, Lenin argues that 
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“sensation, perception, idea, and the mind of man generally” are to be regarded “as an image of 
objective reality”.49 As far as Lenin is concerned, this framework guarantees the simple primacy 
of matter over ideas: “consciousness is only an image of the external world, and it is obvious that 
an image cannot exist without the thing imaged, and that the latter exists independently of that 
which images it.”50 The proof that these images are bearers of objective truth is supposed to be 
provided by scientific experimentation, the analogue of which is seen as political praxis – a claim 
that is left largely unsubstantiated. Accordingly Lenin appears to contradict himself when he 
contends that “[i]t is absolutely unpardonable to confuse, as the Machists do, any particular 
theory of the structure of matter with the epistemological category” of matter itself.51 But if no 
‘particular theory’ can pose a challenge to ‘matter’ as an ‘epistemological category’, then ‘matter’ 
itself – along with the revolutionary politics that it supposedly ensures – is dogmatically elevated 
to an unhistorical invariant. As Lance Byron Richey observes: 
 
In effect, Lenin is responding to the revolution which occurred in modern physics around the turn of 
the last century and the challenge it posed to traditional materialism by separating out the scientific 
and theory-laden features of it (…) and retaining only the philosophical content of it. The result is a 
conception of matter stripped of any specific theoretical content and instead assigned the 
philosophical task of guaranteeing the extra-mental reference of our mental concepts.52 
 
It cannot presently be our task to reconstruct the sense in which the traditional view of matter 
does in fact become defunct in modern physics, albeit not in the way that Lenin outlines. Nor can 
it be our task to determine in what ways this development may or may not complicate the 
scientific self-understanding of Marx’s theories and their reception.53 Suffice it to note that 
insofar as Lenin’s view of matter is apparently immune to any scientific contestation, his effort to 
escape the trappings of idealism runs the danger of underwriting (rather than refuting) the 
positions he rallies against: “so much the worse for the facts”.54 But if Adorno claims that these 
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ostensibly theoretical problems have far-reaching political consequences – what kind of 
‘Marxism’ is conceivable on the basis of Lenin’s materialism? – then the precise nature of his 
criticism warrants further investigation. 
 
ii.) Adorno’s Critique of Reflection Theory: 
 
We have suggested, then, that in ‘Materialism Imageless’ Adorno criticises the official materialist 
doctrines of the ‘Eastern Countries’ by charging that certain “deficiencies” in their 
epistemological frameworks – e.g. their elevation of matter to an ontological invariant – are used 
to justify a political configuration where, “on the threadbare pretext of a dictatorship (…) of the 
proletariat (…), governmental terror machines entrench themselves as permanent institutions” 
thus “mocking the theory they carry on their lips.”55 Rather than “going in for epistemology”, 
Adorno charges that Lenin’s “political requirements turned him against the goal of theoretical 
cognition” with the “disastrous result” that “the unpenetrated target of criticism remains 
undisturbed (…) and not being hit at all (…) can be resurrected at will in changed constellations 
of power.”56 Adorno thus asserts that Lenin tends to unwittingly reproduce the imperialism of 
spirit that he seeks to refute in a view of reality as seamlessly causal-mechanical. However, this 
view is open to criticism on at least two points. Firstly, it might be argued that Adorno’s rejoinder 
to Materialism and Empirio-Criticism is no less glib than Lenin’s retort to Bogdanov. If 
Adorno’s point will be that dialectical materialism rests on an unacknowledged metaphysical 
basis which curtails the particularity of matter, then the lack of differentiation with which he 
treats Lenin’s admittedly problematic book is somewhat alarming. Secondly, it is not clear that 
bad politics necessarily follow from bad philosophy. If Adorno’s objection to Lenin hinges on the 
claim that Materialism and Empirio-Criticism is insufficiently dialectical, then it is unclear how 
postulating an immediate causal relation between theory and praxis is supposed to remedy this 
problem. Nevertheless, we note the following: if, as we suggested, Adorno’s critique of 
‘representational thinking’ throws into relief the contours of his own conception of materialism – 
a point to which we will turn in due course – then we must begin by clarifying two points: a.) In 
what sense does Adorno pit Hegel against Lenin by playing on the ambiguity of the ‘reflection’ in 
‘reflection theory’? b.) In what sense does Adorno liken Lenin’s ‘reflection theory’ to Pre-
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Socratic/Hellenic Atomism? 
 
a.) To the extent that Adorno’s polemic appears to be directed at the epistemological precepts of 
Lenin’s Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, his play on the ambiguity of the term ‘reflection’ 
(Reflexion) takes on a particular significance. As we have seen above, Adorno writes that 
‘representational thinking would be without reflection – an undialectical contradiction, for 
without reflection there is no theory’. The equivocality of this term is fortuitously captured by the 
translation of the German Reflexionstheorie as ‘reflection theory’. After all, the term ‘reflection’ 
connotes both mirroring and thinking in English and German alike. On the one hand, then, we 
have already noted that for Engels and Lenin ‘reflection’ principally means the imagistic 
reproduction of reality in the mind, which is – in turn – said to affirm the unshakable primacy of 
the material world as existing independently of and external to consciousness. (It is telling that 
Adorno appears to associate Lenin’s reflections with idols and fetishes. As he argues, “[w]hat 
clings to the image remains idolatry, mythic enthrallment.”57 By extension, he appears to identify 
the image ban with the monotheistic injunction against idol worship: “[d]emythologisation, the 
thought’s enlightening intent, deletes the image character of consciousness.”)58 On the other hand, 
Adorno means a mode of theoretical ‘reflection’, which he somewhat imprudently associates with 
Hegel.59 As he writes, “[d]ialectics is a moving-through-contradictions. Without the moment of 
reflection, i.e. without the moment when a thing appears in its otherness (…) dialectics is in fact 
unthinkable.”60 This association is ill advised because, as Adorno knows full well, Hegel connects 
the term ‘reflection’ with certain perceived shortcomings in the philosophies of Kant and Fichte. 
‘Reflection’ is on the side of the Understanding, which is thought to have no purchase on the 
absolute. 61 In spite of this apparent misreading, though, Adorno’s attempt to marshal Hegel 
against Lenin rightly locates the ‘deficiency’ of Soviet materialism in its fraught relation to 
German Idealism. In order to grasp the full weight of this claim, however, we must briefly 
consider it in light of the epistemological framework underlying Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
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(1806), if only because Adorno explicitly invokes this text against the notion of ‘representational 
thinking’.62 
Without presuming to detail the enormous scope of Hegel’s propaedeutic effort to outline a 
“science of the experience of consciousness”,63 our present focus requires that we note the 
following: Hegel’s Phenomenology starts out by critically recasting the notion of cognition laid 
out in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787). Hegel describes Kant’s outlook as a kind of 
“natural assumption”:64 before one can start to deal with philosophy’s “proper subject matter one 
must first of all come to an understanding about cognition (…) either as the instrument to get 
hold of the absolute, or as the medium through which one discovers it.”65 Hegel rejects this view 
on two counts: firstly, he argues that Kant’s effort to delimit the conditions of possibility and the 
limits of legitimacy of cognition before cognising, so to speak, is akin to the absurd attempt to 
learn how to swim without getting into the water;66 secondly, he argues that Kant’s “fear of 
falling into error” leads him to falsely distinguish “between ourselves and (…) our cognition”.67 
Instead, Hegel suggests that consciousness is co-extensive with cognition and that its truth is 
attained processually. Significantly for our purposes, Adorno appears to view reflection as the 
motor of this process. Accordingly, he portrays phenomenology as the de-familiarisation of 
certain established modes of cognition through reflection. He acknowledges that Sense-Certainty, 
Perception, Understanding, etc. are partial articulations of what is ultimately recouped as absolute 
knowing, absolute cognition; that the progression through these stages follows from 
consciousness discovering the immanent limitations of each of its shapes. Upon reflection – 
Adorno suggests – the simple ‘here and now’ of Sense-Certainty, for instance, is revealed to be 
an empty universal, which contradicts its claim to be cognisant of a given particular. In turn, this 
contradiction forces consciousness into motion so that this incongruity might be overcome. 
Consciousness thus encounters itself as though it were looking in a mirror. This dialectical drive, 
conceived of as the reflexive movement of consciousness through contradiction, produces a series 
of shapes-of-consciousness whose sum appears as the history of its education to the standpoint of 
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science.  
Despite Adorno’s somewhat tendentious use of Hegel, his invocation of the 
Phenomenology helps to clarify his objections to the proponents of ‘representational thinking’. 
Broadly speaking, his criticism hinges on the claim that Lenin’s theory of reflection corresponds 
to Hegel’s description of Sense-Certainty – a naïve mirroring of purportedly objective reality in 
the senses: ‘this’, ‘here’, ‘now’. By disavowing Hegel’s supposed emphasis on reflection, 
however, Adorno suggests that Lenin cannot move forward from this stage. Accordingly, 
‘reflection theory’ is – in fact – ‘without reflection’ and, indeed, without dialectics. That is, 
Adorno pits Hegel against Lenin by arguing that whilst “[d]ialectics lies in things” (he is a 
materialist after all) “it could not exist without a consciousness that reflects it”. 68  Since 
contradiction – the antithetical moment in all dialectics – can only be reflected within 
consciousness, “the moment of subjectivity or reflection cannot be taken out of the dialectic. 
Where this does nonetheless happen” – as in Lenin’s Engelsian reading of Hegel – “the 
philosophical grounds for a transition to a state-religion are laid, wherein we can observe with 
horror the deterioration of dialectical theory.”69 That is to say, “[w]hat is not reflected in itself 
does not know contradiction” and insofar is it ‘does not know contradiction’, it is eminently un-
dialectical.70 Adorno continues: “the perversion of dialectical materialism into the state religion of 
Russia is theoretically based on the defamation of that element as idealistic.”71 (The proliferation 
of religious metaphors is decisive here. The idolatrous ‘images’ of Lenin’s reflection theory are 
worshipped at the altar of Russia’s ‘state religion’ – an image that further conjures the personality 
cult surrounding Lenin.) Adorno’s critique of Lenin, then, seeks to highlight the inadequacy of 
‘reflection’ through ‘reflection’, i.e. meta-critically. That is to say: on Adorno’s reading, there is a 
materialist moment to Hegel’s Speculative Idealism and hence to the ‘bourgeois’ subjectivity that 
Lenin seeks to disavow. But what does this say about the purported ‘risk that supposedly 
materialist thinking will involuntarily turn into its opposite’? In order to answer this question we 
must turn to the second aspect of Adorno’s plaint: his identification of Soviet materialism with 
Pre-Socratic/Hellenic Atomism. 
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b.) Having thus determined the sense in which Adorno’s critique of ‘reflection theory’ plays on 
the ambiguity of the term ‘reflection’, it is worth calling to mind that – in a second step – he 
likens the epistemological precepts of Lenin’s dialectical materialism to those of Pre-Socratic and 
Hellenic Atomism, particularly as advanced by Democritus and Epicurus. Adorno argues as 
follows: ‘reflection theory’ is rooted in “an Epicurean-style materialist mythology, which invents 
the emission by matter of little images”.72 The “naïve replica-realism” of Leninist epistemology is 
thus said to depend on a “materialist metaphysics, such as that advanced by antique 
Epicureanism, with its thesis that we continually receive little images from matter”.73 In turn, this 
‘thesis’ raises questions about how “matter, which was previously characterised as wholly 
without soul or spirit, i.e. causal-mechanical material in the sense of Democritus comes to emit 
such images in the first place?”74 Notwithstanding the fact that Adorno’s analogy appears in a 
kind of philosophical shorthand, what interests us here is how the alignment of Moscow and 
Athens allows him to expose certain unacknowledged metaphysical presuppositions that underlie 
Lenin’s purportedly scientific mode of ‘representational thinking’. 
In his lecture series on Philosophical Terminology (1963) Adorno outlines a highly 
condensed history of materialism, which includes some notable passages on Atomism.75 Herein 
he traces a development leading from Democritus’ Pre-Socratic effort to “fixate the essence of 
matter” to Epicurus’ Hellenic “attempt to establish a materialism solely on the basis of 
experience”.76 Adorno highlights two aspects of this progression: on the one hand, he follows 
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Friedrich Albert Lange in arguing that “we have every reason to suppose that many features of 
the Epikurean Atomism (…) are due to Demokritos”.77 That is, insofar as Democritus’ “whole 
philosophy was finally absorbed by Epikuros”,78 the two are de facto interchangeable.  On the 
other hand, he distinguishes between Epicurus’ alleged “anti-scientism”79 – his eudemonic 
commitment to bodily pleasure – and Democritus’ “fully formed scientific system”.80 (The 
significance of this discontinuity will become apparent in due course.) To begin with, however, 
Adorno describes the sense in which Democritus divides the physical universe into two 
distinctive realms: ‘atoms’ and ‘void’. Atoms (from the Greek atomos: ‘indivisible’) are the 
irreducible building blocks of all material entities, a sentiment that is expressed in the thesis that 
‘nothing arises out of nothing’, i.e. that “nothing that is can be destroyed”; that “[a]ll change is 
only combination and separation of atoms.”81 In turn, atoms are said to move through space, 
which is conceived of as an infinite void. (As Lange puts it, “[n]othing exists but atoms and 
empty space: all else is only opinion.”)82 Over the course of their movements, then, atoms either 
repel one another or combine into groups that ultimately constitute objects, which is to say that 
“[n]othing happens by chance, but everything through a cause and of necessity.” 83  Once 
constituted, the continual movements of atoms cause these objects to change, thus accounting for 
phenomena such as growth, decay, etc. In other words, “[t]he variety of all things is a 
consequence of the variety of their atoms in number, size, figure and arrangement; there is no 
qualitative difference of atoms.”84 Against this backdrop the Epicurean theory of perception 
comes into focus. As Adorno reports, in Epicurus’ view all matter continually emits “fine 
particles”, which are absorbed by our sense organs.85 The origin of our sense impressions – 
“mental images” – is thus due to a constant flow of such particles from the surface of material 
bodies.86 As Lange expounds, it is thus that “actual material copies of things” are said to “enter 
into us.”87 Accordingly, it is the impact of these particles on our sense organs that enables us to 
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perceive the ‘images’ sent out by matter. But in what sense does Adorno deem this outlook to be 
coextensive with Lenin’s theory of reflection? 
The answer to this question hinges on the sense in which Adorno differentiates between 
Democritus and Epicurus. As he argues, in Epicurus “the moment of sensory perception is far 
more forcefully accentuated than in Democritus”.88 It alone is presented as the “true source of 
cognition”; relative to it “[s]pirit is (…) something thoroughly derivative, dependent, 
secondary.”89 That is to say, “sensory perception and” – indeed – “sensory pleasure have a much 
greater status” in Epicureanism than in the “objectively oriented” natural-scientific model that 
typifies “Democritean materialism”.90 However, insofar as Lange notes that Epicurus takes up his 
forerunner’s Atomism part and parcel, he is caught in a contradiction. Accordingly, Adorno asks: 
how is it possible “to simultaneously teach the being-in-itself of nature as something independent 
of us, whilst assuming that our sensory perception is the source of all cognition?”91 In order to 
square this contradiction, we are told, “Epicurus is forced to posit a metaphysical thesis, which is 
irreconcilable with Materialism’s denial of metaphysics”,92 namely: that matter, ‘which was 
previously characterised as wholly without soul or spirit, i.e. causal-mechanical material in the 
sense of Democritus’ emits images, whose truth is verified by sensory experience. The 
convergence with Leninist reflection theory is thus characterised as follows: 
 
This reflection theory, then, played a significant role in the history of Marxist materialism. To this 
day it lives on in the form of DIAMAT reflection theory, according to which theory is supposed to 
be an image of reality, regardless of the fact that whilst the spiritual and intentional may be directed 
at particular states of affairs – it may mean them, make judgements about them – it does not 
resemble them (…) imagistically.93 
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Finally, then, the critique of ‘representational thinking’ that we have sought to elucidate begins to 
take shape. As Adorno argues, Lenin’s theory of reflection reproduces precisely those meta-
physical presuppositions that it seeks to recant by assigning an extra-physical quality to 
ostensibly disenchanted matter. By positing the mysterious ability of mind-independent bodies to 
emit ‘little images’, whose truthfulness is confirmed through sensory reflection; by elevating this 
reality to the status of an unalterable philosophical principle and by asserting this principle as the 
guarantor of revolutionary praxis, Lenin’s concept of materialism succumbs to the very 
“metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties” that it aims to overcome.94 That is to say, Lenin 
fetishises matter by imbuing it with life-like qualities, whilst simultaneously reifying man by 
turning him into a passive object: a reflecting mirror. It follows that if the official materialist 
doctrines of the so-called ‘East’ aid the ‘uncritical reproduction of existing relationships in 
consciousness’, then the kind of ‘Marxism’ that these doctrines serve to ground is not only 
theoretically deficient but also politically bankrupt. (At least this is Adorno’s claim.) 
Accordingly, Adorno contends that Lenin’s trans-historical metaphysics of matter embeds man in 
a system of seamlessly determined nature that belies “the possibility of freedom, whilst” 
paradoxically “speaking at the same time of spontaneous action, even revolution.”95 Wherever 
materialism consigns itself to affirming such a total order of blind nature, it betrays its 
emancipatory intention – a failure that has everything to do with the image-character of thought. 
It remains for us to consider how this tendency lives on in certain contemporary schools of 
thought, particularly those grouped under the name of ‘Speculative Realism’. 
 
iii.) Speculative Realism: 
 
Having thus sketched the outlines of Adorno’s misgivings about Lenin’s mode of 
‘representational thinking’, it remains to explore how his opposition reverberates today – 25 years 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, we must account for how certain 
characteristics of Lenin’s philosophy (rather than, say, his party-political activity) recur – 
conspicuously and problematically – in the context of a more recent intellectual current, namely: 
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the programme for a ‘Speculative Realism’96 laid out in Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude 
(2006).97 After all, it has repeatedly been pointed out that Meillassoux’s book “often sounds like a 
repetition of Lenin’s ill-famed Materialism and Empirio-Criticism”; that “After Finitude can 
effectively be read as Materialism and Empirio-Criticism rewritten for the twenty-first century”.98 
Before proceeding to interrogate this claim, however, it bears emphasising that Lenin’s spectral 
presence at this juncture is revealing for at least two reasons: firstly, because it throws into relief 
the sense in which Meillassoux’s attempt to think mind-independent matter tacitly draws on an 
older model to delineate how a “transformative materialism” might be thought today;99 secondly, 
because if it is true that After Finitude seeks to “complete and correct the programme of Marxist 
philosophy undertaken by Lenin”100 – a point whose validity has yet to be demonstrated – then it 
follows that the kind of social and political change that is conceivable on this basis is covered by 
Adorno’s critique of dialectical materialism.101 Without wishing to speculate on Meillassoux’s 
express political commitments (neither Marx nor Lenin are named in After Finitude),102 the 
consequence of this peculiar convergence points back to our opening wager: that purportedly 
materialist thought tends to relapse into its opposite; that its theoretical deficiencies serve to 
ground an idolatrous “political creed”.103 Set against this backdrop, then, Adorno’s critique of 
Lenin et al yields its contemporary resonance, allowing us to approach his concept of an 
‘imageless’ materialism as more than a historical curio. In order to do so, however, we must 
begin by asking what is at stake in After Finitude. 
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Put briefly, Meillassoux’s claim is two-pronged: on the one hand, he argues that it is 
possible to gain determinate knowledge of absolute reality through philosophical speculation; on 
the other hand, he argues that it is possible to demonstrate the sense in which reality is radically 
contingent. “Nothing is necessary, apart from the necessity that nothing be necessary. Anything 
can happen, at any place and at any time, without reason or cause.”104 But if Meillassoux’s 
concern is with reality itself, then this does not mean thinking “about what is” so much as it 
means thinking about “what can be”:105 not ‘being’ (être) but ‘may-being’ (peut-être), as Peter 
Hallward observes. In other words, “[i]f Meillassoux can be described as a ‘realist’, then the 
reality that concerns him does not involve the way things are” – this is only a first step – “so 
much as the possibility that they might always be otherwise.” 106 Broadly speaking, then, 
Meillassoux expounds these theses in two steps: a.) Through a critique of what he calls 
‘correlationism’; b.) Through a radicalisation of what he describes as ‘Hume’s problem’. How 
so? 
 
a.) Meillassoux’s effort to demonstrate that we can know mind-independent matter depends on 
his objections to a central tenet of critical philosophy whereby “we only ever have access to the 
correlation between thinking and being” – subject and object – “and never to either term 
considered apart from the other”.107 In the main, Meillassoux argues that European philosophers 
since Kant mistakenly surmise that “anything (…) totally a-subjective cannot be”,108 since 
objectivity can only be construed on “the foundations of the cognition in which it is grounded”.109 
From Hegel to Heidegger, we are told, philosophy has univocally demanded various forms of 
mediation between thought and being. It is the defensibility of this relation – “whether it be 
clarified through logical judgement, phenomenological reduction, historical reflection, linguistic 
articulation, pragmatic experimentation or inter-subjective communication” – which supposedly 
determines the legitimacy of any present claim about reality.110 Meillassoux illustrates this 
predicament by citing the Preface to the second edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1787). 
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Herein Kant famously likens the endeavour of critical philosophy to “the first thoughts of 
Copernicus”:111 the so-called Copernican turn. Whereas, in Kant’s view, traditional metaphysics 
assumed that “our cognition must conform to objects” (the metaphorical analogue of the sun’s 
supposed revolution around the earth) we must now consider the reverse: that objects “conform to 
our cognition”,112 i.e. that the earth revolves around the sun. Without presuming to recount the 
intricacies of Kant’s first Critique in the form of an aside, the comparison with Copernicus is 
important because – as Meillassoux points out – it contains an awkward slippage. 
 
[I]t has become abundantly clear that a more fitting comparison for the Kantian revolution in 
thought would be to a ‘Ptolemaic counter-revolution’, given that what the former asserts is not that 
the observer whom we thought was motionless is in fact orbiting around the observed sun, but on 
the contrary, that the subject is central to the process of knowledge.113 
 
The point is clear: if Copernican heliocentrism places reality at the centre of intellectual inquiry, 
then Kant’s critical turn entails a geocentric ‘counter-revolution’, such that man becomes the 
measure of matter.114 Notwithstanding the bias of Meillassoux’s reading,115 his objection serves to 
frame the very question that he shares with Lenin: how can philosophy regain access to mind-
independent matter beyond its correlation with a thinking subject? In order to answer this 
question, Meillassoux proposes to complicate the Kantian picture by introducing the problem of 
‘ancestrality’, i.e. statements about events anterior to the emergence of any form of human 
consciousness. 116  Accordingly he asks: “[h]ow are we to grasp the meaning of scientific 
statements bearing explicitly upon a manifestation of the world that is posited as anterior to the 
emergence of thought and even of life – posited, that is, as anterior to every form of human 
relation to the world?”117 Put in Kantian terms: “how is one to legitimate the assertion that 
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something subsists beyond our representations when one has already insisted that this beyond is 
radically inaccessible to thought?”118 
Certainly, Meillassoux is not advocating a simple regression to pre-Kantian dogmatism. 
Rather, he seeks to “overcome the correlational obstacle to his acausal ontology” by showing that 
Kant’s “correlationist critique of metaphysical necessity itself enables (…) the speculative 
affirmation of non-necessity”.119 To this end Meillassoux enlists an unlikely ally – Hegel – whose 
critique of Kant he claims to turn against itself. As he argues, “instead of concluding that the in-
itself is unknowable”, Hegel transforms the correlation between thought and being into “the only 
veritable in-itself”.120 If Kant’s “instrument of empirico-critical de-absolutisation” becomes the 
“model for a new type of absolute”,121 then this has a double consequence. On the one hand, 
absolute knowledge is laudably reintroduced (we can know absolute reality); on the other hand, a 
slippage in the first Critique is retroactively illuminated. In turn, the correlation of thought and 
being itself is supposed to be exposed as a mere contingency. As Hallward explains: “the 
correlationist” – Kant – “in order to guard against idealist claims to knowledge of absolute 
reality” – Hegel – “accepts not only the reduction of knowledge to knowledge of facts” (that is, to 
knowledge of appearances within certain irreducible intellectual strictures); he also accepts that 
this ‘reduction’ itself is nothing but a fact amongst other facts: “another non-necessary 
contingency”.122 The point for Meillassoux is that “if such correlating reduction is not necessary 
then it is of course possible to envisage its suspension”.123 In other words, “the only way the 
correlationists can defend themselves against idealist absolutisation requires them to admit ‘the 
impossibility of giving an ultimate ground to the existence of any being’, including the 
impossibility of giving a ground for this impossibility.”124 It is in this tacit admission that 
Meillassoux locates the ‘affirmation of non-necessity’ on which his project hinges. Far from 
experiencing things-in-themselves as the limits of thought, he pronounces their ‘facticity’ as 
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knowledge of their absolute reality. But if Meillassoux thus circumscribes the existence of mind-
independent matter, then this raises the question as to how he proposes to know the sheer 
contingency of its modality. 
 
b.) In order to grasp this we must briefly consider the second aspect of the argument announced 
above, namely: Meillassoux’s radicalisation of ‘Hume’s problem’. As he recounts, Hume – in 
those sections of the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748) that contest the principle 
of sufficient reason – teaches that “any cause may actually produce any effect whatsoever, 
provided the latter is not contradictory.”125 In other words, “we may well be able to uncover the 
basic laws that govern the universe – but the cause that underlies those laws themselves, and 
which endows them with necessity, will remain inaccessible to us.”126 (This is another reason why 
the subject-object correlation in post-Kantian thought is presented as being ultimately arbitrary.) 
Meillassoux concedes Hume’s basic point but objects that he shies away from the full 
consequence of his insight. Instead of abandoning the idea of causal necessity, Hume simply 
consigns it to a realm beyond demonstration. In the end, he is thus said to “believe blindly in the 
world that metaphysicians thought they could prove.”127 By contrast, Meillassoux contends that 
the impossibility of rationally grounding the principle of sufficient reason – of demonstrating that 
things are as they are of necessity – in fact proves that there is no such reason or necessity at all. 
“Rather than try to salvage a dubious faith in the apparent stability of our experience” – 
Meillassoux speaks of fideism in this regard – “we should affirm the prospect that Hume refused 
to accept”: that “an infinite variety of ‘effects’ might emerge on the basis of no cause at all, in a 
pure eruption of novelty ex nihilo.”128 
Here a decisive difference between Meillassoux and Lenin comes into focus. Whereas 
Lenin holds that ordinary sense experience provides the ultimate proof of matter’s primacy – a 
primacy that, in turn, ensures the pre-eminence of transformative political praxis – Meillassoux 
argues that it is precisely the ‘stability’ of ordinary sense experience that prevents us from 
surrendering to the full consequence of absolute contingency: to transformation ‘ex nihilo’. 
Hallward describes this shift as follows: the “[c]onversion of Hume’s problem into Meillassoux’s 
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opportunity” requires a “deflation of experience and the senses”.129 It requires, in other words, 
“that thought must free itself from the fascination for the phenomenal fixity of laws, so as to 
accede to a purely intelligible Chaos capable of destroying and of producing, without reason, 
things and the laws which they obey.”130 That is to say, ‘intelligibility’ takes the place of 
‘phenomenal fixity’; ‘speculation’ takes the place of ‘reflection’.131 Meillassoux proceeds to 
buttress this point by reviving the ostensibly pre-critical notion of a purely ‘intelligible’ form of 
intuition so as to overturn the supposed strictures of Kant’s critical turn. He extrapolates from the 
Cartesian account of objective reality’s ‘primary qualities’, i.e. those aspects of matter – e.g. 
weight – that can be determined independently of its phenomenal appearance. But if Descartes 
conceives of these qualities in geometric terms – in terms of an object’s physical parameters – 
then Meillassoux goes one step further by isolating this mathematical aspect from extension 
altogether: “what is mathematically conceivable” – however hypothetical – “is absolutely 
possible.”132 In other words, the irrefutable reality of a mind-independent matter whose modality 
is utterly contingent is supposedly proven ex hypothesi through recourse to mathematics.133 But 
how does all this relate to Adorno’s critique of ‘representational thinking’? 
 
I take it that there are at least two aspects of Speculative Realism that resonate with the critique of 
‘Diamat’ outlined above: one regarding the locus of transformative agency in Meillassoux’s 
philosophy, the other regarding the tendency of After Finitude to relapse into idealism. How so? 
The first point concerns Meillassoux’s equivocation between meta-physical and physical 
necessity, that is, between “epistemology and ontology”. 134 We have already seen a version of 
this equivocation in Engels and Lenin’s view that the material world evinces a kind of dialectical-
developmental logic – that cells as much as societies necessarily evolve according to a historical 
dynamic that proceeds through overcoming internal contradictions, sublating them and carrying 
them forward into ever-higher degrees of articulation which are in turn mirrored by 
consciousness. By contrast, Meillassoux seems to invert this tendency by claiming to deduce the 
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absolute contingency of being by transposing Hume’s metaphysical repudiation of the principle 
of sufficient reason onto physical and natural laws. From this he infers that “there is no cause or 
reason for anything to be the way it is”, and that consequently the transformation of material 
conditions may be both absolute and instantaneous. 135  Although the consequence of the 
Engelsian-Leninist materialist dialectic is a strong form of historical necessity, whereas the 
outcome of Meillassoux’s speculative-realist deduction is an absolute form of contingency, both 
positions converge in mistaking metaphysical claims for binding natural-scientific models. But 
whereas the former over-determines the course of the historical dynamic that is supposed to 
follow from the identification of physics and metaphysics, the latter can provide no real account 
of what drives its process of transformation. Accordingly, Meillassoux – for his part – has no 
adequate substitute for what others have called “substance, or spirit, or power, or labour.”136 That 
is to say, “[h]is insistence that anything might happen” ex nihilo “can only amount to an 
insistence on the bare possibility of radical change.”137 If Meillassoux’s model is thus supposed to 
‘correct and complete’ the shortcomings of Engels and Lenin’s ontological determinism, then it is 
unclear how the strictures which the latter unwittingly impose on revolutionary praxis are 
supposed to be lifted by displacing the affirmation of matter from the domain of the sensual to 
that of the mathematical. Despite this shift of emphasis, Meillassoux ultimately faces the same 
problem as Engels and Lenin: by hypostatising a trans-historical metaphysics of matter – be it on 
the basis of sense-certainty or mathematics – all three belie the possibility of freedom whilst 
paradoxically speaking at the same time of spontaneous and total transformation. 
The second point worth noting here concerns the view that “[i]n trying to maintain the 
speculative sovereignty of philosophical reason”,138 Meillassoux in fact reintroduces idealism at 
the level of form. It is unclear why an account of material reality in terms of pure number should 
be any less anthropocentric than its verification through sense-impressions. The claim that the 
meaning of ‘ancestral statements’ can be grasped apart from a thinking subject does not account 
for the fact that the very terms of their mathematical reformulation stem from the eminently 
human discourse of mathematics. As Hallward explains: 
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As a matter of course, every unit of measurement, from the length of a meter to the time required 
for a planet to orbit around a star, exists at a fundamental distance from the domain of number as 
such. If Meillassoux was to carry through the argument of ‘ancestrality’ to its logical conclusion, he 
would have to acknowledge that it would eliminate not only all reference to secondary qualities like 
colour and texture but also all conventional primary qualities like length or mass or date as well. 
What might then be known of an ‘arche-fossil’ (…) would presumably have to be expressed in 
terms of pure numbers alone (…). Whatever else such (…) knowledge amounts to, it has no obvious 
relation with the sorts of realities that empirical science tries to describe. 
 
Meillassoux’s misstep, then, lies in the presumption “that a speculative philosophy in conjunction 
with a mathematized science can struggle against abstractions that are perceived as mere errors of 
the intellect, and not as abstractions that have any basis in a social, material and extra-logical 
reality.”139 That is to say, the mathematical form of Meillassoux’s argument undermines its 
purportedly materialist content. As such, it relapses into idealism. His parochial defence of mind-
independent matter tends to obfuscate the material grounds of techno-scientific and capitalist 
abstraction. In this respect, Adorno’s critique of ‘representational thinking’ in fact applies as 
much to After Finitude as it does to Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. It remains to see, though, 
what this peculiar convergence reveals about the stakes of Adorno’s ‘imageless’ materialism. 
 
*** 
 
Let us recap: over the course of the preceding pages we have recounted Adorno’s critique of 
‘representational thinking’ with reference to the epistemological precepts of dialectical 
materialism. Building on this reconstruction we have attempted to weigh up the actuality of 
Adorno’s objections by mapping them onto Meillassoux’s programme for a Speculative Realism; 
a timely task insofar as After Finitude has repeatedly been likened to Lenin’s Materialism and 
Empirio-Criticism. In both cases the point has been to demonstrate that Adorno allows us to 
uncover the common metaphysical presuppositions that underpin these materialist philosophies. 
However, the claim that the political deficiencies of dialectical materialism follow directly from 
its theoretical shortcomings presumes a somewhat un-dialectical relation between theory and 
praxis. Accordingly it might be objected that Adorno’s criticisms tend to reproduce the very lack 
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of mediation between mind and matter that he derides in Engels, Lenin and others. Adorno 
wrestles with this issue in a late text titled ‘Marginalia on Theory and Praxis’ (1969). Herein he 
identifies the division between thought and action with the separation of subject and object, a 
schism that – in turn – sits in a wider historical narrative outlined in Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
“Just as the division of subject and object cannot be revoked immediately by a decree of thought” 
– a point to which we will return below – “so too an immediate unity of theory and praxis is 
hardly possible: it would imitate the false identity of subject and object and would perpetuate the 
principle of domination that posits identity and that a true praxis must oppose.”140 Leaving this 
point in suspense for a moment, we note that the motivation for our protracted reconstruction has 
been twofold: firstly, to prepare the ground for a discussion of Adorno’s singular reorientation of 
the concept of materialism in terms of the Mosaic interdiction against idol worship; secondly, to 
suggest that this reorientation throws into relief Adorno’s own view of a non-dogmatic Marxian 
materialism, whose central concern is not the prioritisation of ‘matter’ or the valorisation of 
‘praxis’, but the abolition of bodily suffering. The remainder of this chapter aims to explore this 
far-reaching shift of emphasis. 
 
II: Adorno & The Image Ban 
 
The preceding pages have paid close attention to the opening lines from the passage of 
‘Materialism Imageless’ cited at the outset, where Adorno observes that ‘a consciousness 
interpolating images, a third element, between itself and that which it thinks would unwittingly 
reproduce idealism.’ As we have seen, Adorno’s critique targets the ‘representational’ character 
of dialectical materialism – an epistemological precept that he polemically likens to idol worship. 
We noted, then, that this sardonic interjection aligns Adorno’s concept of an ‘imageless’ 
materialism with the monotheistic proscription of idol worship. (‘What clings to the image 
remains idolatry, mythic enthrallment’; ‘demythologisation, the thought’s enlightening intent, 
deletes the image character of consciousness.’) In order to grasp the full weight of this quip, 
however, we must consider the remaining lines of ‘Materialism Imageless’ in light of two 
questions: i.) How are we to understand the relationship between image and imagelessness 
expressed in Adorno’s verdict that ‘the full object could be conceived’ only ‘in the absence of 
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images’? ii.) What are the somatic, affective and rhetorical features of the materialism that stems 
from Adorno’s reference to a ‘resurrection of the flesh’, i.e. his estimation that ‘the perspective 
vanishing point of historic materialism would be its self-sublimation, the spirit’s liberation from 
the primacy of material needs in their state of fulfilment’? Surely the move from ‘matter’ to 
‘flesh’ requires some degree of qualification. 
 
i.) Image & Imagelessness: 
 
In order to determine the relationship between ‘image’ and ‘imagelessness’, stipulated above, we 
must consider the following proviso: if the image ban designates a negation of the images 
associated with Leninist reflection theory and hence a confrontation between ‘representational’ 
and ‘non-representational’ thinking, then the locus of what we have called Adorno’s ‘Utopia of 
cognition’ – a mode of grasping and acting upon objectivity beyond instrumentality, 
intentionality and means-ends relations – lies precisely in the particular dynamic that is unfolded 
in the latter part of the passage cited at the outset.141 Put differently: if, as we suggested, ‘the 
materialist longing to grasp the thing’ means nothing less than a radical reconfiguration of 
thinking as such;142 if – in turn – this intellectual modality is supposed to stave off the sacrificial 
logic that Adorno associates with Soviet-style socialism and cold-war capitalism alike;143 and if, 
finally, formulating such a mode of materialist cognition hinges on the figure of the image ban, 
then it follows that his phrasing illuminates – however tacitly – the vexed political stakes of the 
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idiosyncratic ‘Marxism’ that we have been exploring following Comay’s cue.144 The question in 
each case relates to how Adorno figures this ‘Utopia of cognition’, with all of its far-reaching 
resonances, if it cannot be ‘positively pictured’. In particular, I take it that he makes use of two 
strategies, which can be placed under the headings: a.) Inversion; b.) Negation. 
 
a.) The dynamic figure of ‘inversion’ designates a characteristic movement of Adorno’s dialectic: 
the paradoxical attempt to glean an inverted image of reconciliation between the subject and 
object of thought from within the “bewitched, distorted and upside-down world” of capitalist 
modernity.145 Adorno thus gestures ex negativo towards a positive third term (thesis-antithesis-
synthesis) by dwelling in the moment of dialectical contradiction, i.e. by refusing what he 
considers to be an extorted form of rapprochement between subject and object. This emphasis on 
non-identity, however, is not reducible to a merely methodological quirk.146 Rather, Adorno 
views dialectical antitheses as philosophical expressions of socio-historical antagonisms. These 
demand that we highlight their incommensurability, push against their limit and strengthen our 
resolve that ‘things should be different’ – a resolve that, for its part, cannot be satisfied abstractly. 
In brief, by emphasising what is false, Adorno seeks the inverse image of what is true.147 To 
illustrate this point he upends a famous dictum from Benedict Spinoza’s correspondence with 
Albert Burgh: ‘Verum Index sui et falsi’148 becomes “Falsum (…) index sui et veri”.149 In the 
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present context this strategy of syntactical inversion is remarkable to the extent that it reflects 
back on Adorno’s iconoclastic critique of dialectical materialism. Might it not be said under this 
aspect that the ‘false’ images of Leninist reflection theory yield a negative imprint of their 
opposite, a kind of “mirror-writing”?150 If so, then Adorno might be seen to provide us with the 
tools for destabilising the language of ‘reflection’ by playing on the metaphorics of ‘mirroring’ in 
terms of codes, puzzles and riddles – a tactic that recalls Leonardo Da Vinci’s practice of 
encrypting sensitive texts by inverting their script. Benjamin’s presence is palpable when we 
learn that it is the task of philosophical “interpretation” to discern the truth-content of such puzzle 
images (Vexierbilder) by reading them as though they were sacred texts.151 “Dialectics discloses 
(…) every image as script. It teaches us to read from its features the admission of falseness which 
cancels its power and hands it over to truth.”152 This tendency is borne out in Adorno’s 
Habilitationsschrift, Construction of the Aesthetic (1933), which contains some notable passages 
on Søren Kierkegaard’s description of a curious 19th century contraption: 153  the so-called 
“window mirror” (Reflexionsspiegel).154 In order to grasp this point, however, we must briefly 
situate Adorno’s discussion of this detail in the context of his argument. 
 Broadly speaking, Adorno’s study of Kierkegaard considers the Danish thinker’s immanent 
critique of Hegel as a bourgeois counterpart to Marx’s concurrent confrontation with Speculative 
Idealism. “Although both rejected Hegel’s identity theory because it lost sight of lived reality, 
Kierkegaard rested his case on the reality of individual existence” – a tendency that Adorno sees 
echoed in the work of Martin Heidegger – “whereas for Marx existence is a social category.”155 In 
Adorno’s estimation, Kierkegaard’s view that “life is utterly meaningless” – an expression of his 
melancholic individualism – thus contrasts with the Marxian emphasis on societal 
transformation.156 As Susan Buck-Morss observes, Adorno’s attempt to “explode” Kierkegaard’s 
philosophy of inwardness from the inside out thus shows itself as having two principle aims: 
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firstly, “to rob (…) existentialism of its validity, and to justify simultaneously a (…) Marxist 
alternative”; and secondly, “to argue against the view (…) that aesthetics was the realm of 
subjective immediacy and irrationalism, and to validate in its place the Hegelian conception of 
aesthetics as a medium for knowing objective truth”.157 In order to demonstrate the validity of 
these claims, Adorno seeks to expose the internal contradictions of Kierkegaard’s thought so as to 
glean from them the unintended expression of historical truth: that “the inner realm into which the 
logic of his theory led” – the subject’s retreat from the object world – “was itself a historical 
manifestation, marking the passing of the bourgeois era”.158 What is at stake here is nothing less 
than the spellbound relation between subject and object under the rule of capitalist exchange 
relations. Adorno seeks to highlight this by reversing the hierarchy of existential ‘spheres’ – 
aesthetics, ethics, religion – outlined in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous opus Either/Or (1843). As 
is well known, Kierkegaard views the aesthetic sphere as the lowest stage of his dialectic. It is 
associated with the sensual, with worldly matter, rather than with the higher domains of ethics 
and religion. Johannes the Seducer, in whose guise Kierkegaard narrates those sections of 
Either/Or that outline the aesthetic attitude, is emblematic of this outlook. Accordingly, Adorno 
homes in on the portrayal of Johannes’ relation to his material surroundings: his furnishings. The 
‘window mirror’ in Johannes’ apartment becomes a case in point: 
 
Why can’t you just be nice and quiet? What have you done all morning but shake my awnings, tug 
at my window mirror and the cord on it, play with the bellpull wire from the fourth floor, push 
against the windowpanes – in short, proclaim your existence in every way as if you wanted to 
beckon me out to you?159 
 
Adorno comments on the inside/outside relation in this passage as follows: “[t]he window mirror 
is a characteristic furnishing of the spacious nineteenth-century apartment”;160 “[t]he function of 
the window mirror is to project the endless row of apartment buildings into the isolated bourgeois 
living room”;161 “[t]he window mirror testifies to objectlessness – it casts into the apartment only 
the semblance of things – and isolated privacy.”162 Adorno views this seemingly innocuous 
                                                
157 Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, 114 
158 Ibid, 116  
159 Kierkegaard, Either/Or, 354 [Translation altered] 
160 Adorno, Kierkegaard, 42 
161 Ibid 
162 Ibid 
 49 
feature of Johannes’ lodgings as a material expression of Kierkegaard’s inward turn. It 
inadvertently registers “the alienation of subject and object”.163 That is to say, the window mirror 
stands for the fact that, “[i]n Kierkegaard there is so little of a subject/object in the Hegelian sense 
as there are given objects; there is only an isolated subjectivity” – the private resident of the 
‘spacious nineteenth-century apartment’ – “surrounded by a dark otherness.”164 In other words, 
Johannes is connected to the world of objects only in semblance – by the reflections from the 
‘window mirror’. On this basis Adorno draws the following analogy: 
 
In his philosophy the knowing subject can no more reach its objective correlative than, in a society 
dominated by exchange-value, things are ‘immediately’ accessible to the person. Kierkegaard 
recognised the distress of incipient high-capitalism. He opposed its privations in the name of a lost 
immediacy that he sheltered in subjectivity. He analysed neither the necessity and legitimacy of 
reification nor the possibility of its correction. But he did nevertheless (…) note the relation of 
commodification and the commodity form in a metaphor that need only be taken literally to 
correspond with Marxist theories.165 
 
This ‘metaphor that need only be taken literally’ is none other than that of the bourgeois 
intérieur: the smoke and mirrors of Johannes’ reified consciousness. To put it simply, Adorno’s 
question is how to mobilise this figure, how to turn the impasse of Kierkegaard’s objectless 
interiority against itself. In what sense can the reflections from the window mirror be seen to 
contain a negative image of their opposite? Like Marx’s account of the “camera obscura”,166 the 
window mirror casts into the apartment an image of the ‘upside-down’ world of capitalist 
production. But as Adorno suggests, these projections do not re-double the world so much as they 
“displace and estrange” it by literally putting it on its head.167 (But what might it mean to put 
something on its head that is already upside-down? Would that not mean putting the world on its 
feet?) Whatever we make of this, the metaphorical thrust of Adorno’s phrasing appears to be that 
the window mirror divulges the perversion of the present as the code of its own undoing – ‘the 
mirror writing of its opposite’ – not as a “blueprint for Utopia” but as an “encrypted message” 
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containing a “‘prolegomenon’ to a new reality”.168  This ‘message’ requires philosophical 
‘interpretation’ – the labour of criticism – in order to uncover the history of domination that lies 
concealed in Johannes’ petrified interior. There may be “no true life in the false”,169 but the 
negative contours of a reconciliation between subject and object shine through the cracks and 
fissures of the present. As such, the notion of inversion marks a paradoxical affirmation of 
Utopia, whilst accepting that philosophy has no positive claim to it. 
 
b.) Having thus established the sense in which Adorno plays on the figure of inversion in order to 
invoke an image of Utopia that does not transgress the ban on positively picturing it, it now 
remains to see how he marshals the force of negation that is operative in the ban on images. As 
Adorno notes, “[t]he right of the image is rescued in the faithful observance of its prohibition”, an 
‘observance’ that is – in turn – associated with the Hegelian notion of “determinate negation”.170 
But what kind of a ‘right’ is envisaged here? Once again the matter hinges on Adorno’s singular 
remodelling of Hegel. ‘Determinate negation’ – a term whose meaning we will explore 
momentarily – is enlisted in the services of a negative dialectic, i.e. a dialectic that defers the 
moment of synthesis on the grounds that such reconciliation is co-extensive with the overcoming 
of societal injustice. In order to grasp this, though, we must briefly consider the place of 
determinate negation in Hegel’s thought. 
The broad outlines of what Hegel means by determinate negation can be found in the 
Introduction to his Phenomenology of Spirit. As above, Hegel’s exposition turns on his critique of 
Kant. Insofar as objects are only knowable as appearances, they are supposed to remain 
indeterminate. This is because the differentiation of one object from another (this-not-that) – a 
differentiation which proceeds through negation (this-not-that) – cannot, so long as it is governed 
by the sceptical consciousness that Hegel associates with Kant, truly determine an object. In 
Hegel’s estimation, then, Kant stalls at the recognition that there is a difference between this and 
that but he is unable to adequately express this difference. As we have seen in our discussion of 
Meillassoux, Hegel claims to overcome this impasse by absolutising it: the Kantian thing-in-itself 
is knowable as unknowable. Hegel associates this gesture with a certain productivity of the 
negation contained in the judgement this-not-that. When the result of a dialectical reflection is 
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“conceived as it is in truth, namely, as a determinate negation, a new form has thereby 
immediately arisen”.171 In other words, if the appearance of an object is followed by reflection on 
whether it is adequate to the conception of knowledge held by the subject at a given stage of 
consciousness; and if – in turn – the object is found lacking so that a new one is posited, which 
includes the unity of the process that produced it, then negation does not just produce nothing: it 
produces a “determinate nothingness” which follows the arithmetic principle that the negation of 
a negation yields a positive term.172 (Hegel describes this cumulative movement of supersession 
as ‘sublation’: Aufhebung).173 As we have already alluded to, in the case of the Phenomenology 
this insight – first articulated vis-à-vis Kant – inaugurates a movement through all conceivable 
stages of consciousness. Its sum appears as the standpoint of absolute knowing from whence the 
true work of philosophy – outlined in Hegel’s Science of Logic (1816) – can finally begin. It is 
well known, too, that Adorno explicitly conceives of his philosophical enterprise along Hegelian 
lines. However, to the extent that Hegel’s philosophy is supposed to chart a purposeful forward-
movement of the development of consciousness,174 Adorno charges that what “wins out” in a 
positive dialectic is in fact an “anti-dialectical principle: that traditional logic which, more 
arithmetico, takes minus times minus for a plus.”175 By contrast, Adorno contends that “[t]o 
negate a negation does not bring about its reversal”; negative dialectics “proves, rather, that the 
negation was not negative enough.” 176  That is, insofar as Adorno views philosophical 
contradictions as expressions of societal antagonisms, dialectics must not prematurely smooth 
over its antitheses lest it succumb to vulgar automatism. Accordingly Adorno argues that Hegel 
shies away from the full consequence of the negativity that drives his dialectic. He “could not 
resolve the contradiction between his dialectic and his experience: it was this alone that forced 
Hegel the critic to maintain the affirmative.”177 To affirm the moment of synthesis means to 
sanction the status quo. A genuine resolution of the contradictions between thesis and antithesis 
would mean nothing less than the reconciliation between subject and object, man and nature, i.e. 
the overcoming of the dialectic of enlightenment. Without presuming to recount in detail the 
                                                
171 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 51 
172 Ibid 
173 The German verb Aufheben literally means ‘to pick up’ or ‘to preserve’. 
174 Certainly, many of Hegel’s most influential readers do not read him this way.  
175 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 158 
176 Ibid, 159-60 [My emphasis] 
177 Theodor W. Adorno, “The Experiential Content of Hegel’s Philosophy”, in Hegel: Three Studies, trans. Shierry 
Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 80 
 52 
premises of Adorno’s negative dialectic, it remains to ask how this critical re-imagination of 
determinate negation plays out in the present context. 
To be sure, if the ‘image’ of a reconciliation between subject and object – Utopia – were 
simply sublated in the act of banning it, i.e. if Adorno’s argument followed the positively 
dialectical schema of determinate negation, then the true life would irresistibly emerge from the 
false. In other words, the iconoclastic criticism of Leninist reflection theory would necessarily 
resolve into a higher form of cognition, just as the monotheistic injunction against idol worship 
ineludibly supersedes polytheistic paganism in Hegel’s philosophy of religion.178 But given that 
Adorno identifies the synthetic moment of Hegelian dialectics with the actualisation of 
philosophical universality – a clear echo of Marx’s final thesis on Feuerbach – he cannot settle 
for such a causally determined ‘image’. That is to say, if in Adorno’s view the historical moment 
for such a synthesis has been “missed”,179 as the famous opening line from Negative Dialectics 
proclaims; if philosophy is thus suspended in the moment of contradiction, and its principal task 
is marked out as perpetual critique, then the ban on images means – above all – holding open the 
possibility that what is depicted by ‘representational thinking’ is not everything. This sentiment is 
forcefully expressed in a passage from ‘Marginalia on Theory and Praxis’, where Adorno writes: 
“[t]he hostility to theory in the spirit of the times, the by no means coincidental withering away of 
theory, its banishment by an impatience that wants to change the world” (belabour it as an image) 
“without having to interpret it while so far it has been chapter and verse that philosophers have 
merely interpreted – such hostility becomes praxis’s weakness.”180 Put differently, if – as we have 
argued – the images of dialectical materialism are in fact static reflections of immutable matter, 
then surely their elevation to a philosophical principle grants the status quo absolute authority. If, 
by contrast, the image ban forbids the ‘uncritical reproduction of existing relationships in 
consciousness’, then Adorno’s iconoclasm designates a clearing-away: forging a space in which 
the subject-object relation can be recast, albeit negatively. Like Benjamin’s destructive character, 
then, Adorno “sees no image hovering before him”; he “knows only one watchword: make 
room”, “not for the sake of the rubble but for that of the way leading through it”.181 On Adorno’s 
model, to determinately negate the images of self-identical reality produced by Leninist reflection 
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theory means to underscore their inadequacy to the lived experience of un-freedom. The ‘right’ of 
the image – the rightfulness of the promise it holds – is thus ‘rescued’ in the unswerving criticism 
of the present, a criticism that is carried out for the sake of the possibility that things might yet be 
otherwise. It is against this backdrop that Adorno’s reference to the Old Testament ban on 
making images of God serves to frame his meta-critique of materialism – a materialism whose 
central concern is not the prioritisation of matter, but the abolition of bodily suffering. Let us 
explore this point in more detail. 
 
ii.) Adorno’s Concept of Materialism: 
 
As we have seen, an ‘imageless’ mode of materialist cognition initially depends on the sense in 
which Adorno subverts the images of Leninist reflection theory. In this respect, we have argued, 
Adorno’s polemical invocation of the ‘theological ban on images’ serves to bolster his alternative 
conception of a Marxian materialism, which departs from Soviet orthodoxy by foregrounding 
neither ‘matter’ nor ‘praxis’ but rather the elimination of bodily suffering. We will return to the 
question as to what kind of ‘theology’ informs Adorno’s phrasing in Chapter Two of the present 
study. In the meantime, it will be recalled, ‘Materialism Imageless’ concludes with the estimation 
that materialism’s ‘great desire would be the resurrection of the flesh, a desire utterly foreign to 
idealism, the realm of the absolute spirit.’ In this regard Adorno contends that ‘the perspective 
vanishing point of historic materialism would be its self-sublimation, the spirit’s liberation from 
the primacy of material needs in their state of fulfilment. Only if the physical urge were 
quenched’, we are told, ‘would the spirit be reconciled and would become that which it only 
promises while the spell of material conditions will not let it satisfy material needs’. For Adorno, 
then, materialism is neither a method nor a goal but rather “an impulse”, a drive, as Simon Jarvis 
observes: “the utopian wish for undeluded happiness, including bodily pleasure, the wish for an 
end to suffering.”182 Nonetheless, this passage marks a crossroads at which the various strands of 
Adorno’s project coincide. That is, on the one hand, ‘materialism’ emerges from the immanent 
critique of idealism – the dictate of ‘identity thinking’: “the concept does not exhaust the thing 
conceived”.183 On the other hand, this ostensibly epistemological concern is supposed to have a 
material correlate in the history of domination outlined in Dialectic of Enlightenment: whatever 
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falls outside given societal parameters is brutally expunged. With regards to the former, this 
means that thinking objectivity is in fact a contradiction in terms: “[t]o think is to identify”.184 
Accordingly, Adorno’s ‘Utopia of cognition’ means paradoxically thinking thought against itself 
so as to throw into relief a materiality beyond thought’s bounds, albeit not for the purposes of 
attaining a renewed sense of ontological certainty, but rather to recast the way in which subject 
and object relate to each other: “to use concepts to unseal the nonconceptual with concepts 
without making it their equal.”185 With regards to the latter, this means that idealism and 
materialism are not binary opposites. Idealism entails a corporeal subject just as much as 
materialism entails a reflecting consciousness. The terms are dialectically mediated. Adorno’s 
claim appears to be that heeding this dialectic is akin to protesting the identitarian strictures of the 
status quo. This is the sense in which he argues that whilst ‘the spell of material conditions’ 
obstructs the transformation of society, the burden of critical theory lies in the much-maligned 
‘interpretation’ of the world: critique. (As he chides, the premature ‘Marxist’ pronouncement of 
having dispensed with theory in favour of praxis “miscarried”.)186 But how are we to conceive of 
a materialism that eschews the traditional primacy of matter, a primacy which is – in turn – 
supposed to guarantee the immediate prevalence of transformative praxis, in favour of a mode of 
thinking that seeks to grasp objectivity without doing violence to it? What are we to make of the 
claim that such an intellectual modality, which – for its part – cannot be positively pictured lest it 
fall prey to the very limits it seeks to overcome, has a material correlate in the overcoming of 
socio-historical antagonisms? Is Adorno suggesting that once the ‘spell’ blocking the 
transformation of society is broken – as a consequence of rigorous critique, presumably – then the 
ban on picturing Utopia will also be lifted? Is the image ban, then, primarily a cipher for holding 
open the possibility of historical change? In order to respond to these questions, the final pages of 
the present chapter must counterpose the two seemingly divergent moments of Adorno’s 
‘imageless’ materialism: a.) His insistence on a formal preponderance of objectivity; b.) His 
emphasis on the somatic moment of thought. 
 
a.) In his late essay ‘On Subject and Object’ (1969), Adorno seeks to challenge the predominance 
of an always-already ill-constituted subjectivity – a point that harks back to his writings from the 
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1940s. In quasi-epistemological terms, Adorno highlights an asymmetry in the relationship 
between the subject and object of cognition by citing certain markers from the history of 
philosophy. (Above all, he cross reads Kant and Marx in terms that are familiar from the work of 
Alfred Sohn-Rethel.) 187  Contrary to certain unspecified epistemological models – Husserl 
perhaps? – Adorno argues that the relation of objects to subjects is qualitatively different from 
that of subjects to objects. This signals not only the reciprocal dependence and mutual production 
of subjects by objects and objects by subjects but also the fact that “[a]n object can be conceived 
only by a subject but always remains something other than the subject, whereas a subject by its 
very nature is from the outset an object as well.”188 Subjects, in short, are special kinds of objects. 
However, their objective character has become obscured and distorted over the course of history. 
This affects both the subject’s self-relation in its capacity as a special kind of object and its 
relation to the material world. But in what terms does Adorno narrate the story of the subject’s 
(self) alienation? 
As Adorno argues, the terms ‘subject’ and ‘object’ are exceedingly equivocal. “‘[S]ubject’ 
can refer to the particular individual as well as to universal attributes of ‘consciousness in 
general’, in the language of Kant’s Prolegomena.”189 Whilst the element of “individual humanity” 
cannot be subtracted from the concept of the subject, the very conceptual articulation of 
subjectivity transforms it into a “universal”.190 By the same token, ‘object’ does not merely mean 
mind-independent matter: “object cannot be known except through consciousness”.191 In other 
words, “[o]bjectivity can be made out solely by reflecting, at every historical and cognitive stage, 
both upon what at that time is presented as subject and object as well as upon their mediations.”192 
The mutual constitution of these terms, however, is historically produced. This point is borne out 
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in Dialectic of Enlightenment,193 where Adorno and Horkheimer argue that the emergence of 
individuated consciousness from the enchanted union with ‘nature’194 marks the process of 
enlightenment as a splitting asunder of ‘subject’ (mind) and ‘object’ (matter). Accordingly, 
enlightenment must be seen, on the one hand, as the dual process of rationalising deadly forces 
from without (both physically and intellectually) and, on the other, as the self-imposed bondage 
necessary to persist under such conditions – a point that is memorably illustrated by Adorno and 
Horkheimer with reference to Homer’s Odyssey. This immemorial rift, which – for its part – is 
read as a “prehistoric” division between mental and manual labour, inaugurates a historical 
dynamic that is characterised from the outset by the subjective domination of objects, including 
the subject’s unwitting (and hence all the more calamitous) self-domination.195 We will return to 
this point in subsequent chapters; for now it suffices to note that the predominance of the subject 
in the philosophies of e.g. Bacon, Descartes or Kant is the expression of a historically fraught 
relation between man and matter. Man has had to renounce his material being in order to 
dominate the external world. He thus becomes estranged from his own objectivity, which – in 
turn – leads to a disastrous form of blind self-instrumentalisation. The epistemological categories 
‘subject’ and ‘object’ thus lend “expression to the real separation, the rivenness of the human 
condition”, which is – in fact – “the result of a coercive historical process” of which the mind-
body dualism is only the most prominent expression.196 The subject’s relationship to objectivity is 
thus portrayed as the undergirding of an instrumental rationality, whose path Adorno wagers 
leads directly into the great cataclysms of the 20th century. 
Nonetheless, such a relation between subject and object is not set in stone. In ‘On Subject 
and Object’ Adorno seeks to criticise this intellectual configuration by intimating a “second 
reflection” of Kant’s Copernican turn i.e. an immanent critique of idealism.197 If, as we have seen, 
the Kantian revolution is supposed to demonstrate the subjective constitution of objectivity, then 
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it follows that the ‘second reflection’ of this turn is supposed to put this picture on its head. As 
Adorno argues, such an inversion exposes the Kantian view of ‘consciousness in general’ as a 
reification of the subject.198 The alleged self-sufficiency of constitutive consciousness relies on an 
objectification of the subject that is not transparent to it. “[M]ind’s claim to independence 
announces its claim to domination. Once radically separated from the object, subject reduces the 
object to itself; subject swallows object, forgetting how much it is object itself.”199 Adorno seeks 
to redeem this purported failure of Kant’s thought by crediting him with inadvertently registering 
a historical truth: that the idealist conception of subjectivity is an ill-begotten abstraction. 
Following Sohn-Rethel’s cue, Adorno thus reads Kant through a Marxian prism. The general 
abstraction of the transcendental subject is an expression of the real abstraction of capitalist 
exchange relations. As Sohn-Rethel writes to Adorno in a long letter dated 04-12 November 
1936: “the formation of subjectivity is the inextricable correlate of the establishment of the 
money form of value.”200 In the present context this means that Adorno’s effort to elaborate a 
materialist mode of cognition aims, not least, to break the ‘spell’ of exchange relations that 
prevents the subject from recognising its objective entanglements. He does so by dialectically 
exposing an asymmetry in the configuration of subject and object. That is to say, Adorno 
attempts to cast into relief the possibility of a non-coercive “communication” between subject and 
object as truly differentiated entities.201 His aim is not so much to reunite subject and object in the 
sense of forging a self-identical and, hence, Hegelian figure of thought – this would be 
“romantic”, he objects – but rather to expound the reasons for the subject’s constitutive inability 
to recognise its own objective ties.202 As he argues, “[i]n its proper place, even epistemologically, 
the relationship of subject and object would lie in a peace achieved between human beings as 
well as between them and their Other. Peace” – the maxim of Adorno’s ‘Utopia of cognition’ – 
“is the state of differentiation without domination, with the differentiated participating in each 
other.”203 This ‘participation’ would be playful and mimetic – a point to which we will return in 
the final chapter of the present study. It cannot be positively pictured lest it be entered into the 
                                                
198 Cf. Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. Rodney Livingstone 
(London: Merlin Press, 1971), 83 
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very economy it seeks to overcome. For now, however, it remains to take note of a considerable 
obstacle for the persuasiveness of Adorno’s claims: to the extent that this theoretical 
reconfiguration of the subject-object relation is supposed to correlate with the material 
transformation of society, the stakes of his considerations are extremely high. The question, then, 
is whether his identification of epistemological questions with social, historical and political ones 
is ultimately sustainable. Might it not be objected that the lack of differentiation between these 
registers relinquishes the very particularity that Adorno seeks to rescue? 
 
b.) As we have seen, Adorno purports to deduce a preponderance of objectivity over an ill 
constituted subjectivity in quasi-epistemological terms by following Sohn-Rethel’s example in 
mapping the structure of Kant’s transcendental subject onto Marx’s account of the exchange 
relation. This outwardly theoretical consideration is augmented by the other foremost feature of 
Adorno’s materialism: his emphasis on corporeality. As Adorno argues, “[t]he object, the positive 
expression of non-identity, is a terminological mask.”204 It covers over an elusive excess of matter 
that cannot be captured by thought. “Once the object becomes an object of cognition”, as it does 
for idealist and materialist epistemologies alike, “its physical side” – its irreducibly material 
moment – “is spiritualised”.205 It is “called ‘object’ only from the viewpoint of a subjectively 
aimed analysis in which the subject’s primacy seems”, once again, “beyond question.”206 As 
Adorno contends, leaving this primacy uncontested reduces sensation – “the crux of all 
epistemology” – to a “fact of consciousness”.207 There can be no sensation without a somatic 
moment. In this sense, epistemology runs the danger of misconstruing the thing that is registered 
in sensation as simply another link in the chain of cognitive functions. By contrast, Adorno 
argues, sensation is not spent in consciousness. “Every sensation is a physical feeling also.”208 
(The echoes of Adorno’s critical engagement with Husserlian phenomenology and its afterlife are 
unmistakable.) It is this ‘feeling’ that is associated with the aforementioned ‘resurrection of the 
flesh’.209 As we will find in the final chapter, it is to do with what Adorno describes as a “feeling 
                                                
204 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 192 
205 Ibid 
206 Ibid 
207 Ibid, 193 
208 Ibid 
209 Adorno vigorously contests the Christological connotations of this formulation. Instead, he cites the “Wisdom of 
Solomon” as his source. Adorno, Philosophische Terminilogie, Bd. 2, 187 [My translation] 
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of resistance.”210 But, as above, this ‘resurrection’ is intimated negatively. That is to say, in the 
first instance ‘physical feeling’ means suffering. Suffering is marked out as the somatic index of 
the non-identity between subject and object, man and matter, nature and culture. Adorno 
suggestively illustrates this point in a passage from Negative Dialectics titled ‘Suffering 
Physical’: “[a]ll pain and all negativity, the motor of dialectical thought, is the variously 
mediated, sometimes unrecognisable form of physical things”.211 In a characteristic gesture, 
Adorno identifies the antithetical moment of dialectical thought – ‘negativity’ – with ‘pain’, an 
enduring feature of his philosophy of history.212 Adorno’s ‘Utopia of cognition’ is the mirror 
image of this negativity. It inversely signals a state of hedonic fulfilment. As it stands, however, 
the perceived disparity between mind and matter causes one to experience the full weight of the 
dialectic of reason as somatic torment. For Adorno, this experience is imbued with an ethical 
imperative:213 the “physical moment tells our knowledge that suffering ought not to be, that things 
should be different ‘Woe speaks: Go.’ Hence the convergence of the specifically materialist with 
the critical, with socially transformative praxis.”214 Once again, Adorno’s multifarious concerns 
converge. As he argues, “[t]he telos of such an organisation of society” as would allow for the 
satisfaction of want “would be to negate the physical suffering of even the least of its 
members”.215 The insistence on a negation of ‘physical suffering’ in such a society in turn recalls 
a formulation from Adorno’s ‘Theses on Need’ (1942): “[t]he question of the immediate 
satisfaction of needs should not be posed under the aspects ‘social’ and ‘natural’, ‘primary’ and 
‘secondary’, ‘true’ and ‘false’. Rather it falls into the same category as the question of the 
suffering of the vast majority of all the people on earth.”216 In a “classless society”, we are told, 
the relation between “need and satisfaction will be transformed” – an unusually confident 
pronouncement.217 This transformation, then, is coextensive with that of the relation between the 
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subject and object of thought. Its locus is the tortured body. Notwithstanding the question as to 
what kind of anthropology informs Adorno’s slippery conceptions of ‘need’ and ‘satisfaction’, 
this passage – for its part – points forward to the central motivation of Adorno’s final unfinished 
work: Aesthetic Theory (1969). The alleviation of bodily suffering, the reconciliation of subject 
and object, the overcoming of societal antagonisms – in short, Utopia – can only be achieved via 
negativa in rendering conscious the ‘spell’ that obstructs these transformations: in the self-
consciousness of semblance achieved in autonomous works of art.218 For the present discussion 
this means the following: whilst the possibility of societal transformation is mandated by an 
individual experience of bodily suffering, the ‘satisfaction of material needs’ hinges on the 
continued criticism of a philosophical tradition that had been prematurely left for dead. “The 
power of determinate negation”, outlined above, “is the only permissible figure” of such 
fulfilment.219 If Adorno argues, then, that ‘the spirit’ would ‘be reconciled and would become that 
which it only promises while the spell of material conditions will not let it satisfy material needs’, 
then this means – in René Buchholz’s words – that “such spirit may only emerge undiminished 
when the conditions of lack [Mangel] and privation [Not], which it repressed, will come to an 
end.”220 This ‘end’ can only be arrived at critically. The image ban that undergirds Adorno’s 
‘imageless’ materialism thus stands in for the refusal to foreclose on the possibility that such an 
‘end’ may yet be realised.221 
 
*** 
 
In a lecture on the concept of materialism, dated 17 January1963, Adorno argues that, “[o]ne of 
the substantive misinterpretations of materialism believes that, since it teaches the preponderance 
of matter or, indeed, of material conditions, this preponderance itself is desired and wanted, that it 
                                                
218 We will return to this point in Chapter Three of the present study. 
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is itself positive.”222 Rather, Adorno argues that “[t]he telos (…) of Marxist materialism is the 
abolition of materialism, i.e. the introduction of a state in which the blind coercion of people by 
material conditions would be broken and in which the question of freedom would become truly 
meaningful.”223 On Adorno’s reading, then, a truly Marxian concept of materialism is ultimately 
self-effacing. This is the sense in which he argues that ‘the perspective vanishing point of historic 
materialism would be its self-sublimation, the spirit’s liberation from the primacy of material 
needs in their state of fulfilment’. That is to say, properly speaking, materialism would mean its 
own undoing, erasing even the trace of itself in the satisfaction of need. As such, it is not simply a 
counter-position to idealism but rather the outcome of an immanent critique of the latter – an 
immanent critique that aims at an altogether different relationship between subject and object 
beyond the coercive strictures of the status quo. Adorno’s self-effacing – imageless – mode of 
materialist cognition, then, points beyond the critique of ‘representational thinking’ to a ‘Utopia 
of cognition’ whose “weak messianic” promise motivates the unlikely deployment of an 
ostensibly biblical motif in the critical re-imagination of a Marxian materialism.224 The question, 
then, is: how are we to understand the theological resonances of Adorno’s invocation of the 
image ban? 
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Chapter 2: 
Inverse Theology 
 
“Ihr sollt euch kein Bild –”1 
Franz Kafka 
 
The previous chapter explored a reference to the Old Testament ban on making images of God in 
a passage from Theodor W. Adorno’s magnum opus Negative Dialectics (1966). It will be 
recalled that particular attention was paid, herein, to Adorno’s concept of an ‘imageless’ 
materialism. However, the biblical provenance of Adorno’s terminology invites another question: 
what – if anything – is the theological weighting of his enigmatic formulation?2 Such an inquiry 
demands considerable qualification for at least two reasons. Firstly, Adorno does not engage at 
any point in a sustained scholarly inquiry into the nature of God that might be called properly 
theological in an academic sense. (Certainly, he never received any formal training in such 
matters.) Secondly, as we have noted at the outset, Adorno explicitly echoes the verdicts of his 
intellectual progenitors Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud and Karl Marx, arguing that 
“positive religion has lost its (…) validity”;3 that “[t]raditional theology is not restorable.”4 
Accordingly, his invocation of a biblical motif is indeed somewhat surprising, raising the 
question as to whether it can be seen as anything more than an incidental metaphor. 
Once again, our problem can be framed with a view to Adorno’s reflections on Arnold 
Schoenberg’s unfinished opera Moses und Aron (1932). In his essay ‘Sacred Fragment’ (1963) 
Adorno describes Schoenberg’s Exodus-adaptation as a work of “sacred music”.5 As he argues, 
                                                
1 “Thou shalt no image –” Franz Kafka, Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente II, ed. Jost Schillemeit (Frankfurt 
am Main: Fischer Verlag, 2002), 360 [My translation] 
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presentation) this means, above all, a reasoned discourse about scripture, the ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Testaments, 
respectively. Theology is thus treated as the ‘science of religion’. 
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4 Theodor W. Adorno, “Theologie, Aufklärung und die Zukunft der Illusion”, in Frankfurter Adorno Blätter VIII, ed. 
Rolf Tiedemann (Munich: Edition Text + Kritik, 2003), 235 [My translation] 
5 Theodor W. Adorno, “Sacred Fragment: Schoenberg’s ‘Moses und Aron’”, in Quasi Una Fantasia: Essays on 
Modern Music, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: Verso, 1992), 229. Giorgio Agamben’s recent characterisation 
of the term ‘sacred’ is useful in this context. Following a definition by the Roman jurist Trebatius, Agamben argues 
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“[s]acred works of art – and the fact that Moses und Aron was written as an opera does not 
disqualify it from being one – claim that their substance is valid.”6 That is to say, Schoenberg’s 
opera insists on the continuing actuality and the binding validity of its biblical ‘substance’, its 
biblical subject matter. But, Adorno argues, “a secular world can scarcely tolerate (…) sacred 
art”.7 This estimation designates a two-pronged difficulty for Schoenberg’s piece. On the one 
hand, this impasse is conditioned by historical factors, “[t]he impossibility (…) of sacred art 
today”.8 On the other hand, there is a contradiction “intrinsic to the work”:9 “God, the absolute, 
eludes finite beings. Where they desire to name him, because they must, they betray him. But if 
they keep silent about him, they acquiesce in their own impotence and sin against the other, no 
less binding, commandment to name him.”10 Finite beings “lose heart”, Adorno continues, 
“because they are not up to the task” of naming the infinite.11 (They are not up to this task 
because after the expulsion from paradise the Adamitic language of names becomes mere chatter, 
Geschwätz.) As Adorno argues, Schoenberg is aware of these difficulties. He has “an intuition of 
the link between the possibility of sacred works and the actual historical situation”, which is 
“uncongenial” to religious sentiments.12 His opera thus stages a kind of necessary failure: on the 
one hand, the piece “must extend a hand to the sacred if it is not entirely to fail its own 
intention”;13 on the other hand, this extending-of-a-hand must over-reach itself. 
In light of this short gloss, Adorno’s challenge to the Viennese composer comes into focus. 
Adorno asks: “how is cultic music possible in the absence of cult?”14 In other words, how does 
Schoenberg’s opera resist a lapse into wanton anachronism? Leaving in suspense Adorno’s 
solution to this quandary (he describes Schoenberg’s opera in terms of “negative theology”),15 I 
propose to reformulate his question and direct it back at him. Accordingly, we must ask: how is it 
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possible for Adorno to invoke the language of theology given that he explicitly rejects its 
validity? My wager is that Adorno turns to theology in spite of itself, thus assigning figures such 
as the image ban a curious afterlife. As we will find, the modern dislocation of traditional 
theology thus serves as the condition of possibility for the deployment of its terms in the 
immanent critique of reality under the rule of a capitalist cult religion.16 
Before elaborating on this point, however, we must clarify some underlying issues. 
Accordingly, the first part of the present chapter asks the following questions: i.) What roles do 
religion and theology play in Adorno’s life and work, more generally? ii.) How does Adorno 
distinguish between theology, religion and metaphysics? Moreover, can his thought be adequately 
grasped as a form of ‘negative theology’? iii.) What is meant by the notion of a capitalist cult 
religion and how does it bear on our reading of Adorno? iv.) And finally: to what extent can 
Adorno be said to ‘secularise’ figures like the image ban? 
 
With these questions in mind, the second part of the present chapter aims to develop Adorno’s 
concept of an ‘inverse theology’. This formulation occurs in a letter from Adorno to Walter 
Benjamin, dated 17 December 1934, wherein he responds to his friend’s essay, ‘Franz Kafka: On 
the Tenth Anniversary of his Death’.17 Adorno writes: 
 
Do not take it for immodesty if I begin by confessing that our agreement in philosophical 
fundamentals has never impressed itself upon my mind more perfectly than it does here. Let me 
only mention my own earliest attempt to interpret Kafka, nine years ago – I claimed he is a 
photograph of earthly life taken from the perspective of the redeemed, of which nothing appears but 
the edge of a black cloth, whereas the terrifyingly displaced optic of the photographic image is none 
other than that of the obliquely angled camera itself – no further words seem necessary to 
demonstrate our agreement, however much your analyses also point beyond this conception. And 
this also, and indeed in quite a principled sense, concerns the position of ‘theology’. Since I always 
insisted on such a position, before entering your Arcades, it seems to me doubly important that the 
image of theology, into which I would gladly see our thoughts dissolve, is none other than the very 
                                                
16 Cf. Walter Benjamin, “Capitalism as Religion”, in Selected Writings 1, 1913-1926, eds. Marcus Bullock & 
Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 288-291 
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one which sustains your thoughts here – it could indeed be called ‘inverse’ theology.18 
 
The first part of this passage contains an early articulation of a notable figure from Adorno’s 
post-war writings. The ‘photograph of earthly life taken from the perspective of the redeemed’ 
occurs both in ‘Finale’ – the closing aphorism from Minima Moralia (1951) – and in ‘Notes on 
Kafka’ (1953). This formulation is treated, below, with a view to exploring what it might mean to 
speak of such a ‘perspective’ (or – indeed – from it). After all, Adorno’s self-professed abidance 
by the image ban prohibits him from furnishing the “standpoint of redemption” with any positive 
determinations.19 This question is explored with an eye to some of the criticisms that this phrasing 
has provoked in recent years, specifically from Jacob Taubes and Giorgio Agamben, who charge 
that the ostensibly ‘messianic’,20 ‘theological’ current in Adorno’s work amounts to little more 
than hollow aestheticism written in the mode of the ‘as if’. 
In turn, the second part of this passage concerns Adorno’s self-avowed agreement with an 
‘image of theology’ that he attributes to Benjamin. To be sure, this enthusiastic declaration of 
allegiance must be taken with a pinch of salt. Adorno’s assertion is complicated by at least two 
factors: firstly, the role of theology in Benjamin’s writings is notoriously unstable, displaying a 
great range of facets between early works, such as ‘Dialogue on the Religiosity of the Present’ 
(1912), and later texts, such as the piece on Kafka, not to mention the theses ‘On the Concept of 
History’ (1940). In this regard, speaking of Benjamin’s ‘image of theology’ in the singular is in 
fact untenably reductive. In any case, it will not be our aim to survey the many guises of theology 
in Benjamin’s thought (from the blotting pad to the wizened dwarf) as if to suggest that they form 
                                                
18 Theodor W. Adorno & Walter Benjamin, The Complete Correspondence, 1928-1940, trans. Nicholas Walker, ed.  
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formulation of an ‘inverse theology’ are Benjamin and Kafka, I take it that a certain affinity with this tradition should 
not be wholly discounted. Cf. Michael Löwy, Redemption & Utopia: Jewish Libertarian Thought in Central Europe, 
trans. Hope Heaney (London: Athlone Press, 1992), 16 
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some self-sufficient framework in which Adorno figures as a mere afterthought. Rather, 
inasmuch as Adorno’s reading of Benjamin contains an element of projection – the as-yet nascent 
‘image’ of a ‘theology’ into which he ‘would gladly’ see their ‘thoughts dissolve’ – I take it that 
his views possess a degree of independence that is often underestimated. 
Secondly, it is worth noting that little over a year after writing the letter cited above, 
Adorno famously criticises one of Benjamin’s Arcades exposés, arguing for a radicalisation of his 
friend’s dialectic “right into the theological glowing core”.21 However, instead of recounting the 
catalogue of familiar grievances concerning the rift between Adorno and Benjamin, contained in 
nuce in their 1935 exchange,22 the present chapter aims to trace an (admittedly) speculative 
thread, leading from Adorno’s singular over-identification with Benjamin’s ‘image of theology’ 
to his use of theological terms in an ostensibly secular critique of capitalist modernity. As I will 
aim to prove, Adorno views the ‘image’ of an ‘inverse theology’ as suggesting a shift of the 
topography on which traditional theological inquiry rests: the supposedly stable orders of the 
‘sacred’ and the ‘profane’. On the one hand, this means a standard enlightenment narrative, which 
teaches that the authority of a religious worldview is displaced by the advancement of the natural 
sciences; on the other hand, it means that the seemingly secular-scientific phenomenon of 
capitalism is itself imbued with religious characteristics. We might ask then: what happens to 
theology under the sway of a capitalist cult religion? Moreover: in what sense can its displaced 
terms be put to work by a critical theory, such as Adorno’s, without nostalgically reasserting an 
irretrievably lost authority? As I argue, reflecting on Adorno’s notion of an ‘inverse theology’ can 
shed some light on these matters. 
 
I: Adorno & Theology 
 
i.) Life & Work: 
 
We have asserted, then, that Adorno is neither a religious nor a theological thinker in any 
straightforward sense. This is reflected, in part, by his biography. Adorno’s father – the German 
wine merchant Oskar Wiesengrund – converted from Judaism to Protestantism before his son’s 
                                                
21 Adorno & Benjamin, Complete Correspondence, 143 
22 For an influential account of the disagreement over dialectics in Adorno and Benjamin’s 1935 correspondence, see: 
Susan Buck-Morss, “The Adorno-Benjamin Debate, Part 1: The Issues”, in The Origin of Negative Dialectics: 
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birth, whereas Adorno’s mother – the Corsican singer Maria Calvelli-Adorno – was Catholic.23 
Adorno was nominally raised as a Lutheran but organised religion appears to have played no 
particular role in his upbringing.24 Nevertheless, it is worth noting a few points about Adorno’s 
relation to his Jewish and Christian heritage, if only to give an indication of his sources. 
As Detlev Claussen argues, Adorno was strongly influenced by his upbringing amongst the 
luminaries of Frankfurt’s Jewish Bildungsbürgertum. 25  This is clear, not least, from his 
relationship with the close family friend Siegfried Kracauer.26 In addition to studying key 
philosophical texts by Kant and Hegel, Kracauer and the young Adorno read seminal works of 
inter-war Judaism, such as Franz Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption (1921). However, 
Adorno is said to have been quite unmoved by Rosenzweig’s book, referring to it in a letter to 
Leo Löwenthal as “linguistic philosophemes, which I wouldn’t understand even if I understood 
them”.27 This dismissive attitude is echoed decades later in The Jargon of Authenticity (1964), 
which contains a biting critique of Rosenzweig’s colleague, the Jewish existentialist philosopher 
Martin Buber. (Adorno famously argues that Buber’s account of the ‘I-Thou’ relation, removes 
the “thorn” from “theology, without which redemption is unthinkable”.)28 Though it is not our 
present task to explore Adorno’s objections to Buber, his grievance indicates – amongst other 
things – that Adorno’s early view of Judaism in general, and the circle around the Freies 
Jüdisches Lehrhaus29 in particular, appears to have been broadly unsympathetic – an attitude that 
shifts somewhat in later years through his acquaintance with Benjamin. 
Adorno’s engagement with Christianity, by contrast, appears to have been more substantial. 
This is discernible from his Habilitationsschrift, Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic 
(1933), which was written under the supervision of the Protestant theologian Paul Tillich. 
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1973), 16 [Translation altered] 
29 Cf. Wolfgang Schivelbusch, Intellektuellendämmerung: Zur Lage der Frankfurter Intelligenz in den zwanziger 
Jahren (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985) 
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Ostensibly this work contains Adorno’s most sustained engagement with the work of any one 
‘theologian’. However, as Hermann Deuser points out, Adorno sides with a resolutely 
philosophical Kierkegaard. That is to say, his reading contrasts “a critical and aesthetic 
Kierkegaard, on the one hand” with “a theologian of sacrifice, suspected of existential ontology, 
on the other.”30 Without wishing to focus on Adorno’s reading of Kierkegaard as such, it suffices 
to note the following: in light of the above, any claim to a theological current in Adorno’s 
thinking must take into account not only that he was generally suspicious of religion and 
theology, but – more importantly – that his sources were resolutely second hand. His 
understanding of Judaism owes more to Benjamin than it owes to the Talmud;31 his knowledge of 
Christianity owes more to Kierkegaard than it does to a concerted study of the Gospels. The point 
is that Adorno is not concerned with a return to God, despite his explicit declaration of 
“theological intentions”32 vis-à-vis Max Horkheimer. Accordingly, we are better served by asking 
not how accurately Adorno’s particular reception of theology maps onto its traditional variants, 
but rather how he critically repurposes theological terms, however limited his awareness of their 
original context might be. But how does this critical appropriation of a seemingly defunct 
theological vernacular play out in practice? 
 
ii.) Negative Universal History: Religion – Theology – Metaphysics 
 
As suggested above, the first step in substantiating our opening wager is to situate the terms of 
our investigation in the context of Adorno’s philosophy of history. The point, I argue, is that 
Adorno conceives of religion, theology and metaphysics as particular formations within a larger 
philosophical-historical edifice. As such, these ‘formations’ lie embedded in a highly speculative 
civilisational meta-narrative (characterised by an “unmissable logic and rhetoric of exaggeration, 
                                                
30 Hermann Deuser, Dialektische Theologie: Studien zu Adornos Metaphysik und zum Spätwerk Kierkegaards 
(Munich & Mainz: Kaiser Verlag, 1980), 284 [My translation] 
31 It is noteworthy that Benjamin, in turn, appears to owe his knowledge of Judaism in good measure to the 
relationship with his lifelong friend, the renowned Kabbalah scholar Gershom Scholem. Scholem, for his part, 
recounts a meeting with Adorno in the following terms: “[t]he good spirit that prevailed in the meetings between 
Adorno and me was due not so much to the cordiality of the reception as to my considerable surprise at Adorno’s 
appreciation of the continuing theological element in Benjamin.” Gershom Scholem, Walter Benjamin: The Story of 
a Friendship, trans. Harry Zohn (London: Faber & Faber, 1982), 15 
32 Theodor W. Adorno & Max Horkheimer, Briefwechsel, Band 1: 1927-1937, eds. Christoph Gödde & Henri Lonitz 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003), 52 [My translation] 
 69 
hyperbole, and excess”),33 which traces the vacillations of rational thought from pre-history to the 
present. 34 In order to grasp the problematic coherence of this narrative, however, we must 
consider two of Adorno’s core ideas: a.) Negative universal history; b.) The dialectic of reason. 
 
a.) Negative universal history is understood as an immanent recasting of Hegel’s concept of 
universal history. In order for there to be history at all, Adorno suggests, universal history has to 
be – at once – “constructed and denied.”35 How so? In Adorno’s view, the basic movement of 
Hegel’s concept of universal history can already be discerned in the Phenomenology of Spirit 
(1806). Herein, it will be recalled, Hegel charts a series of dialectical stages through which 
consciousness moves purposefully forward towards freedom. Universal history, at least as 
Adorno sees it, means the totality of this movement conceived of as “the continuous history of 
mankind”.36 Inasmuch as Adorno is concerned with constructing a concept of history, he must 
affirm the totality of this movement. After all, concepts always aim at universality and since, for 
Adorno, philosophy necessarily deals in concepts, it follows that the concept of history must be a 
priori universal. However, although Adorno deems the structure of Hegel’s reflections to be 
necessary for constructing a concept of history, he is nonetheless careful to emphasise its Achilles 
heel: that universal history is apparently unable to account for contingency. (On Adorno’s 
account, Hegel himself overstates his case when he suggests that history turns contingent events 
into necessary ones according to their providential telos. To be fair to Hegel, though, it is 
debatable whether he is, in fact, suggesting this.) Without presuming to settle this issue here, it 
suffices to note that Adorno turns to an unlikely ally: the positivist critique of universal history. 
As he argues, the minutiae of contingent historical events cause breaks and fissures in Hegel’s 
supposedly seamless narrative of historical progress. “As long as you do not have too great a 
knowledge of historical detail”, he claims, “you not only have the benefit of (…) distance which 
                                                
33 Hent De Vries, Minimal Theologies: Critiques of Secular Reason in Adorno and Levinas, trans. Geoffrey Hale, 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), xvii 
34 Adorno first outlines the broad contours of this narrative in his early lectures, ‘The Actuality of Philosophy’ (1931) 
and ‘The Idea of Natural History’ (1932). It is, then, elaborated in his Habilitationsschrift on Kierkegaard from 
whence it is taken up into Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947). The piecemeal theses contained in these texts finally 
receive their full philosophical articulation in a section of Negative Dialectics titled ‘World Spirit and Natural 
History: an Excursion on Hegel’. Herein Adorno proposes two divergent approaches: on the one hand, he outlines an 
idea of ‘natural-history’, which is largely derived from a cross reading of Benjamin and Lukács; on the other hand, 
he presents a concept of ‘negative universal history’ to which we will turn momentarily. (As we will find, these sit 
uneasily beside each other.) 
35 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton (London: Routledge, 1973), 320 
36 Adorno, History and Freedom: Lectures 1964-1965, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 
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enables you to gain a better overview, but, by the same token, you are blinder to facts that make 
things awkward for philosophical theory.”37 That is to say, universal history falsifies those events 
that do not conform to its narrative thrust. Its guiding ethos is: “so much the worse for the 
facts”.38 To this extent, universal history has to be negated, ‘denied’. 
Negative universal history, then, is a problematic sort of counter-narrative that seeks to tell 
the history of domination and defeat rather than progress. Adorno cites Benjamin on this point, 
arguing that universal history is always written from the standpoint of the victor of historical 
struggle.39 
 
[B]y pointing out that the element of consent, of apologia, that is to say the element that justifies 
history from the standpoint of the victor and defends everything that has happened on the grounds 
of its necessity – this element of consent is connected with the construction of a theory of universal 
history because the assumption of such a continuous unity in history seems to point to the idea that 
history has meaning.40 
 
We will return to the point about the breakdown of meaning in history in our discussion of 
Adorno’s ‘Mediations on Metaphysics’. For now let us note that if, for Hegel, universal history is 
supposed to tell the story of an inevitable unfolding of consciousness towards freedom, then 
negative universal history must mean the story of man’s (self) domination and the ensuing state 
of un-freedom. This, of course, is the theme of Dialectic of Enlightenment, to which we will turn 
momentarily. First, however, we must account for a serious criticism that Adorno opens himself 
up to on this point. 
One might object that if Adorno aims to expose the fraudulent ideology that is supposed to 
nourish a providential history leading “from savagery to humanitarianism” by reversing its course 
to go “from the slingshot to the megaton bomb”,41 as the famous formulation from Negative 
Dialectics goes, then he is – in fact – simply reproducing it as ‘bad’ universality. Adorno seeks to 
pre-empt this charge by unfolding a somewhat unconvincing dialectic of continuity/discontinuity. 
                                                
37 Adorno, History and Freedom, 82 
38 Ibid, 83. See p. 27 of the present study. 
39 Cf. Walter Benjamin, “On the Concept of History”, in Selected Writings 4, 1938-1940, eds. Howard Eiland & 
Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 389-400 
40 Adorno, History and Freedom, 87 
41 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 320 
 71 
As he argues, “discontinuity and universal history must be conceived together.”42 That is to say, 
on the one hand, history is “discontinuous in the sense that it represents life perennially 
disrupted” and, on the other hand, it is continuous in the sense that this ‘disruption’ is itself 
deemed to be permanent.43 Accordingly, Adorno’s materialist rebuttal of Hegel is that historical 
events do not take place in a predetermined flow of history, but rather that the events themselves 
contain a historical “nucleus” – a Zeitkern – “that can be decoded by interpretation.”44 It is not 
presently our task to retread these matters. Let us note instead that the uneasy tension in Adorno’s 
reasoning speaks to a larger problem with his philosophy of history, namely: that the excursus on 
‘World Spirit and Natural History’ contains two divergent models. On the one hand, it describes 
an idea of natural-history which is fragmented, melancholic and committed to the particularity of 
historical suffering; on the other hand, it proffers an account of negative universal history which 
is linear, albeit not progressive. But if Adorno insists that the incongruity between these models 
can be surmounted dialectically, then it is not clear how he envisages their mutual mediation. His 
conceit, in any case, appears to be that “the trace of possible developments, of something 
hopeful”,45 can be thrown into relief by interpreting the fragments of ‘bad’ universality as 
containing the “mirror writing” of their opposite.46 This broadly messianic view will require 
further qualification in due course. In the meantime we must ask: how does Adorno’s concept of 
negative universal history factor in his account of a dialectic of reason? 
 
b.) Having thus reconstructed the contours of Adorno’s negative universal history, we can take 
another step towards determining how his concepts of religion, theology and metaphysics sit 
therein. For this purpose we turn to Dialectic of Enlightenment, a work co-authored by Adorno 
and Horkheimer during their American exile in the 1940s. By way of introduction, it is worth 
highlighting the following: Adorno and Horkheimer’s central thesis – “[m]yth is already 
enlightenment, and all enlightenment reverts to mythology”47 – already anticipates the grandiose 
historical meta-narrative outlined above. In Dialectic of Enlightenment the markers of this arc are 
different historical guises of what is always already seen by the authors as ‘rational’ thought – a 
                                                
42 Ibid, 319 
43 Ibid 
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45 Ibid, 91 
46 Adorno, Minima Moralia, 247 [Translation altered]. See pp. 46-50 of the present study. 
47 Theodor W. Adorno & Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. Edmund Jephcott, ed. Gunzelin 
Schmid Noerr (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), xviii 
 72 
development that stretches from pre-history to the present and encompasses religion, theology 
and metaphysics. Before attempting to differentiate between these terms, however, the motto 
cited above requires further elucidation. 
In Dialectic of Enlightenment, myth designates two divergent tendencies that Adorno and 
Horkheimer extract from their reading of Homer’s Odyssey.48 On the one hand, the authors 
loosely characterise myth as a particular narrative form, which is “derived from popular 
tradition”.49 With explicit reference to Ulrich Moellendorff and Jacob Burckhardt (and an implicit 
nod to Lukács’ Theory of the Novel, 1916), they assure us that the overarching characteristic of 
myth is that man is ruled over by perennial forces of murky provenance, which they describe as 
‘fate’ or ‘destiny’ (Schicksal). Accordingly, Adorno and Horkheimer present the world of myth as 
emphatically pre-historic inasmuch as past, present and future appear undifferentiated therein. In 
myth, they argue, “nothing can be defined as lasting, and yet everything remains one and the 
same”.50 In this regard, they assert that myth operates according to the timeless law of cyclical 
recurrence (as in the myth of Sisyphus, for instance). On the other hand, however, the authors 
characterise myth as an early product of emphatically rational thought. That is to say, in Adorno 
and Horkheimer’s view, ‘myth is already enlightenment’ to the extent that it serves as an 
explanatory device designed to dispel man’s elementary terror before the death-bringing forces of 
nature – a form of rationalisation. Hence the famous estimation that “[e]nlightement, understood 
in the widest sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating human beings from 
fear and installing them as masters”,51 both physically and intellectually. In turn, the concept of 
‘enlightenment’ extends far beyond a particular historical period, such as the 18th century.52 
                                                
48 As Adorno and Horkheimer argue, “the Odyssey as a whole bears witness to the dialectic of enlightenment. In its 
oldest stratum, especially, the epic shows clear links to myth: the adventures are drawn from popular tradition. But as 
the Homeric spirit takes over and ‘organises’ the myths, it comes into contradictions with them. The familiar 
equation of epic and myth, which in any case has been undermined by recent classical philology, proves wholly 
misleading when subjected to philosophical critique. The two concepts diverge. They mark two phases of an 
historical process, which are still visible at the joints where editors have stitched the epic together.” Adorno & 
Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 35 
49 Ibid 
50 Ibid, 205 
51 Ibid, 3 [My emphasis] 
52 To be sure, Adorno and Horkheimer’s entire exposition must be taken cum grano salis. Their account of animism, 
for example, is certainly not concerned with anthropological research per se. Rather, these excursions serve to 
illustrate a broadly psychoanalytic point about the formation of subjectivity. This is not to suggest, of course, that 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s glaring Euro-centrism is immune to criticism; only that this is not our current focus. 
Certainly, recent scholarship challenging a monolithic view of ‘the’ enlightenment – such as the work of Jonathan 
Israel – seriously calls into question some of Adorno and Horkheimer’s precepts. Reading Dialectic of Enlightenment 
in these terms, however, exceeds the remit of the present chapter. Cf. Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment: 
Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650-1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 
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Rather, it is taken to mean a much more general comportment by which human beings assert their 
place in the world through the mastery of nature. Without rehearsing the specifics of this point, 
we note that Adorno and Horkheimer’s account is tied to a wider, quasi-ontogenetic reflection on 
the emergence of (bourgeois) subjectivity. As they argue, man’s individual consciousness is 
wrested from the realm of brute physical actuality. At the same time, there remains an irreducibly 
‘natural’ dimension to man’s bodily being – though ‘nature’, here, always means second nature.53 
Accordingly, the struggle against nature must also be seen as a struggle against oneself. That is to 
say, for man to safeguard himself against the fearful world from which he emerges, but which he 
fears may at any point reclaim him, he must deny his own ties to nature. Through various twists 
and turns, Adorno and Horkheimer argue, this internalised sense of domination returns as the 
calamitous revenge of repressed nature: the domination of human beings over each other. In this 
sense the book tells a story about the fateful cycle of self-preservation and its cost. The “mythical 
sacrifice of reason” is endlessly replayed in ever more terrible scenarios that extend right into the 
present age.54 
Adorno and Horkheimer illustrate this point with reference to Odysseus’s cunning efforts to 
outsmart the powers of mythical nature (Circe, the Cyclops, the Lotus-Eaters, etc.) As they argue, 
Odysseus becomes a slave to his self-preservational drive and thus relapses to a fateful state of 
un-freedom that is akin to mythical nature. In Adorno and Horkheimer’s view, this is particularly 
evident in book XII of the Odyssey, the tale of Odysseus and the Sirens.55 Herein, it will be 
recalled, Odysseus orders his oarsmen to stuff their ears with wax and tie him to the mast of their 
ship as they pass by the Sirens’ island. This way the crew remain impervious to the Sirens’ 
irresistible call whilst Odysseus may experience it from a position of relative safety. In the 
present context, this episode is significant because it serves as an analogy for the self-abnegation 
of reason that Adorno and Horkheimer purport to diagnose. As they argue, Odysseus – the 
prototype of the bourgeois subject – resists the Sirens’ mythical call only by having himself 
restrained. The cost of his self-preservation, however, is nothing less than his precarious 
autonomy. The point is that Adorno and Horkheimer derive a general historical paradigm from 
this image. As they suggest, a “history of civilisation” conceived along the lines of the Odyssey 
                                                
53 See p. 56, n. 194 of the present study. 
54 Adorno, Kierkegaard, 119 
55 For an illuminating feminist reading of these passages from Dialectic of Enlightenment, see: Rebecca Comay, 
“Adorno’s Siren Song”, New German Critique, No. 81 (Autumn, 2000): 21-48 
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(being bound in order to persist) appears as a “history of the introversion of sacrifice”:56 a 
sacrifice of the self to itself, so to speak. How, then, do the three ‘guises’ of rational thought that 
we set out to situate – religion, theology and metaphysics – factor in this larger construct? 
 
• Religion: 
 
Having established the general outline of Adorno’s historical framework, we can finally turn to 
the first of the three guises of rational thought that we set out to differentiate, namely: religion. 
Although Adorno makes free use of religious motifs throughout his writings, his explicit 
references to religion as religion are scant. (They typically occur indirectly in works like The 
Jargon of Authenticity, where he argues that certain unacknowledged religious sentiments live on 
in the ostensibly secular thought patterns of thinkers such as Jaspers and Heidegger.) Where 
Adorno does speak of religion as such, however, he is generally concerned with various forms of 
Judaism and Christianity. He appears to rely on the etymological derivation of ‘religion’ from the 
Latin religare (to bind), for instance, when he speaks of the “renaissance of revealed religion” in 
terms of “bonds” (Bindungen).57 We might infer, then, that for Adorno religion means being 
bound to and, indeed, by a tradition that claims to derive its authority directly from divine 
revelation, e.g. Moses’ reception of the Ten Commandments at Mount Sinai. The operative terms 
here are ‘revelation’, meaning God’s direct communication with man (God reveals certain 
injunctions to the prophet Moses), and ‘tradition’ (the term “comes from tradere, to hand 
down”),58 which designates the mode of transmission by which God’s injunctions arrive in the 
present. That is to say, Adorno seems to perceive the defining trait of religion as a submission to 
the traditional authority of revelation. The problem with religious thinking in the present, then, is 
that Adorno figures modernity precisely as a crisis of tradition, following a broadly Marxian 
account of the capitalist dissolution of bonds paired with a more thoroughgoing Nietzscheanism. 
Leaving in suspense the resonance of this point with Benjamin’s Kafka essay, which treats the 
modern crisis of tradition at some length, we note the following: on the one hand, religion has a 
socially normative function inasmuch as it binds individuals to each other through a shared 
                                                
56 Ibid, 43 
57 Theodor W. Adorno, “Reason and Revelation”, in Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, trans. Henry W. 
Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 138 
58 Theodor W. Adorno, “Über Tradition”, in Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977), 
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observance of the divine injunctions received from tradition (e.g. the ban on images); on the other 
hand, it has an explanatory function inasmuch as it designates a “system of thought”,59 which – 
like myth – provides an account of the origins of the universe, the meaning of life, etc. In its 
capacity as a ‘system of thought’, to borrow Freud’s idiom, religion must thus be grasped as a 
form of rational thought that is proper to a specific historical moment. As we have noted in our 
Introduction, Adorno and Horkheimer cite Judaism as the paradigmatic example hereof. 
As the monotheistic religion par excellence, Judaism is presented as a rationalisation of 
polytheistic paganism; a more advanced ‘stage’ in the dialectic of enlightenment. Its central 
feature, we are told, is that it “outlaw[s] the principle of magic.”60 Accordingly, Adorno and 
Horkheimer assure us that, in Judaism, spells give way to concepts, and taboos give way to laws 
– above all, the law against idol worship. In this regard, it follows that Judaism is repeatedly 
equated with reason itself in a curious echo of Hermann Cohen’s famous characterisation.61 That 
is why, unlike Christianity, Judaism makes no appeal to faith. In any case, Adorno and 
Horkheimer present the Jewish idea of God as annihilating the spirited cosmos of animism: “as 
its creator and ruler”, they claim, the Jewish God “subjugates nature”. 62  This admittedly 
tendentious interpretation allows the authors to discern the dialectic of reason in Judaism, 
inasmuch as the effort to vanquish myth through a seamless domination of nature only ensnares it 
deeper in its fateful cycle. As Adorno and Horkheimer argue: 
 
God as spirit is the principle opposed to nature; it not only stands for nature’s blind cycle as do all 
the mythical gods, but offers liberation from it. But in its remotest abstractness, the 
incommensurable has at the same time become more terrible, and the pitiless statement: ‘I am who I 
am’, which tolerates nothing beside itself, surpasses in its inescapable power the blinder and 
therefore more ambiguous judgement of anonymous fate.63 
 
The passage clearly illustrates the historical dynamic we have outlined above: whilst ‘God as 
spirit’ is said to ‘offer liberation’ from the ‘blind cycle’ of ‘nature’, His ‘remote abstractness’ 
                                                
59 Sigmund Freud, Totem & Taboo: Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics, 
trans. James Strachey (London: Routledge, 1966), 77 
60 Adorno & Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 13 
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ultimately turns out to be even more ‘terrible’ than what preceded it. As such, Judaism is seen as 
containing an enlightening moment that, in turn, reverts to myth. Redeeming this moment would 
require nothing less than an immanent critique of Judaism itself – an effort that exceeds not only 
the confines of the present chapter but also the remit of Adorno and Horkheimer’s book. Instead 
of attempting to fill out this lacuna, it remains to ask how Adorno envisages the difference 
between ‘religion’ and ‘theology’. 
 
• Theology: 
 
As will be recalled, it was asserted at the outset that Adorno views theology as the intellectual 
superstructure of religion: a reasoned discourse about God. It remains to show, then, that the 
historical dynamic we have outlined above is, in fact, operational in this context too. I propose to 
approach this matter with a view to two guiding questions: a.) How does the dialectic of reason 
play out in Adorno’s paradigmatic essay ‘Reason and Revelation’ (1958)? b.) Can Adorno’s 
thought be adequately grasped as a form of ‘negative theology’? 
 
a.) In a short essay titled ‘Reason and Revelation’ Adorno reflects on a series of interrelated 
questions.64 Firstly, he is concerned with a tension between two ostensibly divergent tendencies 
that span the history of Christian thought from Augustine to Karl Barth. On the one hand, this 
means ‘faith in revelation’ (Offenbarungsglaube); on the other hand, it means ‘autonomous 
reason’ (autonome Vernunft). As we will find, Adorno explores a number of different historical 
efforts to negotiate this relationship. To begin with, the investigation is prompted by what he 
perceives as a disconcerting “turn toward positive religion” in post-war West Germany.65 
Although Adorno cites only anecdotal evidence for this alleged development, he assures us that 
this ‘turn’ expresses an altogether spurious sense – pervasive in the Bundesrepublik – that one 
could simply “breathe back that meaning into the disenchanted world under whose absence we 
                                                
64 The text was first presented at a roundtable discussion between Adorno and the historian Eugen Kogon, held in 
Münster in 1957, and broadcast by the Westdeutscher Rundfunk. Transcripts of both Adorno’s and Kogon’s 
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Kultur und Politik, Vol. 13, No. 6 (Jun 1958): 392-402; “Offenbarung oder autonome Vernunft (ii)”, Frankfurter 
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65 Adorno, “Reason and Revelation”, 136 
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have been suffering for so long”.66 As he suggests, the danger of this tendency is that it 
legitimates a wanton obscurantism: “today”, he claims, “the turn toward faith in revelation” is a 
“desperate reaction” to the perceived failings of “ratio”, an estimation that recalls the 
argumentative pattern familiar from Dialectic of Enlightenment.67 Adorno’s general point appears 
to be that, at best, the “new religious attitude”68 offers a false sense of consolation about the ills of 
capitalist modernity; at worst, its irrationalism serves to reinforce existing injustices (wishing 
away socio-historically conditioned problems, rather than facing them). Secondly, as in The 
Jargon of Authenticity, Adorno’s exposition is underpinned by an indictment of certain strands of 
contemporary philosophy that he perceives as forms of crypto-religious irrationalism. (As above, 
his main target here is Heidegger.)69 Adorno writes that “the endeavours of ontology today” are 
little more than a desperate attempt to “leap without mediation” from an “ongoing nominalistic 
situation” into “realism, the world of ideas in themselves” – a tendency that is, in turn, “closely 
related” to the “renaissance of revealed religion”.70 Without wishing to assay the feasibility of 
these charges, it will prove telling that the topos of a Kierkegaardian ‘leap’ from a ‘nominalistic 
situation’ into ‘realism’ recurs throughout Adorno’s text.71 Before we consider what this can tell 
us about Adorno’s attitude towards theology, however, it remains to pre-empt one possible 
misunderstanding: under no circumstances should the text be read simply as an atheistic diatribe 
against religious sentiments or theological reasoning per se. After all, Adorno notes that, “vis-à-
vis the hardening of the world in late Antiquity”, for instance, “Christianity had an infinitely 
liberating and humane effect”.72 To say that Christianity “has never been anything more than 
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ideology would really be the most narrow-minded sociologism.”73 However, “today” Christianity 
runs the “infinite danger” of becoming a surrogate for “authoritarian” tendencies.74 
Leaving aside some of the glaring gaps in Adorno’s piece, we note that ‘Reason and 
Revelation’ is of interest in the present context less because of its concern with contemporary 
religious trends and more because, between the lines, it contains an admittedly schematic (not to 
say tendentious) account of how Christian thought sits in the larger philosophical meta-narrative 
that we have sought to trace. That is to say, as far as we are concerned, ‘Reason and Revelation’ 
clearly indicates two things: firstly, Adorno’s account of the historical tensions between ‘reason’ 
and ‘revelation’ (cited to illustrate his plaint against the alleged ‘renaissance of revealed religion’) 
constitutes – however scantly – a history of Christian theology. After all, Adorno surveys a 
number of divergent efforts to treat God intellectually and discursively. Secondly, as above, 
Adorno frames the history of these efforts in terms of the dialectic of enlightenment itself. Under 
this aspect, it is worth briefly considering some of his examples. 
Having begun with the premise that the supposed ‘turn to positive religion’ in 1950s West 
Germany is a reaction to the mounting dissatisfaction with reason as such, Adorno suggests that 
in 18th century Europe the situation was the other way around. Here, he assures us, the Scholastic 
concept of faith, “which was inherited from the tradition”, began to come under attack from “an 
autonomous ratio that refuses to accept anything other than what stands up to examination in its 
own terms.”75 Without specifying who launched these attacks (the Philosophes perhaps?), Adorno 
asserts that any “defence” of theology “against ratio had to be carried out with rational means”.76 
That is to say, the “defence already assumed the principle that belonged to its adversary.”77 In this 
regard, theology’s efforts to reasonably ground faith turned out to be self-undermining. The 
question thus becomes by what other means theology might negotiate the tension between faith in 
revelation and the modern demands of reason if the thinkers of the so-called high Enlightenment 
failed to provide satisfactory answers? Certainly one possible response is to resolve the tension 
between ‘reason’ and ‘revelation’ by leaping into the latter, as Kierkegaard is often said to have 
done.78 (Adorno briefly discusses this possibility.) Alternatively, one might want to overcome the 
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polarity between these terms in a more nuanced fashion. For example, Adorno suggests, “[h]igh 
Scholasticism, and especially the Summa of St. Thomas, have their force and dignity in the fact 
that, without absolutising the concept of reason, they never condemned it: theology went so far 
only in the age of nominalism, particularly with Luther.”79 Indeed, in his Summa Theologica (c. 
1274), St. Thomas Aquinas teaches that if there were no mediation between faith and reason, then 
faith would be empty and reason would be blind. That is to say, within certain bounds, the 
philosophical tools that Scholasticism derives principally from Aristotle can be used to verify the 
contents of revealed religion. At the same time, however, such a theological effort can never 
directly grasp that with which it is chiefly concerned, namely: God. In short, although theology 
can provide some reasoned insights into matters concerning the Divine, in metaphysical terms 
God remains beyond the grasp of reason: an incomprehensible esse. In Adorno’s view, then, 
Aquinas maintains a “productive tension”80 between faith and rationality, inasmuch as he posits a 
transcendent realm that cannot be reduced to either the terms of reason or those of faith alone.81 
By contrast, Adorno charges that ‘in the age of nominalism, particularly with Luther’, 
theology renders reason absolute and thus ‘condemns’ it. He does not elaborate on the historical 
connection between Luther and nominalism,82 nor does he indicate why this association should be 
seen as either ‘absolutising’ or ‘condemning’ reason. (Fleshing out this provocative claim in due 
detail would require nothing less than a comprehensive inquiry into the intellectual pre-history of 
the Reformation, which Adorno does not attempt to provide.) Without wishing to overextend the 
reach of his claim, then, it remains to carefully infer a number of points from this passage: for one 
thing, Adorno implies that nominalism – the view that universals do not possess any objective 
reality, adopted by certain late medieval theologians to distance themselves from Aristotelian 
                                                                                                                                                        
Kierkegaard, was made by the most progressive consciousness and at no less a cost than one’s entire life has since 
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realism – breaks with the Thomist conception of God as an incomprehensible esse. It implies that 
God has to denote a discrete entity (an ens), however much this entity may differ from all other 
things. Accordingly, Adorno claims that in order to avoid foregoing God’s transcendence, Luther 
has to qualify his reliance on nominalism by distinguishing between “two types of truth”:83 one 
(inferior) expressed in terms of logic, confirming certain things about the natural world hic e 
nunc; the other (superior) attainable by means of faith alone – the Lutheran sola fide. That is, for 
Luther, only faith can reconcile the paradoxes of revealed religion: Christ as man and God, 
historical and eternal, etc. Reason is thus ‘absolutised’ to the extent that it is pronounced 
sufficient for the attainment of worldly knowledge, which is – in turn – associated with 
“progress” and hence “the increasing domination of nature”.84 At the same time, though, it is 
‘condemned’ to the extent that it is subordinated to the primacy of faith. 
To be sure, Adorno’s speculations hinge on a conflation of numerous historically disparate 
phenomena. For instance, it is not clear how the ‘current religious mood’, which is supposed to 
respond to ‘the prevailing positivism’ of capitalist modernity, is mirrored by ‘the endeavours of 
ontology today’. Nor, for that matter, is it explained how this form of ‘positivism’ is supposed to 
be rooted in Luther’s particular take on ‘nominalism’.85 That is to say, Adorno’s diagnosis of the 
present as a ‘nominalistic’ or ‘positivistic’ situation, from which the likes of Heidegger and Barth 
are seen to ‘leap’ (however unsuccessfully) into the world of ‘realism’, is framed far too 
generally to be persuasive. In this regard, it is surprising that Adorno does not draw on Max 
Weber’s far more nuanced account of how capitalist modernity emerges from the teachings of the 
Reformation. After all, Adorno knew Weber’s work well. Whatever may have inspired Adorno’s 
sweeping claims, for the purposes of the present chapter ‘Reason and Revelation’ contains – at 
the very least – a timely demand. Set against the backdrop of Christian theology, Adorno argues 
that “reason” itself must be immanently criticised, “not as an absolute, regardless of whether it is 
then posited or negated, but rather as a moment within the totality”.86 It is “precisely this theme” 
– apparently “familiar to the great religions” – which “requires ‘secularisation’ today” if the 
dialectic of reason is “not to further the very darkening of the world”.87 As Adorno writes, 
“nothing” of the “theological content” skimmed in ‘Reason and Revelation’ will survive this 
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process of critique (which he demands but does not carry out) “without being transformed; every 
content will have to put itself to the test of migrating into the realm of the secular, the profane” – 
a point to which we will return below.88 But before proceeding to outline Adorno’s concept of 
metaphysics – the final ‘guise’ of rational thought in his historical meta-narrative – it remains to 
ask: can Adorno’s groping for transcendence be seen as a form of negative theology, as has been 
suggested by Jürgen Habermas and others? 
 
b.) In its simplest form, ‘negative theology’, or – more properly – apophatic theology (from the 
Greek apophasis, to deny or negate) means that God is utterly transcendent, wholly ineffable and 
does not admit of positive description. 89  In this regard, negative theology designates a 
philosophical device that addresses itself to problems arising from the convergence of broadly 
Old Testament views regarding the transcendence of God and ontological questions about His 
being – an effort to gain determinate knowledge of God through negation. On this model, since 
one cannot say that ‘God is great’, the statement ‘God is not not great’ is taken to provide more 
adequate knowledge of God’s greatness according to the arithmetic principle that two negatives 
make a positive. In its more mystical guise, this via negativa is said to produce an extra-rational 
spiritual encounter between man and God: “[t]he Divine, experienced as mysterium tremendum, 
shatters the presuppositions of mere human beings and reveals the incomplete, if not erroneous, 
nature of existing beliefs or actions. Divine transcendence interrupts as ‘wholly other’, 
completely beyond the range of human experience.”90 
The most enduring identification of Adorno with negative theology occurs in an influential 
essay by Jürgen Habermas, titled ‘The Primal History of Subjectivity’ (1981). Herein, Habermas 
characterises Adorno’s thought as a negative theology in the sense that his “critique of totality 
and ‘identity thinking’” appears to him as “sharing in negative theology’s aversion to asserting 
positive claims about the absolute, while continuing to posit the usefulness of the category of 
ultimate truth” as a kind of regulative ideal.91 Habermas thus characterises Adorno in the 
following terms: “[d]espairing of the barbaric course of human history, and refusing to identify 
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Laurens ten Kate (New York City: Fordham University Press, 2000), 1-57 
90 Christopher Craig Brittain, Adorno and Theology (London: Continuum, 2010), 92   
91 Ibid, 91 
 82 
any solid foundation for hope or consolation, Adorno is (…) left with nothing but a vague 
longing” for an amorphous “‘wholly other’.”92 Accordingly, Habermas claims that Adorno’s 
abidance by the image ban is akin to a negative theology inasmuch as this “wholly other may 
only be indicated by indeterminate negation, not known.”93 It seems probable that Habermas’ 
objections are directed at a passage from Dialectic of Enlightenment which declares the 
following: “the right of the image” – the ‘image of theology’ perhaps? – “is rescued in the 
faithful observance of its prohibition”, an “observance” that is in turn equated with “‘determinate 
negation’”.94 As we saw in the previous chapter, the ‘images’ to which Adorno and Horkheimer 
allude are not pictures so much as they are figures of thought. They insist on their ‘right’ only in 
the determinate negation of the ‘false’, never directly. Accordingly, since for Adorno and 
Horkheimer there can be no positive expression of ‘the absolutely good’, these ‘images’ are 
subject to a ban. Against this backdrop, Habermas’ critique of Adorno qua negative theology 
comes into focus. James Gordon Finlayson aptly summarises this in four steps: firstly, we are 
told, Habermas argues that Adorno’s position is irrational. He “accuses Adorno of abandoning 
reason in favour of some other mode of apprehension of Utopia”;95 secondly, he charges Adorno 
with mysticism: “Habermas appears to make two claims: first, that apophaticism is eo ipso 
mysticism since it posits a divine, wholly transcendent being that is consequently ineffable and 
unknowable; and second, that apophaticism is mysticism since it holds out the prospect of an 
extra-conceptual experience of the divine presence, won through the dialectical self-subversion of 
discursive reason”;96 thirdly, he maintains that Adorno’s position is incoherent, i.e. that it is in the 
thrall of a “performative contradiction”;97 and, finally, he contends that “negative dialectics, like 
negative theology, is theoretically empty (…)”, i.e. that it is “unproductive or pointless” inasmuch 
as it lacks any “viable political dimension”.98 
                                                
92 Ibid, 89-90 
93 Jürgen Habermas, “The Primal History of Subjectivity”, in Philosophical-Political Profiles, trans. Frederick G. 
Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983), 170. Max Horkheimer comments on the meaning of the ‘wholly 
other’: “Both Adorno and I (…) no longer spoke of God but of the ‘yearning for the wholly other’. In the bible it says 
‘You shall not make yourself an image of God’. You cannot represent what is absolutely good. The pious Jew avoids 
the word ‘God’ where possible (…). By the same token, Critical Theory too carefully calls the absolute ‘the other.’” 
Cf. Max Horkheimer, “Was wir Sinn nennen wird verschwinden – Spiegel Gespräch mit dem Philosophen Max 
Horkheimer”, in Der Spiegel, (05 January 1970), 81 [My translation] 
94 Adorno & Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 18 
95 James Gordon Finlayson, “On not Being Silent in the Darkness: Adorno’s Singular Apophaticism”, The Harvard 
Theological Review 105, No. 1 (January 2012), 2 
96 Ibid 
97 Habermas, “The Primal History of Subjectivity”, 185-186 [My emphasis] 
98 Finlayson, “On not Being Silent in the Dark”, 4 [My emphasis] 
 83 
 There is no need to address these criticisms individually. Let us note only the following: 
Habermas’ self-professed effort to complete the enlightenment project – his effort to delineate an 
inter-subjective concept of communicative reason – is at odds with Adorno’s premise that such 
reason has an unacknowledged mythical core which must be exorcised through immanent 
critique. That is to say, the divergence between Adorno and Habermas stems in no small measure 
from their opposing attitudes towards language (‘communication’). In short, Habermas deems 
that the insistence on a ‘wholly other’ is ‘irrational’, ‘mystical’, ‘incoherent’ and ‘empty’ because 
he does not accept the extent to which, for Adorno, all aspects of human life (including its 
linguistic, communicative regimes) are complicit with a universal state of un-freedom. In this 
regard, the estimation that Adorno “stubbornly refuses” to positively delineate “the structure of a 
life together in communication (…) free from coercion” is telling:99 it indicates that Habermas 
views ‘the structure’ of this ‘life’ as being available to us in a fairly uncomplicated sense. The 
theory of communicative action thus amounts to voluntarism. In order to grasp more fully why 
Habermas’ analogy between Adorno and negative theology does not hold, however, we must turn 
to a third guise of rational thought, which – like religion and theology – is concerned with ‘the 
wholly other’, “the constitutive structures of being”,100 namely: metaphysics. 
 
• Metaphysics: 
 
We have seen, then, where religion and theology qua ‘guises’ of rational thought sit in Adorno’s 
historical meta-narrative. Before concluding this section, however, it remains to consider the final 
part of Negative Dialectics: the 12 ‘Meditations on Metaphysics’. If, as Adorno argues, ‘positive 
religion has lost its validity’ and ‘traditional theology is not restorable’; if “the whole” has indeed 
become “the untrue” and an affirmative concept of metaphysics is no longer sustainable, then we 
must ask:101 a.) What is the cause of Adorno’s diagnosis? b.) What – if anything – does he 
propose to remedy this condition? In order to begin answering these questions, however, we must 
first tie them to the discussion so far. Accordingly, we note that Adorno distinguishes between 
theology and metaphysics in the following terms: 
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It is quite certain that metaphysics and theology cannot simply be distinguished from each other as 
historical stages (…) since they have constantly crossed over historically: one appeared at the same 
time as the other; one was forgotten only to re-emerge in the foreground. They form an 
extraordinarily complex structure which cannot be reduced to a simple conceptual formula. 
Nevertheless, there is an element of truth in the theory of stages (…) in that metaphysics in the 
traditional sense (…) is an attempt to determine the absolute, or the constitutive structures of being, 
on the basis of thought alone. That is, it does not derive the absolute dogmatically from revelation, 
or as something positive which is simply given to me, as something directly existing, through 
revelation or recorded revelation, but (…) it determines the absolute through concepts.102 
 
In Adorno’s view, then, the difference between theology and metaphysics is as follows: theology 
means the attempt ‘to determine the absolute, or the constitutive structures of being’ 
dogmatically, i.e. through reliance on the truth of revelation over and above what can be verified 
discursively or conceptually. That is to say, theology relies on (and constantly reasserts) the 
validity of an external given – God – knowledge of whom is passed down through tradition. By 
contrast, metaphysics means the attempt to determine these constitutive structures out of thought 
alone. That is to say, for Aristotle – Adorno’s main point of reference – metaphysics means “the 
form of philosophy which takes concepts as its objects”:103 purely conceptual thinking. All the 
same, he continues, “it is certainly true that metaphysics has something in common with theology 
in its manner of seeking to elevate itself above immanence, above the empirical world.”104 (We 
are reminded of Adorno’s characterisation of capitalist modernity as a positivistic or otherwise 
nominalistic ‘situation’.) In other words, metaphysics, theology and – we might add – religion 
share a concern with transcendence which, according to Adorno, has become historically 
insubstantial. Nevertheless, he declares his solidarity with this impulse “at the time of its fall”,105 
as the famous final line of Negative Dialectics solemnly declares. After all, the utopian dimension 
of Adorno’s thought aims precisely at breaking out of the closed system of immanence that he 
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associates with the positivistic “cult (…) of facts”106 that characterises the disenchanted world of 
capitalist modernity. We have already noted some of the reasons as to why this ‘beyond’ cannot 
be positively pictured; however, another pressing question arises at this juncture: how does 
Adorno explain this historical unavailability in the first place? 
 
a.) In a postscript to the second edition of his Kierkegaard study (1966), Adorno describes his 
opposition to metaphysics as a “doctrine of the unhistorical, unchangeable”:107 a true and 
immutable world behind the world of mere appearances, a Hinterwelt (to borrow Nietzsche’s 
term).108 Indeed, he seems to associate this view of metaphysics with philosophy more generally. 
After all, Adorno argues that the traditional aim of philosophy is precisely to grasp the totality of 
the real – the constitutive structures of being – bindingly and lastingly out of thought alone. 
Accordingly, it will be recalled, Adorno’s philosophical project begins and ends with a resolute 
disavowal of this undertaking, conceived of as an immanent critique of idealism. (An early 
articulation of this view appears in Adorno’s inaugural lecture on ‘The Actuality of Philosophy’, 
1931: “[w]hoever chooses philosophy as a profession today must first reject the illusion that 
earlier philosophical enterprises began with: that the power of thought is sufficient to grasp the 
totality of the real.”)109 The historical impasse of philosophy is thus deemed to be co-extensive 
with that of metaphysics. It is against this backdrop that we must view Adorno’s reformulation of 
Kant’s epistemological question – “how is metaphysics possible?” – into a historical one: “[i]s it 
still possible to have a metaphysical experience?”, or rather: can it be possible again?110 And if so: 
how? However, before we explore what it might mean to have a metaphysical experience, we 
must note another point concerning Adorno’s diagnosis that an affirmative concept of 
metaphysics has become untenable.  
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Certainly, in the early 1930s Adorno’s reasoning echoed a wider sense that traditional 
structures of meaning have deteriorated – a sentiment once memorably captured by Georg Lukács 
as “transcendental homelessness”.111 After WWII, however, his emphasis shifts explicitly. For 
Adorno, the irrevocable dissolution of a purposeful view of history is expressed in a proper name: 
Auschwitz.112 In response to our question as to what cements Adorno’s conviction that an 
affirmative concept of metaphysics has become impossible we note the following: 
 
In face of the experiences we have had, not only through Auschwitz but through the introduction of 
torture as a permanent institution and through the atomic bomb – all these things form a kind of 
coherence, a hellish unity – in face of these experiences the assertion that what is has meaning, and 
the affirmative character which has been attributed to metaphysics almost without exception, 
becomes a mockery.113 
 
For Adorno, Auschwitz (though ‘not only’ Auschwitz, but rather the institutionalisation of 
‘torture’ for which it stands) becomes the marker of a radical meaninglessness. It belies the 
purposive forward movement of history and hence the positive claim to grasping a ‘wholly other’ 
through religion, theology or metaphysics. Certainly, similar claims have been made long before 
Adorno. (One need only think of Jacobi’s reflections on the Lisbon earthquake.) The differentia 
specifica is that Adorno views Auschwitz as the outcome of an intra-historical process, which 
proceeds through the technological domination of nature. Auschwitz is the apotheosis of the 
dialectic of enlightenment. But what is Adorno proposing here beyond the diagnosis of a 
thoroughgoing nihilism as the pervasive condition of modernity?114 
 
b.) As we have noted, Adorno is keen to salvage the transcendent orientation of metaphysics ‘at 
the moment of its fall’. As he argues, “thinking beyond itself, into openness – that, precisely, is 
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metaphysics.”115 As we have seen, though, Adorno deems that the metaphysical orientation 
towards transcendence is only sustainable negatively as an experience of unavailability. Pain – 
visceral, somatic suffering – throws into relief the contours of something beyond the spellbound 
sphere of existence.116 Such experiences negatively inscribe an opening into the historical process 
in the form of the imperative that “[w]oe” must “go”.117 In this respect, Adorno ultimately affirms 
the possibility of metaphysical experience, however qualified or paradoxical the character of this 
affirmation may be. As Peter Osborne argues, this ‘affirmation’ is best understood as a 
“materialist metaphysics of modernity; rather than (…) a negative theology”, because Adorno 
does not readmit God through the backdoor, so to speak.118 So much, then, for Habermas’ charge. 
Without wishing to retread these matters here, we note only the following: Adorno’s 
reflections concerning metaphysics operate on three overlapping registers: the first is 
epistemological: it concerns the idea that “the absolute, as it hovers before metaphysics, would be 
the nonidentical” (see Chapter One).119 The second is ethical: it concerns the pervasive sense of 
“guilt” implied in the question “whether after Auschwitz you can go on living”.120 (We will return 
to this point below.) The third is aesthetic: it concerns the displacement of metaphysics into the 
realm of aesthetics in Aesthetic Theory. (This will be the focus of Chapter Three.) As we will see, 
Adorno’s conflation of these disparate registers poses a problem for his effort to think 
particularity under the aegis of the image ban. 
 
This crossroads provides an opportunity to recap our argument: so far we have seen how Adorno 
situates the three ‘guises’ of rational thought that we have sought to differentiate within the 
bounds of his negative universal history. As we have argued, the red thread connecting religion 
with theology and metaphysics is a shared concern with transcendence. In Adorno’s view, 
however, the object of this concern has become historically insubstantial. The cause of this 
impasse was said to lie in the dialectic of reason itself (not least in its catastrophic culmination in 
Auschwitz). Accordingly, we asserted that Adorno attempts to salvage the orientation towards a 
realm beyond the spellbound sphere of being by negatively intimating a sense of metaphysical 
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experience in terms of unavailability. This negative concept of metaphysics, in turn, was said to 
throw into relief a historical opening: an indeterminate realm of possibility, albeit not a ‘negative 
theology’. Before concluding this section, however, it is worth emphasising one last point: 
Adorno’s historical verdict concerning the impossibility of positively grasping the absolute in the 
present can be complemented with a view to a text cited at the outset, namely: Walter Benjamin’s 
fragment ‘Capitalism as Religion’. To be sure, there is an asymmetry here in cross reading large 
swathes of Adorno’s mature philosophy with a minor fragment of Benjamin’s, which was – by all 
accounts – neither finished nor intended for publication. This is all the more troubling since it is 
not even clear whether Adorno was familiar with this sketch. (However, given that Adorno co-
edited the first collection of Benjamin’s works in 1955, this is not improbable.) In any case, there 
is a striking correspondence between certain precepts of Benjamin’s text and our reconstruction 
of Adorno’s philosophy of history. Exploring this admittedly speculative correlation will allow us 
to substantiate the opening assertion that Adorno’s heretical repurposing of theological motifs, 
“far beyond” what they “once originally meant”,121 serves the criticism of reality disfigured by a 
capitalist cult religion. After all, as we have seen in ‘Reason and Revelation’, Adorno argues that 
in the present, ‘nothing of theological content will persist without being transformed’; ‘every 
content will have to put itself to the test of migrating into the realm of the secular, the profane’: in 
our sense, into the realm of critical theory. With this in mind, we turn to Benjamin’s text. 
 
iii.) Capitalism as Religion: 
 
Walter Benjamin’s unfinished sketch, ‘Capitalism as Religion’ (1921), barely fills three pages. 
Nevertheless its characteristic density has given rise to much debate since it was first published 
posthumously in 1985. Indeed, the diagnostic force of this short fragment is arresting. Over its 
course, Benjamin radicalises Max Weber’s analysis of capitalism’s religious conditioning, 
famously elaborated in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904). As Benjamin 
argues, religion is not just the causal precondition of capitalism, its historical antecedent, as 
Weber claims; capitalism is itself an “essentially religious phenomenon”, designed to “allay the 
same anxieties, torments, and disturbances” as other “so-called religions”.122 However, before 
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attempting to weigh up the continuity of this text with our discussion of Adorno, it is worth a.) 
Briefly situating the piece in the wider context of Benjamin’s work; and b.) Summarising the 
main thrust of his argument. 
 
a.) ‘Capitalism as Religion’ takes its title – and in some ways its cue – from a section of Ernst 
Bloch’s book Thomas Münzer as Theologian of the Revolution (1921). Bloch and Benjamin had 
become acquainted around 1918 during their time in Switzerland, and Benjamin had reportedly 
read a typescript of Bloch’s book as early as 1920.123 Indeed, Bloch writes that the Reformation 
“inaugurates (…) not merely the misuse of Christianity”, particularly in Calvinism, “but rather its 
complete desertion and even elements of a new religion: of capitalism as religion and the true 
church of Mammon.”124 Despite the explicit echo of Bloch’s formulation in Benjamin’s text, 
however, their approaches differ significantly. “Though Bloch identifies capitalism as a religion 
(…), his judgement is nevertheless a moderate one: for the capitalism in question does not 
represent for Bloch, as it does for Benjamin, the metamorphosis of Christianity into its true form, 
but rather the ‘complete desertion’ from it.”125 Benjamin fleshes out this view over the course of 
three interlocking sections: a relatively polished opening passage followed by some shorthand 
notes and – finally – a literature review.  
As Uwe Steiner demonstrates with a view to the texts cited in the latter part (including 
works by Erich Unger, Georges Sorel and Gustav Landauer), ‘Capitalism as Religion’ belongs to 
a largely unrealised cycle on politics that Benjamin was planning around 1921, a period during 
which he displayed markedly anarchistic leanings.126 Indeed, Benjamin’s letters suggest that the 
series was supposed to comprise at least three parts: firstly, an essay entitled ‘Der Wahre 
Politiker’ (‘The True Politician’); secondly, a piece titled ‘Die Wahre Politik’ (‘The True 
Politics’), which – in turn – was to consist of two sections, respectively called ‘Abbau der 
Gewalt’ (‘Dismantling of Violence’)127 and ‘Teleologie Ohne Edzweck’ (‘Teleology Without 
                                                                                                                                                        
of predestination in Calvinism and commercial instrumentality that provides the occasion for capitalism’s 
emergence. Weighing up this matter in due detail, however, exceeds the scope of the present inquiry. 
123 Cf. Werner Hamacher, “Guilt History: Benjamin’s Sketch ‘Capitalism as Religion’”, in Diacritics, Vol. 32, No. 
3/4 (Autumn-Winter, 2002): 81-106 
124  Ernst Bloch, Thomas Münzer als Theologe der Revolution (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1962), 123 
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125 Hamacher, “Guilt History”, 88 
126 Cf. Uwe Steiner, “Kapitalismus als Religion”, in Benjamin Handbuch, Leben – Werk – Wirkung, ed. Burkhardt 
Lindner (Stuttgart & Weimar: Verlag J.B. Metzler, 2011), 167-174 
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Ends’); and thirdly, a political reading of Paul Scheerbart’s asteroid novel Lesabéndio (1913). 
Curiously, then, the editors of Benjamin’s Gesammelte Schriften omitted a section from their 
transcript of the fragment, titled ‘Geld und Wetter (Zur Lesabéndio-Kritik)’.128 It is reproduced 
elsewhere as part of the supplementary materials for One Way Street (1928). Presumably this is 
because certain formulations in Benjamin’s note are, indeed, reworked and included in this later 
text. However, the particular point of interest here is Benjamin’s mention of Scheerbart, whose 
novel he had reviewed some years earlier. As the correspondence with Scholem indicates, 
Benjamin planned to revisit Lesabéndio in a long-form piece set against his reflections on 
‘Capitalism as Religion’. Steiner suggests that this unwritten piece on Scheerbart, along with a 
lost review of Ernst Bloch’s Spirit of Utopia (1918), were intended to delineate the contours of 
Benjamin’s concept of politics. Without presently wishing to attempt a reconstruction of this 
concept, we turn to a reading of the text itself. 
 
b.) ‘Capitalism as Religion’ contains four main hypotheses, which Samuel Weber helpfully 
summarises as follows: 
 
1. Capitalism is a cult-religion, and indeed, perhaps ‘the most extreme that ever existed.’ 
2. The cult of capitalism is extreme because it never pauses. It is characterized by ‘permanent 
duration’. 
3. The incessant cult of capitalism is verschuldend, which, according to the dual meaning of Schuld 
itself, must be translated both as ‘guilt-producing’ or ‘culpabilizing’ and as ‘debt-producing’ or 
‘indebting.’ (…) 
4. The God of this religion, far from redeeming from guilt, is drawn into it. As a result this God 
‘must be kept secret and addressed only at the zenith of its (his) culpability-indebtedness (…).’129 
 
With regards to the first point, Benjamin writes that “[i]n capitalism, things have a meaning only 
in their immediate relationship to the cult; capitalism has no specific body of dogma, no 
theology.”130 As such, it is not concerned with “higher” or “moral” matters.131 Accordingly, 
                                                
128 To my knowledge this piece has not been translated into English. 
129 Samuel Weber, Benjamin’s Abilities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 253 
130 Benjamin, “Capitalism as Religion”, 288 [Translation altered]. Inexplicably the translators of Benjamin’s Selected 
Writings have dropped the term ‘unmittelbar’ – immediately – from their translation. 
131 Ibid, 290 
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Benjamin describes the cult as “pagan”.132 Its cultic rites are performed blindly and endlessly in 
the accruing of profits. It is telling, then, that Benjamin characterises “banknotes” as the idols of 
the capitalist cult.133 (In the 1930s he elaborates this idea with a view to Marx. In the notes 
comprising his unfinished Arcades Project, for instance, Benjamin describes the shopping 
arcades of fin-de-siècle Paris as “temples of commodity capital”.134 In this early fragment, 
however, Benjamin remains critical of Marx, echoing Landauer’s claim that capitalism cannot 
produce socialism out of itself.) But the tenor of Benjamin’s first hypothesis points in another 
direction. In his view capitalism does not require any outside impetus. As Weber notes, “this 
radically transforms its relation to the divine”.135 Instead of deriving meaning from theology, or – 
for that matter – from economics, “the capitalist cult is itself the locus and source of all 
meaning.”136 
This leads us to the second characteristic noted above. As Benjamin argues, the duration of 
the cult is permanent. “Since the cult no longer draws its meaning from something radically 
separate from it, but only from itself, that self consequently becomes its own measure.”137 It 
becomes, in other words, autonomous. “The measure of a self is its ability to (…) withstand the 
transformative effects of time.”138 That is to say, the capitalist cult withstands the weathering of 
time because it is figured as timeless (in Adorno’s sense: mythical). At this point, Benjamin’s 
cryptic notion that “[c]apitalism is the celebration of a cult sans trêve et sans merci” (without 
truce or mercy) comes into focus.139 In capitalism, he writes, “there are no ‘weekdays.’ There is 
no day that is not a feast day, in the terrible sense that all its sacred pomp is unfolded before 
us”.140 The ‘sacred pomp’ is ‘terrible’ because it appears as “a war without pause or end” – 
without truce or mercy – “a life-consuming exertion”, perpetrated on the living.141 
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Without expanding on this notion, Benjamin turns to his third point. As he claims, “the cult 
makes guilt pervasive. Capitalism is probably the first instance of a cult that creates guilt (Schuld) 
not atonement.”142 That is to say, guilt is universalised to the extent that God himself becomes 
embroiled in it. As Benjamin writes, “God’s transcendence is at an end. But he is not dead; he has 
become involved in human fate”.143 Bracketing the fourth point – that an “unmatured” God, a 
deus absconditus, can only be addressed “when his guilt is at its zenith”144 – we note the 
appearance of two central terms: on the one hand, this concerns Benjamin’s use of the word fate, 
which recalls the passages on myth discussed above; on the other hand, it concerns his play on 
the “demonic ambiguity”145 of the term Schuld, which means both ‘guilt/culpability’ and ‘debt’. 
As Werner Hamacher explains, “it is the ambiguity (…) by which” in capitalism “financial debts 
(Schulden) always serve as an index of legal, moral and affective guilt (Schuld) – and by which 
every guilt manifests itself in debts, and every debt in guilt.”146 In order to tie Benjamin’s text to 
our discussion of Adorno, however, the complex network of ideas designated by the terms ‘guilt’ 
and ‘fate’ requires some elucidation. 
 
• ‘Guilt History’ 
 
According to Hamacher, the alleged pervasiveness of guilt associated with the capitalist cult 
religion is linked precisely to the assertion of its permanent duration. It stems from a particular 
conception of history as ‘guilt history’. As Hamacher argues, for Benjamin guilt is inscribed into 
the very structure of time, at least as it is figured in its dominant historical guises. (Indeed, many 
years after writing ‘Capitalism as Religion’ Benjamin will describe the Social Democratic vision 
of historical progress in terms of “homogeneous” and “empty” time.)147 Hamacher expands on 
this point with a view to the Pre-Socratics, particularly Anaximander (c. 610 – c. 546 BC), for 
whom “the sequence of time orders the rise and fall of all things (…) in accordance with the law 
of guilt and punishment so that becoming (génesis) is a guilt (adikía) that must be expiated in 
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perishing.”148 Time, in other words, appears as “an order of guilt and retribution, debt and 
payback”,149 a dual movement of coming-into-being and passing away. “It is a time of economy,” 
indeed, a “time of law”: the lawful movement of quid pro quo, which is binding for every being 
“as a decree, an ordinance.”150 Whether or not Benjamin was familiar with the Pre-Socratic 
conception of time-as-guilt is unclear. (Hamacher speculates that its central precepts might have 
been known to Benjamin through his reading of Cohen, who refers to it in Religion of Reason out 
of the Sources of Judaism, 1918.) Whatever the case, Hamacher acknowledges a number of other 
sources, which speak to a similar problem. For one thing, Benjamin alludes to the Christian 
doctrine of original sin. Though he does not unfold his criticism of this teaching here, the general 
point is clear: “Christianity (…) raised the doctrine of original sin” – in our sense: original 
guilt/debt – “to the status of a dogma and extended this logic into the furthest reaches of its 
systems of faith, thought and behaviour.”151 More pointedly, Benjamin invokes “the Freudian 
theorem of originary repression (…), the ethno-psychological myth of the murder of the primal 
father”, which locates the source of universal guilt in a speculative pre-history of civilisation.152 
Indeed, Freud features prominently in Benjamin’s fragment, albeit not without a hint of scathing. 
(Benjamin names Freud alongside Nietzsche and Marx as one of the “priests” of the capitalist cult 
religion.)153 It is telling, too, that Benjamin intimates Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals 
(1887), particularly the section on “‘Guilt’, ‘Bad Conscience’ and related Matters”. After all, 
Nietzsche speaks of a “stroke of genius on the part of Christianity”, which stems from the fact 
that “God himself sacrifices himself for the guilt of mankind.”154 That is, “God himself makes 
payment to himself (…) as the only being who can redeem man from what has become 
unredeemable for man himself – the creditor sacrifices himself for his debtor, out of love (can one 
credit that?), out of love for his debtor!”155 Finally, Benjamin points to Max Weber’s essay on 
‘The Work-Ethic of Ascetic Protestantism’ (1904), where it is argued that guilt is universalised in 
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the Calvinist doctrine of predestination, wherein every means of atonement – “whether by the 
devout, through sacraments, through the church” or “by God himself”156 – is withdrawn. 
Focussing on universal guilt as the red thread connecting Benjamin’s sources, we turn to an 
untitled fragment from the vicinity of ‘Capitalism as Religion’, where it is argued that “guilt is 
the highest category of world history”.157 Benjamin observes that every present is guilty in the 
sense that it produces a deficient relation to both past and future. “History, in short, is the process 
by which guilt is incurred – since in its every production the no-longer-being of something else is 
effected.”158 In yet another text, titled ‘Fate and Character’ (1920), Benjamin equates this notion 
of a ‘world history’, whose ‘highest category’ is ‘guilt’, with a particular conception of fate, 
which he describes in an enigmatic turn of phrase as the “guilt-nexus of the living”.159 Fate is thus 
opposed to freedom; within its bounds man is at the mercy of mythical Gods. In the present 
context this means that fate returns in the guise of capitalist social relations, which present 
themselves as divinely decreed, law-like and eternally binding. Though we cannot presently 
expand on this point, it is worth briefly noting the following: Benjamin associates this seemingly 
fateful immersion in second nature with the ruling system of law and order in the administered 
world. That is to say, the order of fate is sustained by a violent “‘mythical-legal system’”, which 
“imposes identity upon difference, commensurability upon alterity, and universality upon 
singularity”. 160  Before the law, he argues, man is reduced to his “purely (…) natural 
dimension”,161 to “bare life”,162 or ‘mere nature’, as Adorno might call it. As such, man appears 
bereft of the capacity for ethical action because he is figured as constitutively un-free. In 
‘Critique of Violence’ (1921), Benjamin contrasts this conception of law (Recht) with a “truly 
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ethico-political standpoint of justice”163 (Gerechtigkeit), which is on the side of “singular, living 
beings”.164 That is to say, if for Benjamin fate is the operational law in the time of guilt, then 
justice belongs to a qualitatively distinct order of freedom that would require the complete 
cessation of the status quo.165 
Setting aside this partial and, admittedly, somewhat schematic reconstruction of Benjamin’s 
fragment we conclude: the dominant regime of time (understood as a linear succession of cause 
and effect) is structurally guilt producing. The pervasiveness of guilt reaches its ‘terrible’ climax 
in the capitalist cult religion, where it is finally universalised to the extent that even God is 
rendered culpable. In turn, Benjamin identifies the time of guilt with mythic fate, which is seen as 
the law of a ‘homogeneous’, ‘empty’ history. Before this law, man – and, indeed, the man-God of 
Christendom – cannot settle his debts and can effect no atonement, because he is radically un-
free. Having bracketed how Benjamin proposes to bring about a breaking-open of this ‘guilt 
history’, we ask: what are the implications of his fragment for our reading of Adorno? After all, 
the verdict that ‘God’s transcendence is at an end’ because He has become ‘involved in human 
fate’ resonates strongly with the reading of Adorno proffered above. As we have seen, Adorno 
argues that – in the present – any claim to transcendence made by ‘positive religion’, ‘traditional 
theology’ and ‘affirmative metaphysics’ becomes untenable, precisely because (in their capacity 
as ‘guises’ of rational thought) all three are fatefully ensnared in myth. In this respect, Benjamin’s 
view that capitalism is the ‘most extreme’ expression of a ‘guilt-nexus of the living’ finds a 
curious echo in Dialectic of Enlightenment, where Adorno and Horkheimer argue as follows: 
“[t]he God of Judaism demands what he is owed and settles accounts with the defaulter. He 
enmeshes his creatures in a tissue of debt and credit, guilt and merit.”166 To be sure, Benjamin’s 
claim is more far-reaching than Adorno and Horkheimer’s: it is not just that God ‘enmeshes his 
creatures’ in an economy of guilt and retribution; rather, God himself numbers amongst the 
guilty. (That is why in capitalism all that remains is pure cult without ‘dogma’ or ‘theology’.) 
Moreover, in all likelihood Benjamin would not have endorsed Adorno and Horkheimer’s 
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characterisation of Judaism. (His target is very explicitly Christianity.) Nevertheless, the 
reasoning that nourishes these verdicts is analogous. In the dialectic of enlightenment, the oldest 
returns in the guise of the new: myth as capitalism, capitalism as myth. The point is that if the 
earliest cultic practices are already a form of enlightenment – an exercise in the mastery of nature 
– and, conversely, the most sophisticated modern phenomena bear the mark of these ancient rites, 
then it follows that the boundaries between our historical bookends are blurred. As such, the 
rationalisation of cultic practices in capitalism speaks of an irrationality that is older than the cult 
itself, a view that – finally – vindicates our opening wager. In turn, it will be our task to weigh up 
what solutions Adorno’s ‘inverse theology’ holds. Before we do so, however, we must turn to one 
final question: whether Adorno’s deployment of theological motifs, such as the image ban, 
amounts to their secularisation. 
 
iv.) Secularisation: 
 
The following section returns us to a question posed at the outset, namely: whether Adorno’s use 
of theological motifs, ‘far beyond’ what they ‘once originally meant’, can be grasped sensu 
stricto as a form of secularisation? (After all, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Adorno 
argues that materialism brings the Old Testament ban on making images of God, “into secular 
form by not permitting Utopia to be positively pictured”.)167 Accordingly, it has been claimed by 
some commentators that Adorno’s approach might be characterised as a form of “secular 
theology”.168 However, as I argue, Adorno’s intentions are far from self-evident and upon closer 
inspection complications arise from this face value reading. Accordingly, I propose to explore 
this matter with a view to three authors whose findings are instructive in this context: a.) Hans 
Blumenberg’s critical reflections on the concept of ‘secularisation’, laid out in his momentous 
study on The Legitimacy of the Modern Age (1966);169 b.) Giorgio Agamben’s subsequent 
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deliberations on the concept of ‘profanation’, laid out in his essay ‘In Praise of Profanation’ 
(2005); c.) Sami Khatib’s Benjaminian re-imagination of Freud’s concept of ‘dislocation’, laid 
out in his book Teleologie ohne Endzweck (2013). Although none of these texts address Adorno’s 
work directly, all three offer helpful models for understanding the complex interplay between 
religious motifs and non-religious sentiments that we set out to explore. 
 
a.) In The Legitimacy of he Modern Age, Hans Blumenberg highlights that the word ‘secular’ 
derives from the Latin saeculum (‘age’). In its common usage it can be taken to mean “‘the 
present age’, ‘this world’ (as opposed to the next), and ultimately ‘the world’ as opposed to the 
transcendent.”170 As such, ‘secularisation’ generally designates a long-term historical process “by 
which a disappearance of religious ties, attitudes to transcendence, expectations of an afterlife, 
ritual performances, and firmly established turns of speech is driven onward in both private and 
daily public life.”171 As Blumenberg reminds us, the term was first used in the 17th century to 
denote the expropriation of ecclesiastic goods by state authorities, for instance in the period 
leading up to the Westphalia peace treaty of 1648. Broadly speaking, we are told, this process has 
a correlate in the history of ideas: like the signatories of the aforementioned treaty, figureheads of 
the European Enlightenment (e.g. Voltaire) are commonly seen as having “secularise[d] 
knowledge in order to free man from the (…) illegitimate control of the Church.”172 However, as 
Blumenberg emphasises, this view is prey to a number of criticisms. For instance, one might 
object that if purportedly ‘modern’ ideas are, in fact, ‘secularised’ religious teachings, then their 
emphatic claim to modernity is undermined. As Blumenberg points out, this un-interrogated 
assumption more or less explicitly underlies the work of many eminent thinkers from the first 
half of the 20th century, including (but not limited to) Max Weber, Carl Schmitt and Karl Löwith. 
In the case of Weber this concerns the view that the modern work ethic is a secularisation of 
Christian asceticism. (As we have alluded to, this claim runs through The Protestant Ethic and 
the Spirit of Capitalism, where Weber argues that capitalism first usurps and then effaces the 
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religious sources from which it emerges.)173 In the case of Schmitt, this concerns the controversial 
estimation that “[a]ll significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularised 
theological concepts”. 174  (As Blumenberg points out, Schmitt’s wholesale identification of 
political sovereignty with divine sovereignty is axiomatic for his book Political Theology, 
1922.)175 Finally, in the case of Löwith, this concerns the premise of his work Meaning in History 
(1949),176 where it is argued that “the modern idea of progress is a transformation into worldly 
form of Christian eschatology”, i.e. “of the Christian preoccupation with the future as the 
dimension of the ‘last things’, the end of the world, the Last Judgement, salvation, damnation, 
etc.”177 Despite the far-reaching differences between these thinkers, Blumenberg’s objection in 
each case is the same. In his view, the idea that modern phenomena should appear primarily as 
secularised versions of religious teachings obfuscates their independence and particularity. In 
other words, “the secularisation theorem obstructs the view of the de facto structure of an epochal 
threshold” – an epochal break between the modern and the pre-modern period – “because the idea 
of a ‘historical constant’ lies, unquestioned, at its basis”.178 Blumenberg rejects this notion of 
historical constancy in the opening chapter of his book, ‘Secularisation: Critique of a Category of 
Historical Wrong’. As he argues, such an “unhistorical interpretation displaces the authenticity of 
the modern age, making it a remainder, a pagan substratum”.179 In short: Blumenberg objects to 
the view that the modern age is an illegitimate derivate of religion, because such a view presumes 
a trans-historical religious original at its basis. It goes beyond our remit to explore how 
Blumenberg attempts to salvage the legitimacy of the modern age through charting its history in 
terms of the supposed self-assertion of reason. Rather, we must ask: how do his objections bear 
on our reading of Adorno?  
To be sure, Adorno’s notion of a negative universal history – ‘from the slingshot to the 
megaton bomb’ – presumes precisely the kind of constancy that Blumenberg is keen to disavow. 
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As we have seen, the entire meta-historical narrative outlined in Dialectic of Enlightenment might 
be read in this way. (Myth as the incognito of reason; reason as the incognito of myth.) 
Nevertheless, we might ask: what if the historical ‘constants’ assumed by secularisation theory 
were themselves displaced in the historical process? In other words, what if the very grounds on 
which we map the putative polarity of the ‘religious’ and the ‘secular’ were to shift? Certainly, 
this would alter the stakes of the question as to whether Adorno’s use of theological terms ‘far 
beyond’ what they ‘once originally meant’ can be adequately grasped as a form of secularisation 
– the illegitimate carrying over of a religious ‘original’ into a ‘secular’ arena. After all, these 
terms would be uprooted from their traditional terrain. In order to grasp how this is supposed to 
be the case, however, we must look to the second text intimated above: Agamben’s essay, ‘In 
Praise of Profanation’. 
 
b.) Having broadly reconstructed Blumenberg’s premise, we must call to mind that at its core the 
concept of ‘secularisation’ designates a particular relationship between the religious and the non-
religious spheres: the passage from the former to the latter. An alternative account of this 
movement underlies Agamben’s concept of ‘profanation’.180 Agamben distinguishes between the 
‘sacred’ and the ‘profane’ in the following terms: on the one hand, he cites the Roman jurist 
Trebatius, arguing that the term ‘sacred’ means ‘belonging to the gods’. Such things are ‘removed 
from the free use and commerce of men’; they can be ‘neither sold nor held in lien, neither given 
for usufruct nor burdened by servitude’. On the other hand, ‘if ‘to consecrate’ (sacrare) means to 
remove things ‘from the sphere of human law’, then ‘to profane’ (profanare) means ‘to return 
them to the free use of men.’ In Agamben’s view, religion can thus be defined as the operation 
that “removes things, places, animals, or people from common use and transfers them to a 
separate sphere”.181 Religious rituals sanction “the passage of something from the profane to the 
sacred, from the human sphere to the divine.”182 Conversely, we are told, ‘profanation’ – 
sacrilege – designates a movement in the opposite direction: the passage of a given thing from 
the sacred to the profane, from the ownership of the gods to the ‘free use of men’. Accordingly, 
profanation points in the same direction as secularisation. Unlike secularisation, however, 
Agamben suggests that profanation does not proceed through an illegitimate process of 
                                                
180 See p. 62, n. 5 of the present study. 
181 Agamben, “In Praise of Profanation”, 74 
182 Ibid 
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expropriation. Rather, it effects this passage “by means of an entirely inappropriate use (or, 
rather, reuse) of the sacred: namely, play.”183 He continues: “play frees and distracts humanity 
from the sphere of the sacred, without simply abolishing it.”184 Accordingly, he sees great 
promise in the profanation of a “religio that is played with but no longer observed”.185 Against 
this backdrop, Agamben distinguishes between ‘secularisation’ and ‘profanation’ in the following 
terms: 
 
Secularisation is a form of repression. It leaves intact the forces it deals with by simply moving 
them from one place to another. Thus the political secularisation of theological concepts (the 
transcendence of God as a paradigm of sovereign power) does nothing but displace the heavenly 
monarchy onto an earthly monarchy, leaving its power intact. Profanation, however, neutralises 
what it profanes. Once profaned, that which was unavailable and separate loses its aura and is 
returned to use. Both are political operations: the first guarantees the exercise of power by carrying 
it back to a sacred model; the second deactivates the apparatus of power and returns to common use 
the spaces that power had seized.186 
 
Agamben does not develop this point here.187 Whatever his stated intentions, one might object 
that the account proffered in Profanations tends to reproduce the problems discussed above under 
a different name. After all, it seems as though Agamben too assumes the ‘constancy’ of a 
religious ‘original’ that can be playfully reclaimed, rather than violently expropriated.188 Read in 
this way, it is unclear why profanation should be any more legitimate than secularisation in 
designating the passage from the sacred to the profane. Both ultimately share the same 
problematic presupposition: a “belief in (…) continuity and concealment”. 189  Agamben’s 
identification of ‘secularisation’ with ‘repression’, in fact, proceeds in much the same vein. It 
implies that religion continues to determine the character of the present in ways that are not 
                                                
183 Ibid, 75 [My emphasis] 
184 Ibid, 76 
185 Ibid 
186 Ibid 
187 Cf. Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government, 
trans. Lorenzo Chiesa & Matteo Mandarini (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011); Giorgio Agamben, The State 
of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004) 
188 As Alberto Toscano observes, “[t]hough Agamben does not straightforwardly embody the apologetic Christian 
purposes that Hans Blumenberg identifies in the discourse on secularisation (…) he does manifest one key aspect of 
that discourse, the idea of a substantial continuity”. Alberto Toscano, “Divine Management: Critical Remarks on 
Giorgio Agamben’s The Kingdom and the Glory”, Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, Vol. 3, No. 16 
(Nov 2011): 128 
189 Toscano, “Divine Management”, 129 
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transparent to it. Agamben is playing on the fact that a central tenet of Freudian psychoanalysis 
teaches that repression leads to a return of the repressed in a distorted form: secularisation as 
defacement. But if we follow Agamben in arguing that secularisation is akin to a repression of 
religion, then it follows that the modern age appears as a series of psycho-pathological symptoms. 
And indeed, on this reading the specifically religious character of these symptoms is only 
obliquely manifest. It requires an archaeological inquiry to unearth the biblical substrate of 
modernity. 
Without wishing to situate this claim in the wider context of Agamben’s work, I take it that 
there is another way to read his passage. After all, Freud describes repression as a dual operation 
of defacement and displacement. (His terminus technicus for this process is ‘dislocation’, 
Entstellung, which connotes both disfigurement and spatial dislodging.)190 As Freud specifies, 
dislocation means not only “to change the appearance” of something – to deface, distort or 
disfigure it – “but also ‘to wrench [it] apart’, ‘to put [it] in another place’.”191 In this regard, the 
putative repression of religion cannot simply mean its unconscious persistence beneath the 
surface of capitalist modernity. If this were the case, then the modern age would, indeed, have to 
appear as the mere incognito of a religious original. However, if ‘repression’ does not just mean 
the distortion of religion, but also the uprooting from its traditional locale – displacement – then 
it follows that religion cannot simply persist as a defaced substratum of the present: an original 
that has merely been covered over, but never substantially altered. Rather, the stakes of the 
secularisation theorem shift – its historical topography is destabilised. On such a reading, it is 
hard to imagine how religion might be seen as a firmly rooted historical invariable, even in the 
context of a civilisational meta-narrative like Dialectic of Enlightenment. Against this backdrop 
our opening question is refocused: where is religion displaced to if it is, indeed, removed from its 
traditional locality and thus from the undergrowth of the modern age?192 
 
                                                
190 The term ‘dislocation’ – also less opportunely rendered as ‘distortion’, which obfuscates the dynamic and 
topographical connotations of the German Entstellung – initially appears in the first part of Freud’s famous work on 
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900). Cf. Sigmund Freud, “Distortion in Dreams”, The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. IV: The Interpretation of Dreams (First Part), eds. James 
Strachey, Anna Freud, Alex Strachey & Alan Tyson, trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1953), 134-163. 
191 Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism, trans. Katherine Jones (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), 52 
192 NB – This verdict is shared by Jean-Luc Nancy who observes that “the modern world does not transpose, in a 
secularised fashion, a theological structure” in the way that Schmitt intends. In reality, “the supposed transposition 
displaces all the terms of the problem, as well as the structure itself.” Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy, “Ré-fa-mi-ré-do-si-do-ré-
si-sol-sol (le peuple souverain s’avance)”, in La démocratie à venir, ed. Marie-Louise Mallet (Paris: Galilée, 2004), 
348 [My translation] 
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c.) Using this diagnosis as a point of departure, Sami Khatib argues that the wider precepts of 
Freud’s reasoning can be productively applied to explain the critical function of theological terms 
in the context of Benjamin’s ‘secular’ critique of capitalist modernity. Insofar as we have sought 
to establish a link between Benjamin and Adorno on this point, the brief discussions of 
Blumenberg, Agamben and Freud come to bear on our discussion. As Khatib emphasises, the 
concept of dislocation, which, as we have seen, is “linked to questions of repressed conflict in 
Freud’s writing”,193 designates a far-reaching topological shift that lastingly displaces theology 
from its ancestral site. That is to say, the shift that we have sought to describe transposes the 
entire ground on which the putative polarity of the religious and the secular has historically been 
charted. Siding with Blumenberg’s critique of Schmitt et al, Khatib argues that for Benjamin the 
present cannot appear as the covering over of a religious foundation because this foundation has 
itself been lastingly undermined. In the present context, the point is that the radical epochal break 
invoked in The Legitimacy of the Modern Age (and figured by Khatib as a seismic shift) effects, 
both, a prospective and a retrospective change in the meaning we ascribe to the historical markers 
of ‘religion’ and ‘modernity’. To this end, Khatib cites Benjamin’s fragment, ‘Capitalism as 
Religion’, arguing that “with the emergence of capitalism as a new religious edifice (…) the 
positions of the old (…) world-religions shift”.194 That is to say, the ‘old world-religions’ are no 
longer anchored to a stable, unchanging location from whence they cannot be dislodged, even if 
they are distorted beyond recognition. As Khatib continues, in its capacity as a “remainder-less 
cult-context” capitalism advances both the absolute “sacralisation” of “profane life”195 (i.e. the 
rendering-religious of ostensibly non-religious terrain) and the “totalising secularisation of a 
realm that was hitherto sacred.”196 In other words, Benjamin’s fragment captures the Freudian 
double movement in the following terms: on the one hand, it describes the “dislocation of the 
field of religion through the emergence of capitalism” as a new religion; and, on the other hand, it 
designates “a shift of (monotheistic) theology” – the intellectual superstructure of religion – 
“whose traditional place within the neo-pagan religious system of capitalism has become 
                                                
193  Samuel Weber, Return to Freud: Jacques Lacan’s Dislocation of Psychoanalysis, trans. Michael Levine 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), xvii 
194 Sami Khatib, ‘Teleologie Ohne Endzweck’: Walter Benjamins Ent-Stellung des Messianischen (Marburg: Tectum, 
2013), 37 [My translation] 
195 Ibid, 39 [My translation] 
196 Ibid [My translation] 
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superfluous.”197 However, far from consigning theology to the scrap heap of history, Khatib 
wagers that its becoming-superfluous serves as the condition of possibility for its deployment in 
an immanent critique of the capitalist cult religion: the critical afterlife of theology without a 
theos. As will become apparent, the significance of this shift has far-reaching consequences for 
our reading of Adorno. But before we explore this point, let us recap. 
 
In light of this protracted digression, it appears that Adorno’s use of terms that are ostensibly 
derived from traditional theology cannot be grasped as a form of secularisation in any 
uncomplicated sense, despite his repeated and seemingly uncritical use of the term. If, as we have 
argued, capitalist modernity short-circuits the traditional polarity of the ‘sacred’ and the 
‘profane’, then it follows that the concept of ‘secularisation’ (and, indeed, the concept of 
theology) takes on a different meaning ‘far beyond’ what it ‘originally meant’. This verdict, 
finally, brings us to the central question raised at the beginning of this chapter: in what sense can 
displaced theological terms (such as the image ban) be put to work by a critical theory like 
Adorno’s without nostalgically reasserting an irretrievably lost authority? In other words: what 
perspectives are offered by Adorno’s enigmatic notion of an ‘inverse theology’? 
 
II: Adorno’s Inverse Theology 
 
Having thus clarified some of the wider issues raised by Adorno’s use of theological terms, we 
can finally turn to the letter cited above wherein the notion of an ‘inverse theology’ is first 
articulated. (As will be recalled, Adorno writes to Benjamin on 17 December 1934 to express his 
whole-hearted ‘agreement’ with an ‘image of theology’ that he attributes to his friend’s essay, 
‘Franz Kafka: On the Tenth Anniversary of his Death’.) In addition to the stipulations made at the 
outset, it is worth highlighting two further provisos. Firstly, it is not our aim to comprehensively 
reconstruct Benjamin’s essay or, for that matter, Adorno’s reading of it. This is in part because I 
take it that the notion of an ‘inverse theology’ points beyond Adorno’s interpretation of this 
                                                
197 Ibid, 41. Admittedly, this very literal reading is open to certain criticisms. As Samuel Weber argues, there is no 
original ‘location’ that precedes the ‘dis-location’ of the unconscious. With a view to Lacan, Weber gives the 
problem a linguistic framing by characterising the “language of the unconscious” in terms of the “unconscious as 
language”. He continues: “[w]hat distinguishes this particular linguistic form is that it never simply speaks directly 
(…) but rather misspeaks itself [verspricht sich], concealing, denying, disavowing.” As Weber explains, “[i]n this 
way the unconscious forms a language of representation that is not constituted by what it designates (…), a 
translation without an original or, as Freud would say, another scene.” Weber, Return to Freud, 1-2 
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particular text.198 As noted above, my conceit is that insofar as Adorno’s letter in fact projects an 
‘image of theology’ onto Benjamin’s thought (an ‘image’ into which he ‘would gladly’ see their 
‘thoughts dissolve’, but which is not yet fully formed), the enthusiastic response to his friend’s 
essay cannot be seen in solely exegetical terms. Accordingly, I avoid discussing central themes 
from Benjamin’s essay, such as tradition and remembrance. It has, in any case, been suggested 
that it would be untenably reductive to distil a single, stable ‘concept’ of theology from 
Benjamin’s essay to which Adorno’s thought would pose a mere addendum. Rather, the as-yet 
unformed character of the ‘theology’ in question – expressed in Adorno’s projective use of the 
modal verb ‘would’ – attests not only to Benjamin’s elusive stance, from which no single 
‘concept’ can be derived, but also to the open-endedness of Adorno’s position. To be sure, the 
notion of an ‘inverse theology’ takes its cue from Benjamin’s reading of Kafka, but it is by no 
means exhausted therein. Accordingly, gaining a better understanding of this term is not a 
question of cross examining Adorno’s letter with Benjamin’s essay; rather it is a case of tracing 
the development of certain figures from Adorno’s letter to their permutations elsewhere in his 
work: to enter them into a conversation (however speculative) with elements taken from 
Benjamin and Kafka alike. 
By the same token, we will not try to situate either Adorno or Benjamin in the wider 
context of early Kafka-reception. The wealth and breadth of research in this field far exceeds the 
confines of the present chapter.199 In terms of historical context it suffices to note that both 
authors are resolutely critical of two interpretative strands that they describe as “natural” and 
“supernatural”, respectively.200 Whilst the former refers to authors such as Hellmuth Kaiser, 
whose book Kafka’s Inferno (1931) attempts a psychological account of Kafka’s texts,201 the 
latter means – above all – Kafka’s editor Max Brod, who emphasises the religious weighting of 
his friend’s work. 202  As Brod insists, Kafka’s concern with guilt, grace, judgement and 
redemption indicates a positive commitment to God in the face of existential despair. In this 
respect, he asserts that Kafka’s Judaism is equally decisive as his affinity for heterodox Christian 
                                                
198 For a critical account of Adorno’s reading of Benjamin’s piece, see: Sigrid Weigel, “Zu Franz Kafka”, in 
Benjamin Handbuch, Leben – Werk – Wirkung, ed. Burkhardt Lindner (Stuttgart & Weimar: Verlag J.B. Metzler, 
2011), 539-542 
199 For a useful overview of the history of early Kafka-reception, see: Waldemar Fromm, “Kafka Rezeption”, in 
Kafka Handbuch, eds. Bettina von Jagow & Oliver Jahraus (Göttingen: Vanenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 250-272 
200 Adorno & Benjamin, The Complete Correspondence, 67 
201  Cf. Hellmuth Kaiser, Kafkas Inferno: Eine psychologische Deutung seiner Strafphantasie (Vienna: 
Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1931) 
202 Cf. Max Brod, Franz Kafkas Glauben und Lehre (Düsseldorf: Onomato, 2011) 
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thinkers like Kierkegaard.203 This view is taken up by Brod’s erstwhile collaborator Hans-
Joachim Schoeps, who goes one step further by arguing that Kafka must be read in light of Karl 
Barth’s dialectical theology.204 As Schoeps suggests, both Barth and Kafka honour Kierkegaard’s 
verdict about the infinite qualitative distinction between man and God:205 only the inward turn to 
faith – away from the corrupt establishment of the church – can bring about man’s redemption.206 
Since it is not our aim to discuss Kafka in terms of his and his readers’ divergent approaches to 
Kierkegaard, however, we must limit ourselves to the following question: if Adorno follows 
Benjamin in rejecting the characterisation of Kafka in terms of a positive religious teaching – 
whatever its constitutive elements may be – then what is the object of his ‘inverse theology’? 
I propose to approach this question in two steps: i.) By exploring Adorno’s formulation 
literally, i.e. as a dynamic metaphor (after all, ‘inversion’ is nothing if not a movement);207 ii.) By 
considering some of the criticisms that Adorno’s phrasing has provoked. (As we will find, this 
concerns, above all, the posthumously published transcripts of Jacob Taubes’ late seminars on 
The Political Theology of Paul, 1993, which are in turn echoed in Giorgio Agamben’s 
commentary on Paul’s letter to the Romans, The Time that Remains, 2000.)208 
 
i.) Let us begin by stressing that Adorno describes the inverted ‘image of theology’ which he 
assigns to Benjamin by use of a topographical term: as he argues, it concerns – ‘in quite a 
principled sense’ – its ‘position’, i.e. its placement or orientation. This peculiar description 
                                                
203  Adorno changes his mind about Kafka’s relationship to Kierkegaard. Early on he describes Kafka as 
Kierkegaard’s “student”. Adorno, Kierkegaard, 25. Later on he describes him as his “critic”. Adorno, “Notes on 
Kafka”, in Prisms, trans. Samuel & Shierry Weber (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981), 267 
204 Cf. Max Brod & Hans-Joachim Schoeps, Im Streit um Kafka und das Judentum (Frankfurt am Main: Jüdischer 
Verlag, 1985) 
205 I consciously bypass Adorno’s critique of Barth as it does not bear directly on our investigation. Suffice to note 
that Adorno does not share Barth’s positive conception of revelation over and against the failings of institutional 
religion. For an interesting cross reading of Adorno and Barth, see: Hent de Vries, “Inverse Versus Dialectical 
Theology: The two Faces of Negativity and the Miracle of Faith”, Cornellcast Video, last altered September 2012, 
accessed 26/08/2014: http://www.cornell.edu/video/inverse-versus-dialectical-theology. See also: Margarete 
Kohlenbach, “Kafka, Critical Theory, Dialectical Theology: Adorno’s Case against Hans-Joachim Schoeps”, 
German Life and Letters, Vol. 63, No. 2 (April 2010): 146-165 
206 Incidentally, Brod sharply criticises Schoeps’ reading as an illegitimate Christianisation. This charge in echoed in 
Gershom Scholem’s “Open Letter” to Schoeps (1932). Cf. David Biale, Gershom Scholem: Kabbalah and Counter-
History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 130 
207 For the sake of brevity, we must bypass the broader philosophical resonance of the concept of inversion. Cf. 
Manfred Frank & Gerhard Kurz: “Ordo Inversus. Zu einer Reflexionsfigur bei Novalis, Hölderlin, Kleist und Kafka”, 
in Geist und Zeichen: Festschrift für Arthur Henkel, ed. Herbert Anton (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1977), 75-97 
208 Taubes’ lectures – first held at the University of Heidelberg in 1987 and later published as Die politische 
Theologie des Paulus (1993) – are a milestone in the recent philosophical revival of Paul by authors ranging from 
Alain Badiou to Slavoj Žižek. However, our reading of Taubes’ remarkable book will focus only on his short 
discussion of Adorno. 
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resonates with Adorno’s own ‘earliest attempt to interpret Kafka’ in 1925, 209  which he 
paraphrases in the previous line: ‘I claimed he’ – Kafka – ‘is a photograph of earthly life taken 
from the perspective of the redeemed, of which nothing appears but the edge of a black cloth, 
whereas the terrifyingly displaced optic of the photographic image is none other than that of the 
obliquely angled camera itself’. Bracketing for a moment Adorno’s prominent use of 
photographic imagery, it is worth highlighting that – as with the ‘position’ of theology – the 
‘perspective’ of the redeemed ostensibly marks a determinate place. This calls to mind two 
critical junctures in Adorno’s post-war writing at which the topographical language of his letter 
reappears: firstly, ‘Finale’ – the closing aphorism from Minima Moralia – and secondly, his essay 
‘Notes on Kafka’.210 The former in particular is worth citing in full, as it is central to the 
criticisms of Adorno that we will treat below. Adorno writes: 
 
The only philosophy which can be responsibly practiced in the face of despair is the attempt to contemplate 
all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint of redemption. Knowledge has no light but 
that shed on the world by redemption: all else exhausts itself in reconstruction and remains mere technique. 
Perspectives would have to be fashioned that displace and estrange the world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and 
crevices, as indigent and dislocated as it will appear one day in the messianic light. To gain such perspectives 
without capriciousness or violence, entirely from felt contact with its objects – this alone is the task of 
thought. It is the simplest of all things, because the situation calls imperatively for such knowledge, indeed 
because consummate negativity, once squarely faced, shoots together into the mirror writing of its opposite. 
But it is also the utterly impossible thing, because it presupposes a standpoint removed, even though by a 
hair’s breadth, from the scope of existence, whereas we well know that any possible knowledge must not only 
first be wrested from what is, if it shall hold good, but is also marked, for this very reason, by the same 
dislocated-ness and indigence which it seeks to escape. The more passionately thought denies its 
conditionality for the sake of the unconditional, the more unconsciously, and so calamitously, it is delivered 
up to the world. Even its own impossibility it must at last comprehend for the sake of the possible. Vis-à-vis 
the demand thus placed on thought, the question of the reality or unreality of redemption itself hardly 
matters.211 
 
The echo of Adorno’s 1934 letter is unmistakable in this passage: a philosophy that contemplates 
‘all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint of redemption’ recalls almost 
                                                
209 This text is thought to have been lost. 
210 For a useful account of Adorno’s reading of Kafka see: Sonja Dierks, “Kafka-Lektüre” in Adorno Handbuch, 
Leben – Werk – Wirkung, eds. Richard Klein, Johann Kreuzer, Stefan Müller-Doohm (Stuttgart & Weimar: Verlag 
J.B. Metzler, 2011), 210-213. Although Adorno frequently refers to Kafka, his 1953 essay is the only sustained 
engagement with the author. 
211 Adorno, Minima Moralia, 247 [Translation altered] 
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verbatim Adorno’s ‘earliest attempt to interpret Kafka’, referred to in his letter. As we are told, 
such a philosophy aims to fashion ‘perspectives’ from whence the world appears as though it 
were illuminated by a ‘messianic light’. The figure of a ‘messianic light’ is in all likelihood an 
allusion to the Lurrianic Kabbalah. Adorno had a passing familiarity with this source through his 
reading of Scholem’s influential book Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (1941) – a fact that is 
documented in their recently published correspondence.212 In this regard, the title of Adorno’s 
piece may be seen as deliberately evoking an eschatological ‘end’ to the existing order. After all, 
the German title, ‘Zum Ende’, would be better translated as ‘occasioned by-’, ‘accompanying-’ or 
‘towards the end’, rather than as ‘Finale’. In any case, we might infer that these ‘perspectives’ 
coincide with the vantage point from whence “the land-surveyor” Kafka “photographs the earth’s 
surface”, as Adorno puts it in his 1953 essay.213 The ‘messianic light’ could thus be seen as the 
flash bulb of Kafka’s camera – a striking association when one calls to mind the prevalence of 
photographic imagery in Kafka’s prose. Whatever we make of this, the origin of this light-source 
is presented as determinate. It appears to shine from a distinct outside source, indeed, an 
“optimal” place or locality.214 Leaving in suspense, for a moment, Adorno’s view that this light 
reveals the world “as it would be for the intellectus archetypus” (“absurd”, “lacerated”, 
“indigent”, “dislocated”),215 we note that the topography of ‘Finale’ gives rise to a serious 
problem which has not eluded a number of commentators: “how can Kafka look down on earthly 
life from a transcendent position if he is human,” we might ask; “if man is placed on earth and 
God cannot even be known as an object?”216 In other words, what might it mean to speak of such 
localities, or – indeed – from them, given (as we have noted) that Adorno’s self-avowed 
commitment to the ban on images forbids him from furnishing either God’s presence on earth or 
the ‘standpoint of redemption’ with any positive determinations? 
 
ii.) At first glance the answer to this question appears to lie in Adorno’s repeated use of the 
conditional form: Kafka “feigns” a standpoint that portrays the world as it would appear “from 
                                                
212 Cf. Theodor W. Adorno & Gershom Scholem, Der Liebe Gott wohnt im Detail: Briefwechsel, 1939-1969, ed. 
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the perspective of salvation” (hellish, mutilated, etc.)217 Unsurprisingly, this view has given rise to 
some damning invectives against Adorno’s text. Jacob Taubes, for instance, argues that Adorno’s 
aphorism reduces the ‘standpoint of redemption’ to a “beautiful”, albeit “empty” fiction.218 
“Think of Minima Moralia, the last part”, he writes.219 “There you can tell (…) how the whole 
messianic thing becomes a comme si affair”:220 a castle in the sky. This point is echoed some 
years later by Giorgio Agamben, who charges that ‘Finale’ amounts to little more than an 
“aestheticisation of the messianic in the form of the as if”:221 a fantastical, indeed, artistic 
rendering – a projection that can be pondered and enjoyed but never realised. In other words, for 
Agamben (following Taubes), Adorno’s remark means that philosophy is condemned to 
“indefinitely contemplate the appearance of redemption”,222 which is to say that negative 
dialectics is emphatically quietistic: a melancholic reverie. Agamben generalises Taubes’ plaint, 
arguing that “[t]he whole of Adorno’s philosophy is written” in this form – the “as if” – 
conceived of as an “intimate modality” at the heart of his thought.223 Alluding to one of the 
opening lines from Negative Dialectics, Agamben drives the final nail into Adorno’s coffin: 
“[p]hilosophy had been realising itself, but the moment of its realisation was missed. The 
omission is at one and the same time absolutely contingent and absolutely irreparable, thus 
impotential. Redemption is consequently only a ‘point of view’”,224 a ‘standpoint’. Agamben is 
referring to the opening passage from Negative Dialectics, where Adorno claims that 
“[p]hilosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realise it was 
missed.”225 As is well known, Adorno plays here on Marx’s view of communism as the 
becoming-socially-actual of philosophical universality in practice. Pending this actualisation, 
however, Adorno views philosophy as having a suspended life. He accepts Marx’s materialist 
critique of philosophy, albeit with the proviso that history has cast serious doubt on the possibility 
of its practical overcoming in the present. As we have noted in the previous chapter, Negative 
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Dialectics thus continues with the philosophical critique of philosophy because it deems that 
these efforts have not been sufficient. For Agamben, however, Adorno’s arrest in the moment of 
critique means that he defects to a realm of semblance – “[a]esthetic beauty” as schöner Schein – 
conceived of as a “chastisement” for “philosophy’s having missed its moment”.226 
It is of little consequence, here, that Taubes and Agamben’s shared criticism of Adorno 
stems from their respective accounts of St. Paul’s letter to the Romans. Accordingly, we need not 
reconstruct the sense in which their view of Paul’s “as not” philosophy influences their take on 
Benjamin.227 By the same token, it is not in our purview to recount how Taubes and Agamben 
assign a putative political theology to Paul, which takes its cue (if not its consequence) from 
Schmitt.228 In any case, both Taubes and Agamben’s criticisms of Adorno appear somewhat 
extraneous to their overall arguments. Adorno appears to only be intended as a negative foil for 
framing Benjamin’s allegedly more substantial Messianism. (“No shmontses (…), the 
Messiah”.)229 Without wishing to speculate further on their possible motivations for discussing 
Adorno, it remains to note two points about Taubes’ and Agamben’s critique. Firstly, the use of 
the terms ‘as if’/‘comme si’ is no accident. It is a play on Kant’s notion of ‘Als ob’, a maxim of 
regulative judgement. More to the point, it is a figure that is taken up by the Neo-Kantian 
philosopher Hans Vaihinger in a book titled The Philosophy of ‘As If’ (1911). Agamben quotes 
the following passage from Vaihinger’s book: 
 
The kingdom of truth will almost certainly never come, and in the final aim set before itself by the 
republic of scholars will, in all likelihood, never be attained. Nevertheless, the unquenchable 
interest in truth that burns in the breast of every thinking man will demand, for all eternity, that he 
should combat error with all his power and spread truth in every direction, i.e. behave exactly as if 
error must some day be completely extirpated and we might look forward to a time when truth will 
reign undisputed sovereignty. This indeed is characteristic of a nature like that of man, designed to 
                                                
226 Agamben, The Time that Remains, 37 
227 Ibid, 30-31. Hamacher for his part argues emphatically that the comparison between Benjamin and Paul is not 
tenable. For Benjamin, “the possibility of speaking of a historical hope for the Messianic Kingdom, of a Pauline 
waiting for its arrival (…) falls away.” Cf. Werner Hamacher, “Das Theologisch-Politische Fragment”, in Benjamin 
Handbuch, Leben – Werk – Wirkung, ed. Burkhardt Lindner (Stuttgart & Weimar: Verlag J.B. Metzler, 2011), 178 
[My translation] 
228 Cf. Samuel Weber, “Exception to Decision: Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt”, in Benjamin’s Abilities, 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 176-194 
229 Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul, 70 [My emphasis] 
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be forever approximating to unattainable ideals (...). It is true that in all this you cannot scientifically 
demonstrate that it must be so. Enough that your heart bids you act as if it were so.230 
 
According to Agamben, then, Adorno follows Vaihinger’s directive to act “as if God, the 
kingdom, truth, and so on existed”, even if these ideals are deemed to be unattainable.231 In this 
regard, the charge that Adorno illegitimately conjures up an aesthetic image of a divine 
‘standpoint’ suggests that he is committed to a continual striving towards an (ethical) ideal 
conceived of as a beautiful fiction, a gradual approximation of conditions that are – in the end – 
unreachable. The likening of Adorno and Vaihinger thus has a distinctly polemical thrust. After 
all, “the social democratic theory of the ideal as infinite progress” (so vehemently criticised by 
both Benjamin and Adorno) was inspired precisely by Neo-Kantians like Vaihinger.232 To 
associate Adorno with the philosophy of ‘as if’ is, thus, to align him with a political persuasion 
whose progressive orientation he did not share. Adorno heeded “Kafka’s statement that progress 
has not yet begun.”233 But this does not yet answer the question of how Adorno is able to invoke 
what appears to be a fully furnished ‘standpoint of redemption’ in the first place. The answer to 
this question can be framed with reference to Kafka’s novel fragment The Castle (first published 
posthumously in 1926). This allows us to reprise the thematic arc that took us from Adorno’s 
‘Sacred Fragment’, in the beginning, to his letter concerning Benjamin’s Kafka essay and, finally, 
to the question of whether an ‘inverse theology’ entails a reversal of the respective standpoints of 
man and God. As we have already implied, theologically inclined readers of Kafka – chiefly Max 
Brod and Hans Joachim Schoeps – view The Castle in the following terms: the castle represents 
the seat of divine grace, whereas the village at its foot represents the corrupt world of man. On 
this reading, castle and village are separated by an infinite qualitative distinction. (Indeed, 
Kafka’s protagonist, the land-surveyor K, is never admitted to the castle.) By contrast, for Adorno 
this distinction is collapsed: “[p]recisely that ‘infinite qualitative distinction’ taught by 
Kierkegaard and Barth is levelled off”, he argues; “there is no real distinction (…) between town 
and castle.”234 That is to say, there is no transcendent seat of divine grace, no ‘standpoint of 
redemption’; there is only “[l]ife as it is lived in the village at the foot of the hill on which the 
                                                
230 Hans Vaihinger, The Philosophy of ‘As If’, trans. C.K. Ogden (London: Kegan Paul, Tench, Trubner & Co., 
1935), 322, cited in: Agamben, The Time that Remains, 36-37 
231 Agamben, The Time that Remains, 37 
232 Ibid, 36 
233 Theodor W. Adorno, “Valéry’s Deviations”, in Notes to Literature, Vol. 2, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 157 
234 Adorno, ‘Notes on Kafka’, 258 
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castle is built”, as Benjamin puts it in a famous letter to Scholem.235 This maps onto the terms of 
our discussion thus far. The topological, indeed, tectonic shifts discussed above in terms of a 
dislocation of theology mean that the question as to how Adorno can legitimately reverse the 
standpoints of man and God is rendered moot. If the putative polarity of village and castle is 
short-circuited, then so is the supposed distinction between the ‘standpoints’ of redemption and 
damnation. If ‘perspectives’ must, indeed, ‘be fashioned that displace and estrange the world’, 
then the ‘messianic light’ in which the world will ‘one day’ appear need not shine from an outside 
source at all. It does not require a ‘standpoint removed … from the … sphere of existence’ by 
however little. Accordingly, Adorno cannot be seen as proposing to inhabit the ‘standpoint of 
redemption’ as a fictive u-topos located in “another world”,236 as Agamben and Taubes suggest. 
The ‘messianic light’ shines from within the world, through the ‘rifts and crevices’ of damaged 
life, or – as Adorno puts it in his Kafka essay – through the “cracks and deformations of the 
modern age”.237 It is a negative light – a Gegenlicht, to borrow Paul Celan’s term – which does 
not illuminate the appearance of redeemed creation, but rather ‘wrenches it apart’ to reveal its 
hellish inner workings: its lacerated, mutilated intérieur. The abject Kehricht (“refuse”), which 
Adorno recognises as the building blocks of Kafka’s world, becomes a Kehrlicht, a reverse light, 
or – put another way – the light of an ‘inverse theology’.238 
 
*** 
 
To the extent that the preceding pages have succeeded in clarifying Adorno’s singular adaptation 
of a theological vernacular for the purposes of bolstering his profane critique of capitalist 
modernity, it finally remains to tie this point to our discussion of the image ban. Both Benjamin 
and Adorno explicitly associate Kafka with this figure: “[n]o other writer has obeyed the 
commandment ‘Thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image’ so faithfully”;239 the figure of 
Odradek “is the sole promise of immortality which the rationalist Kafka permits to survive the 
ban on images.”240 Kafka himself alludes to this connection when he writes: “[t]hou shalt no 
                                                
235 Walter Benjamin, The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin 1910-1940, eds. Theodor W. Adorno & Gershom 
Scholem, trans. Manfred R. Jacobson & Evelyn M. Jacobson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 453 
236 Agamben, The Time that Remains, 30-31 
237 Adorno, Prisms, 259 [Translation altered] 
238 Adorno & Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 250 
239 Benjamin: “Franz Kafka”, 808 
240 Adorno, “Notes on Kafka”, 270 
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image –”,241 the motto of the present chapter. The conspicuous absence of the verb in Kafka’s 
micro-parable signals his keen sense of the irreducibly self-transgressive character of the 
interdiction against image making.242 “The prohibition that the sentence is about to express 
intervenes into this very sentence and makes it into the fragment of a language that would 
correspond to the prohibition. By adhering to the prohibition, however, the only sentence in 
which it could present itself as law is interrupted.”243 For Adorno, then, the auto-interruption of 
the ban on picturing the absolute designates a certain circularity: a “gesture that opens up this law 
and lets it remain open”.244 However, this openness – Adorno’s negative metaphysics, his ‘inverse 
theology’ – does not designate an opening onto another world; rather, it signals a tear in the fabric 
of ‘the village at the foot of the hill’ on which Kafka’s castle is built – the possibility of a radical 
transformation from within, effected without blueprints or guarantees. 
                                                
241 Kafka, Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente II, 360 [My translation] 
242 See pp. 9-10 of the present study. 
243 Werner Hamacher, “The Gesture in the Name: On Benjamin and Kafka”, in Premises, trans. Peter Fenves 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 336 
244 Ibid 
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Chapter 3: 
Negative Aesthetics 
 
 
Fig. 1: Louise Bourgeois, “I Had a Flashback of Something that Never Existed”, 2002 
 
As will be recalled, the previous chapters have explored two interlocking questions. Firstly, 
we asked: in what sense is Adorno able to enlist the ostensibly biblical figure of the image 
ban in aid of articulating his enigmatic concept of an ‘imageless’ materialism? Herein, it was 
argued, lies a rebuttal of certain tendencies within materialist thought (particularly in its 
Soviet guise), which obfuscate the central demand of Adorno’s heterodox Marxism: the 
abolition of bodily suffering. This in turn raised questions about the theological weighting of 
Adorno’s lexicon. Accordingly we asked in what sense Adorno’s invocation of terms that 
have been originally derived from scripture could be reconciled with his explicit rejection of 
their actuality without relegating them to the status of mere metaphors. Having concluded that 
Adorno’s recourse to biblical terminology must be seen against the backdrop of his ‘inverse 
theology’ – a notion articulated with explicit reference to Franz Kafka and Walter Benjamin – 
we now turn to a third facet of his interest in the ban on images: his writings on art and 
aesthetics.1 
                                                
1 As is well known, the term Ästhetik enters the German philosophical tradition as a coinage of Alexander 
Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762). It is derived from the Greek word aesthesis, meaning ‘pertaining to the 
senses’. Baumgarten’s interest in aesthetics is rooted in older, not strictly art-theoretical debates that took place 
throughout parts of the English-speaking world during the first half of the 18th century. He developed his ideas 
on aesthetics chiefly in two texts: Reflections on Poetry (1735) and subsequently Aesthetica (1750). Both tracts 
were written in response to certain perceived shortcomings in the work of the German rationalist philosopher 
Christian Wolff (1679-1754). On Wolff’s reading, sensibility produces disorderly perceptions of rational 
perfection. Baumgarten by contrast argues that sensibility – the aesthetic – has a particular kind of dignity, which 
augments rational knowledge (particularly in the case of art). Accordingly, he claims that art amounts to a 
‘sensible image of perfection’ and that judgements of taste locate beauty in a given object as an objective 
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We have already seen some evidence to support the claim that Adorno’s aesthetic works 
– his texts on music, literature and the visual arts – abound with references to the 
Bilderverbot. Mahler and Schoenberg,2 Hölderlin and Baudelaire,3 Eichendorff and Corot:4 all 
of these figures are discussed in terms of their abidance by the image ban. However, the 
fullest articulation of Adorno’s views concerning the aesthetic implications of this figure 
appears in his posthumously published Aesthetic Theory (1970). This is of the utmost 
significance because by the late 1960s Adorno comes to view art as the last vestige of 
metaphysics in the administered world: “art (…), under the impress of its semblance” – 
Schein – is “what metaphysics, which is without semblance, always wanted to be.” 5 
Aesthetics, then, means the privileged site upon which resistance to the disenchanted world of 
capitalist exchange relations remains conceivable. Before proceeding to explore this matter 
further, though, it is worth calling to mind that Adorno’s magnum opus remains emphatically 
unfinished. That is to say, the published version of the text is comprised of extensive notes 
and manuscripts left by the author and edited posthumously by his wife Gretel Adorno, and 
his assistant Rolf Tiedemann. In the absence of a critical edition, however, it should be noted 
that Aesthetic Theory bears the mark of its editors almost as much as that of its author. Any 
attempt to interpret the work – including the one tendered below – must necessarily remain 
inconclusive. With this in mind, a central passage from a chapter dedicated to the concept of 
natural beauty serves to frame our investigation. Herein Adorno writes: 
 
The Old Testament ban on images has an aesthetic as well as a theological dimension. That one 
should make no image, which means no image of anything whatsoever, expresses at the same 
time that it is impossible to make such an image. Through its duplication in art, what appears in 
nature is robbed of its being-in-itself, in which the experience of nature is fulfilled. Art holds 
true to appearing nature only where it makes landscape present in the expression of its own 
negativity. Borchardt’s ‘Verse bei Betrachtung von Landschaft-Zeichnungen geschrieben’ (…) 
expressed this inimitably and shockingly. Where painting and nature seem happily reconciled – 
                                                                                                                                                   
quality. Although Kant, for his part, remains indebted to many of Baumgarten’s insights (particularly in the 
Critique of Pure Reason), the aesthetic theory outlined in the Critique of the Power of Judgement marks a 
significant departure from Baumgarten’s views. For an insightful account of the history of modern aesthetics, 
from Shaftesbury to Du Bos, see: Paul Guyer, “The Origin of Modern Aesthetics: 1711-35”, in The Blackwell 
Guide to Aesthetics, ed. Peter Kivy (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 15-44 
2 Theodor W. Adorno, “Mahler”, in Quasi Una Fantasia: Essays on Modern Music, trans. Rodney Livingstone 
(London: Verso, 1992), 110; Theodor W. Adorno, “Sacred Fragment: Schoenberg’s ‘Moses und Aron’”, in 
Quasi Una Fantasia: Essays on Modern Music, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: Verso, 1992), 243 
3 Theodor W. Adorno, “Parataxis”, in Notes to Literature, Vol. 2, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1992), 142; Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, eds. Rolf Tiedemann & Gretel 
Adorno, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (London: Continuum, 2002), 21 
4 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 67 
5 Ibid, 344 
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as in Corot – this reconciliation is keyed to the momentary: An everlasting fragrance is a 
paradox.6 
 
In what follows I propose to approach this passage under two separate aspects. Firstly, having 
discussed the way in which Adorno treats the ‘theological dimension’ of the ban on images, 
above, it now remains to ask: how are we to understand its alleged aesthetic element? I take it 
that any effort to respond to this question will require some contextual groundwork. 
Accordingly, the first part of the present chapter will ask: in what sense can Adorno be 
situated in a lineage of modern German thinkers – ranging from Kant to Schiller, Hegel and 
beyond – all of whom cite the image ban in their aesthetic writings (albeit with divergent 
emphases)? After all, as we have seen Adorno was far better acquainted with this tradition 
than with any properly religious sources. My wager is that reading Adorno in these terms will 
provide a firmly non-theological – indeed aesthetic – account of how the image ban finds 
entry into his work, which supplements both the inversely theological derivation from 
Kafka/Benjamin and the critique of reflection theory outlined in the previous chapters. 
Having thus charted the basic parameters of our inquiry, the second part of this chapter 
will ask: what does the supposed aesthetic dimension of the image ban say about the 
relationship between art, nature and beauty in capitalist modernity? In order to gain a clearer 
sense of what is at stake in the estimation that ‘art holds true to appearing nature only where it 
makes landscape present in the expression of its own negativity’, we must ask: what is the 
polemical thrust of Adorno’s decision to cite the image ban specifically in a chapter on 
natural beauty? After all, as we will find, Kant for his part associates the image ban with the 
sublime rather than the beautiful in nature,7 whereas Hegel – amongst others – subordinates 
natural beauty to artistic beauty; the merely real to Geist. Some questions raised by the 
literary theorist Rodolphe Gasché in an article on the concept of natural beauty appear 
instructive in this context. As Gasché asks: why is “natural beauty the prime paradigm of the 
beautiful in Kant’s aesthetics” to begin with?8 Moreover, “what is at stake for Hegel” – 
writing in the wake of Kant – “in relegating the beautiful of nature to a secondary role in his 
aesthetics”?9 And finally: “what does Adorno hope to achieve by playing Kant and Hegel off 
                                                
6 Ibid, 67  
7 By way of contrast with Adorno, a discussion of the way in which Jean-François Lyotard adapts Kant’s notion 
of the sublime during the 1980s will follow an initial treatment of the relevant passages in the Critique of the 
Power of Judgement. 
8 Rodolphe Gasché, “The Theory of Natural Beauty and its Evil Star: Kant, Hegel, Adorno”, Research in 
Phenomenology, Vol. 32, No.1 (2002): 104 
9 Ibid 
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against one another” by trying, we must add, to re-think natural beauty specifically under the 
aegis of the image ban?10 
Perhaps one preliminary answer to this question could be phrased as follows: building 
on the accounts of image and imagelessness proffered in the opening chapter, Adorno’s 
efforts are closely connected to his estimation that “[n]ature, as something beautiful, cannot 
be copied. For natural beauty as something that appears is itself image.”11 That is to say the 
“portrayal” of natural beauty “is a tautology that, by objectifying what appears, eliminates 
it.”12 And yet – Adorno seems to suggest – art ‘holds true to appearing nature’ precisely 
through the “remembrance” of a reconciled condition, which “probably never existed”.13 
Quite what is at stake in this paradoxical formulation will be explored over the course of the 
following pages. 
 
I: Aesthetics & Bilderverbot 
 
Let us begin by turning our attention to the contextual question raised at the outset: in what 
sense can Adorno be situated in a lineage of modern German thinkers – including Kant, Hegel 
and others – who cite the image ban in their aesthetic writings? In attempting to answer this 
question we will take two distinct approaches. On the one hand, we will consider two 
historical sources which were well known to Adorno and which feature prominently 
throughout Aesthetic Theory, namely:14 Immanuel Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgement 
(1790) and G.W.F. Hegel’s lectures on Aesthetics (1835/1842).15 On the other hand, we will 
take stock of a particular episode in the recent reception of Kant’s aesthetics during the 1980s, 
                                                
10 Ibid 
11 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 67 
12 Ibid 
13 Ibid, 65-66 
14 It should be noted that the title of Aesthetic Theory plays on the fact that Adorno views the possibility of 
theorising the aesthetic as a contradiction in terms. This estimation draws on one of the central insights from 
Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgement, namely: that one cannot theorise judgement. All one can do is 
delimit its sphere (its conditions of possibility and the limits of its legitimacy) in order to account for the 
meaning of individual judgements. That is to say, for Kant, aesthetics is – in fact – a radically non-theoretical 
enterprise. The specificity of the aesthetic object exceeds the possibility of its full conceptualisation. Building on 
this insight, the contradiction expressed by the title of Adorno’s book serves to articulate his position: on the one 
hand, there can be no aesthetics without theory; on the other hand, an aesthetic theory is not – in any obvious 
sense – a theory at all. For Adorno this means that neither aesthetics nor theory turn out to be adequate for an 
understanding of art. What he proposes instead is a reflection on the inadequacies of these approaches, 
particularly where they are thought together. In a duly negative-dialectical fashion, Adorno abstains from 
resolving these contradictions into a positive third term – a new, supposedly more suitable discourse about art. In 
short: for Adorno the significance of art lies precisely in the fact that it eludes theorisation whilst, at the same 
time, demanding it. 
15 It is only for reasons of presentational economy that we avoid a discussion of figures such as Schiller, whose 
Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man (1794) pose another significant marker in Adorno’s encounter with 
the German aesthetic tradition. 
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i.e. some years after Adorno’s death in 1969, namely: the work of Jean François Lyotard. 
Whereas the former serves to ground the subsequent discussion of Adorno’s singular recovery 
of the seemingly antiquated concept of natural beauty under the banner of the Bilderverbot, 
the latter serves – essentially – as a point of contrast. Although both Adorno and Lyotard aim 
to derive an orientation for art ‘after Auschwitz’ from the figure of the image ban, it will 
become apparent that their approaches differ markedly. 
 
i.) Kant: 
 
Our first example stems from Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgement, specifically from 
the closing section of the ‘Analytic of the Sublime’: the ‘General Remark on the Exposition 
of Aesthetic Reflective Judgements’. Herein Kant makes the following evocative claim: 
“Perhaps there is no more sublime passage in the Jewish Book of the Law than the 
commandment: Thou shalt not make unto thyself any graven image, nor any likeness either of 
that which is in heaven, or on the earth, or yet under the earth etc.”16 But what exactly does 
Kant mean when he aligns the image ban with the sublime? Although it goes beyond the remit 
of the present chapter to locate these issues in the overall architecture of Kant’s philosophy – 
a system that defies easy summary – we must nonetheless recall at least some of the precepts 
that inform these lines, if only to clarify our terms. This will entail: a.) A cursory positioning 
of the Critique of the Power of Judgement vis-à-vis the two preceding volumes of Kant’s 
critical trilogy; b.) A distinction between Kant’s notions of beauty and sublimity. 
 
a.) The Critique of the Power Judgement is often viewed as Kant’s attempt to bridge the 
realms of theoretical necessity and practical freedom (respectively associated with the 
faculties of understanding and reason), explored in the previous volumes of his major trilogy: 
the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) and the Critique of Practical Reason (1788). 
Accordingly, Kant emphasises that “the power of judgement” – Urteilskraft – “provides the 
mediating concept between the concept of nature”, treated in the first Critique, “and the 
concept of freedom”, treated in the second.17 In this respect, Kant’s third Critique rounds off 
his undertaking with a discussion of judgement as a fully-fledged faculty in its own right. 
                                                
16 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 156. It seems probable that Kant’s reference to the image ban 
follows on from an earlier controversy with the pre-eminent philosopher of the Jewish Enlightenment, Moses 
Mendelssohn. Cf. Ingrid Lohmann, “Das Motiv des Bilderverbots bei Moses Mendelssohn”, Das Achtzehtne 
Jahrhundert – Zeitschrift der Deutschen Gesellschaft für die Erforschung des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts, Vol. 
36, No. 1 (2012): 33-42 
17 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, 81-82 
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Without presuming to accurately survey the many roles that judgement plays throughout 
Kant’s work, it is nonetheless worth noting that, in the most general sense, it means the 
capacity “to subsume the particular under the general”,18 to distinguish between ‘a’ and ‘b’, 
‘this’ and ‘that’. However, Kant differentiates between numerous different kinds of 
judgement. For instance, a ‘determinate’ judgement “possesses” a concept which it then 
applies to “a multiplicity of spatio-temporal appearances”.19 By contrast, an ‘indeterminate’ 
judgement creates a concept at the same time as it determines whether a given thing is – in 
fact – ‘a’ or ‘b’, ‘this’ or ‘that’, etc. Throughout the first two volumes of his trilogy, Kant 
considers the various operations of judgement in great detail. His accounts range from 
seemingly simple functions, such as the ones cited above, to complex questions about the 
existence of God and the immortality of the soul. Hereby, Kant aims to delimit the sphere 
within which the judgements of philosophy can operate legitimately. Thus, he views himself 
as laying the ground on which to subsequently build his philosophical system.20 The Critique 
of the Power of Judgement, then, “addresses what was taken for granted in the previous two 
critiques”, namely “that it was possible”, without qualification, “to make theoretical and 
practical judgements, and set about justifying the conditions for” their “possibility” in the first 
place. 21 That is to say, the third Critique “inquires into the conditions of the possibility not of 
discrete theoretical or practical judgements” – what we can know and what we ought to do – 
“but” rather “of judgement itself.”22 Specifically, “[i]t does so by means of an analysis of two 
particularly problematic” , liminal “forms of judgement”, i.e.: “the aesthetic judgement of 
taste”, on the one hand, and the so-called “teleological judgement”,23 on the other. These 
judgements have a common peculiarity: they neither possess nor create a determining concept 
for a given thing. They are, in Kant’s phrasing, “reflective”.24 One of the reasons that 
‘reflective’ judgements are significant for Kant is that they throw the judging subject back 
onto its own resources, i.e. they operate without reference to externally given concepts. In this 
                                                
18 Ibid, 9 
19 Ibid, 54 
20 Kant has often been charged with failing to realise this ambition. Hegel, for instance, famously criticises 
Kant’s effort to lay a comprehensive groundwork for any future philosophy by likening it to learning to swim 
before getting into the water. Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. III, ed. Robert F. 
Brown, trans. Robert F. Brown, J.M. Stewart & H.S. Harris (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 
263 
21 Howard Caygill, A Kant Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), 140 [My emphasis] 
22 Ibid 
23 Ibid 
24 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, 43 [My emphasis]. As Caygill highlights, it is far from self-evident 
what exactly Kant means by a ‘reflective’ judgement. “[T]he principle of reflective judgement remains 
undetermined, although it clearly involves pleasure, the enhancement of life, communication through common 
sense and tradition, and hints of a supersensible harmony.” Caygill, A Kant Dictionary, 55. See also: Howard 
Caygill, The Art of Judgement (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1989) 
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regard, both aesthetic and teleological judgements say much about the judging subject’s 
feelings of pleasure and displeasure, which Kant wagers harbour the a priori legislating 
principle of judgement in general. 
 
b.) Leaving in suspense some of the wider implications of Kant’s argument (particularly the 
significance of teleological judgement), we turn to the second point announced above: an 
account – however brief – of Kant’s notion of the aesthetic judgement of taste. To this end, 
we must distinguish between two particular kinds of aesthetic judgement outlined in the first 
half of the book, namely: the judgements of the beautiful and the sublime, respectively. 
 
• ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’: 
 
Kant’s main account of beauty is contained in the 22 sections that comprise ‘Book One’ of the 
‘Analytic of Aesthetic Judgement’, the ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’. These sections are – in 
turn – grouped into four ‘moments’ (‘quality’, ‘quantity’, ‘relation’ and ‘modality’), a 
division that echoes the table of categories from the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant assigns 
succinctly phrased formulae to each of these moments: the beautiful is that which pleases 
“without any interest” (quality);25 it is that which “pleases universally without a concept” 
(quantity);26 it is the “form of the purposiveness of an object (…) without representation of an 
end” (relation);27 and, finally, it is “the object of a necessary satisfaction” that is “cognised 
without a concept” (modality).28 Let us attempt to flesh out these highly condensed vignettes 
with a view to our focus on natural beauty. As we will find, Kant’s examples are 
overwhelmingly drawn from the realm of nature.29 
In the paragraphs dedicated to the first ‘moment’ – ‘quality’, §§ 1-5 – Kant argues that 
judgements of taste are “disinterested”.30 That is to say, they arise without any regard for 
“purposes that can be fulfilled or interests that can be served by their existence”.31 In other 
words, if something is deemed to be beautiful, then – properly speaking – the object in 
question must be pleasing without appealing to any sensible, practical or intellectual 
                                                
25 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, 96 
26 Ibid, 104 
27 Ibid, 120 
28 Ibid, 124 
29 It is only later in the book – specifically in the passages on ‘Fine Art’ and ‘Genius’, §§ 43-53 – that Kant 
discusses the possibility of an artificial beauty. 
30 Ibid, 89 [My emphasis] 
31 Paul Guyer, “Editor’s Introduction”, in Critique of the Power of Judgement, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer 
& Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), xxviii 
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‘interests’. The disinterestedness of aesthetic judgement is clarified by way of contrast with 
two other types of judgement: the “agreeable” and the “good”.32 As Kant argues, the former 
merely pleases the senses and is thus no more than the expression of lowly physiological 
‘interests’. Accordingly, such pleasures cannot legislate for an a priori and hence universal 
principle of judgement. With regards to judgements of the ‘good’, by contrast, Kant cites a 
political example: “in true Rousseauesque style”, he argues, “I might vilify the vanity of the 
great who waste the sweat of the people” on building “superfluous things”, such as lavish 
palaces at Versailles.33 Indeed, I might expect that everyone should share in my disdain. 
However, as Kant contends, such judgements remain too closely tied to contingent, worldly 
concerns – however commendable they may be – to count as pure and thus disinterested. 
In the second ‘moment’ – ‘quantity’, §§ 6-9 – Kant insists on the “subjective 
universality” of aesthetic judgements.34 Paul Guyer aptly summarises some of the salient 
issues running through this section. As he argues, Kant’s central thought is “that in a 
judgement of taste a person can claim inter-subjective” – indeed, universal – “validity for the 
feeling of pleasure” that is experienced in response to a beautiful object.35 This is because 
such feelings are “produced, in an attitude of disinterested contemplation”; not “by a practical 
concern for utility or advantage in the possession of an object” – interest – “but by the free 
and harmonious play of the cognitive faculties of imagination and understanding that the 
beautiful object induces”.36 We can rightly claim the universal validity of our aesthetic 
judgements because, since we all share the same cognitive faculties, “everyone (…) who 
experiences an object that we find beautiful should” – at least in principle – “experience the 
same pleasure in it that we do.”37 
In the sections devoted to the third moment – ‘relation’, §§ 10-17 – Kant makes two 
claims. Firstly, he asserts that judgements of taste occur strictly in the absence of a concept of 
an object (in this case, the concept of an object’s utility or function). Truly beautiful objects 
are independent of use, i.e. their beauty is “free” rather than “merely adherent”.38 Secondly, he 
                                                
32 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, 91-92 
33 Ibid, 90. For an interesting account of Kant’s views on the French Revolution, see: Dieter Henrich, “The 
French Revolution and Classical German Philosophy: Toward a Determination of Their Relation”, in Aesthetic 
Judgement and the Moral Image of the World (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 85-99 
34 Ibid, 97 
35 Guyer, “Editor’s Introduction”, xvii 
36 Ibid [My emphasis] We will return to Kant’s point about the ‘free play of the faculties’ in due course. 
37 Ibid, xxix  
38 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, 114. Kant discusses both ‘perfect’ and ‘ideal’ kinds of beauty as 
exceptions to this rule. The details of his account need not concern us here. Suffice it to note that Kant postulates 
an ideal of beauty as something that is adequate to the idea of the moral law, which – in turn – governs man’s 
highest and final purpose. We will return to the association of beauty and morality under a more general aspect, 
below. 
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claims that despite the absence of such an “objective purposiveness”,39 a beautiful object 
nonetheless appears to us as being somehow purposive. Hence, Kant famously describes 
beauty as evoking the paradoxical feeling of “purposiveness without an end” – pure 
purposiveness, so to speak.40 How so? As Kant argues, we take pleasure in the form of an 
object, not in its content41 – for instance, the play of shapes in a crystalline structure, but not 
its colour.42 As Kant will later argue, the formal beauty of an object is testament to its pure 
purposiveness insofar as it satisfies “our subjective purpose in cognition” – which is 
connected with our moral vocation – but “without serving any other, more concrete 
purpose.”43 Kant cites an evocative example, characteristically taken from the natural world, 
to illustrate this point: “[f]lowers are free natural beauties. Hardly anyone other than the 
botanist knows what sort of thing a flower is supposed to be; and even the botanist, who 
recognizes in it the reproductive organ of the plant, pays no attention to this natural end if he 
judges the flower by means of taste.”44 
In the fourth and final moment of the ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’ – ‘modality’, §§ 18-22 
– Kant attempts to substantiate his earlier claim that aesthetic judgements ought, in principle, 
to be agreed upon by all. To demonstrate this point he introduces the notion of “common 
sense” (Gemeinsinn).45 However, as it turns out, the putative necessity of common sense is – 
in fact – of a highly qualified sort, which Kant describes as “exemplary” or “conditioned”.46 
Without wishing to unpack the wider ramifications of this point, it remains to note only that in 
the case of aesthetic judgements (rather than determinate ones), “we do not have rules that we 
can mechanically follow, but at most examples that can, especially in the case of art, provide 
us with models not for imitation but for inspiration.”47 That is to say, although genuine 
aesthetic judgements are necessary, they neither rest upon nor produce a concept of the 
                                                
39 Ibid, 111 
40 Ibid, 112 
41 Cf. Rodolphe Gasché, “On Mere Form”, in The Idea of Form: Rethinking Kant’s Philosophy (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2003), 60-88 
42 It is not immediately plain to see how Kant distinguishes between the legitimate pleasure derived from the 
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45 Ibid, 122 
46 Ibid, 123 
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beautiful, but rather stem from what Kant calls ‘common sense’: the universally 
communicable aspect of aesthetic feeling. 
 
Having summarised (however briefly) some of the central themes that run through the 
‘Analytic of the Beautiful’, we now return to a question cited at the outset, namely: why does 
Kant seem to privilege the beautiful in nature over the beautiful in art? As Gasché argues, 
Kant holds that “[t]he beautiful in nature becomes significant in view of the duty that man has 
to himself as a moral being.”48 This ‘duty’, we are told, denotes a “disposition (…) to love 
something (e.g. crystal formations, the indescribable beauty of plants) even apart from any 
intention to use it.”49 As Gasché insists, the Kantian ‘disposition’ to love “something that is of 
no use to us” (a clear echo of first moment from the ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’) denotes a 
“sensible feeling that is beneficial” – if not definitive – for “the formation of morality” and, 
hence, conducive to the fulfilment of a “human being’s destiny”: the establishment of a moral 
world.50 This is because for Kant beauty – and particularly natural beauty – is, in fact, an 
analogue (indeed, a “symbol”) for morality.51 Without wishing to detail the particularities of 
Kant’s claim, it is worth noting four parallels between beauty and morality outlined later in 
the book: (1) “both please directly and not through consequences or purposes; (2) both are 
disinterested; (3) both involve the idea of a free conformity to law (…);” and “(4) both are 
understood to be founded upon a universal principle that does not involve determining 
concepts of the understanding.”52 Sidestepping the finer points of this supposed parallel, 
Gasché continues his questioning: but “on what basis do beautiful things in (…) nature”, 
rather than art, “foster in us this” supposed “love for things that we have no intention to 
use”?53 After all, even if we concede Kant’s association of beauty and morality, we might 
object that it is not clear why a natural phenomenon should be better suited to ‘symbolise’ this 
parallel than, say, a painting or a sculpture. Gasché describes this ‘basis’ by bringing certain 
precepts of both Kant’s epistemology and his moral philosophy to bear upon the third 
Critique. As he reminds us, “only such things (…) for which we have no (determinate) 
concept can be found to be beautiful.”54 Such things occur primarily in nature because, even 
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54 Ibid, 108 
 123 
where ‘Genius’ is able to channel the beautiful into art, these products remain mere echoes of 
beauty’s proper place in nature. That is to say, for Kant, “[n]atural beauty” – far more than 
artificial beauty – is “intimately tied to the indeterminacy of cognitively unfamiliar and 
undomesticated” objects.55 Although it is not their “indeterminacy” per se “that makes natural 
things beautiful”, it is their form which “raises them to the dignity of a thing and” thus “makes 
them determinable”, at least in principle.56 And, according to Kant, the pleasure associated 
with the judgement that an ‘undomesticated’ thing is beautiful denotes precisely its 
conformity to our cognitive faculties. That is, the experience of beautiful things in nature “is 
testimony to nature’s conformity to reason even when no concepts of the understanding are at 
hand to determine them.”57 Thus, Gasché concludes, “[n]atural beauty is an index of nature’s 
cognisability”, and – inasmuch as Kant holds that “it is our destiny to make nature knowable” 
– it thus “becomes a moral issue”.58 In other words, Kant privileges natural beauty over 
artificial beauty because he views the former as affirming the primacy of reason – a primacy 
from which, he argues, man’s moral ‘duty’, ultimately, stems. 
It cannot presently be our task to pursue this central aspect of Kant’s thought any 
further. Suffice it to note that, although Adorno’s account of natural beauty will turn out to 
differ from Kant’s in significant respects, his debt to the third Critique remains considerable. 
As we will see, this concerns – above all – the extra-conceptual character of aesthetic 
judgement. Indeed, natural beauty is related to what Adorno calls the ‘non-identical’, i.e. all 
that is repressed in the dialectic of enlightenment. At the same time, Adorno will turn out to 
be critical of the fact that Kant’s account of natural beauty (like much else in his philosophy), 
ultimately stands to affirm the sovereign reign of reason over nature.59 Bracketing the 
particularities of Adorno’s ambiguous relation to Kant for the moment, we can pre-empt our 
subsequent discussion by noting the following: Adorno’s particular use of the terms ‘nature’ 
and ‘beauty’ is, in fact, highly unusual. It points back to his cross reading of Lukács and 
Benjamin under the aspect of ‘second nature’.60 But before we turn to this issue, we must first 
take stock of another aspect of the third Critique, namely: Kant’s ‘Analytic of the Sublime’, 
where the aforementioned reference to the image ban occurs. 
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(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001) 
60 See p. 56, n. 194 of the present study. 
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• ‘Analytic of the Sublime’: 
 
In ‘Book Two’ of the ‘Analytic of Aesthetic Judgement’, Kant details his thoughts on 
judgements of the sublime. Broadly speaking, the sublime means the experience of something 
awe-inspiring.61 Specifically, Kant distinguishes between two variants of the sublime: the 
mathematical (§§ 25-27) and the dynamical (§§ 28-29). Whereas the former means a sense of 
awe experienced in the face of something “absolutely great” in size,62 the latter means a sense 
of awe experienced before something with great “power”.63 Kant cites two kinds of examples 
throughout this section: firstly, natural phenomena, including “threatening cliffs, thunder 
clouds (...), flashes of lightning (…), volcanoes (...), hurricanes (...), the boundless ocean (...) 
etc.”,64 and, secondly, man-made phenomena, such as the Egyptian pyramids and St. Peter’s 
Basilica in Rome.65 As we will find, however, Kant’s examples are not in and of themselves 
sublime, but rather inspire in us a feeling of sublimity, which ultimately affirms “the 
superiority of the rational”, indeed moral “vocation of” man’s “cognitive faculty” over 
nature.66 Before we consider Kant’s distinction in more detail, however, it is worth noting a 
few general points about this central section of the third Critique. 
To begin with, Kant names three commonalities between the beautiful and the sublime. 
Firstly, he argues that both are pleasing in their own right, i.e. aside from any ‘interest’. He 
cites the example of an awe-inspiring storm to illustrate this point. As Kant suggests, any 
struggle to save oneself from the “real danger” posed by such a storm precludes this 
experience from qualifying as sublime.67 This is because such an experience stems from a 
physiological interest in self-preservation, however understandable this impulse may be. As 
he argues, only if the storm can be experienced from a position of relative “safety” – i.e. free 
from the constraints of self-interest – will its sublime force truly be felt.68 To this extent, the 
sublime is indeed akin to the beautiful inasmuch as the latter, too, disqualifies judgements 
made on the basis of sensible, intellectual or (we might add) existential interests. Secondly, 
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Kant suggests that, as in the case of the beautiful, judgements of the sublime are ‘reflective’ 
inasmuch as they concern experiences that exceed man’s ability to sensibly determine them. 
(We will return to this point below.) Thirdly, like judgements of the beautiful, judgements of 
the sublime are said to demand universal assent. In other words, Kant claims that in principle 
the feeling of sublimity should be communicable to everyone, given that human beings share 
the same set of cognitive faculties. 
In turn, Kant cites two differences between the beautiful and the sublime. Firstly, he 
argues that whilst beauty concerns the form of an object, the sublime concerns that which is 
“formless”.69 Kant appears to associate two characteristics with this term: on the one hand, he 
seems to mean phenomena whose appearance is erratic and unstable (such as the storm); on 
the other hand, he seems to mean phenomena that resist being comprehended in their totality 
(such as the cosmos). Secondly, Kant claims that whereas judgements of the beautiful 
produce pleasure in the experience of an object’s pure purposiveness (its determinability), the 
sublime – in fact – initially produces displeasure by frustrating our ability to make sensible 
determinations. In other words, Kant claims that judgements of the beautiful stem from a 
playful and harmonious relationship between the faculties of imagination and understanding, 
whereas judgements of the sublime initially stem from a frustrated and dissonant relationship 
between the faculties of imagination and reason. However, the point – in turn – will be to 
demonstrate how this experience of frustration is recuperated as pleasure. 
Having thus charted some of the similarities and differences between the two kinds of 
aesthetic judgement, we now turn to the distinction between the mathematically and the 
dynamically sublime. Kant initially defines the mathematically sublime as “that which is 
absolutely great”, i.e. “great beyond all comparison.”70 Such judgements are occasioned by 
encounters with objects of an overwhelming size. Kant distinguishes between two methods 
for judging the magnitude of such appearances: aesthetics and mathematics. With regards to 
the former, he argues that aesthetic judgements of size occur “in mere intuition (measured by 
eye).” 71  That is, judgements like ‘this man is tall’ do not follow from numerical 
measurements, but rather from our sense of  “the average magnitude of the people known to 
us.”72 By contrast, the mathematical determination of an object’s size requires us to employ a 
particular unit of measurement, i.e. a calculation made “by means of numerical concepts.”73 
Thus, mathematical determinations of size are directed by reason (rather than intuition). As 
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Kant argues, “[f]or the mathematical estimation of magnitude” there is no single “greatest” 
figure, because “the power of numbers goes to infinity”.74 Even though the vast expanse of the 
cosmos exceeds our ability to fathom it intuitively, its parameters can nonetheless be 
expressed in terms of number – even if such sums defy our ability to imagine them. Aesthetic 
judgements of size, by contrast, are limited. Encountering a monumental structure like St. 
Peter’s exceeds our ability to picture it as a totality. In Kant’s view, thinking such a totality 
(in accord with the faculty of reason) would entail nothing less than determining the 
noumenal ground of its appearance. Thus, he describes experiences of overwhelmingly 
proportioned objects that make us aware of the inadequacy of our sensible cognition as 
“absolutely great”, i.e. as “an absolute measure, beyond which no greater is (…) possible” for 
“the judging subject”.75 However (and this is the clincher), the discussion of measure is 
significant because it demonstrates that the power of reason in fact exceeds the capacities of 
both the imagination and the understanding. As Kant writes, “[t]he very inadequacy of our 
faculty for estimating the magnitude of the things of the sensible world awakens the feeling of 
a supersensible faculty in us.”76 That is to say, in Kant’s view, mathematically sublime 
experiences produce a sense of “respect” in us, which is only improperly attributed to natural 
phenomena. (Kant calls this misattribution “subreption”.)77 The true object of reverence is our 
faculty of reason.78 As Kant claims, this insight redeems our sense of dissatisfaction with the 
mathematically sublime and renders it pleasurable. 
In the case of the dynamically sublime, Kant observes an irresistible “power” that 
ostensibly overwhelms our sense of free volition, i.e. our will (specifically: our sense of 
resistance).79 Kant seems to suggest that, just as our experience of the mathematically sublime 
begins by showing up the limits of our intuition, so the dynamically sublime initially proceeds 
by overpowering our sense of agency – our will. The point is as follows: as Kant argues, the 
dynamically sublime has a comparable relationship to the notion of freedom as the 
mathematically sublime has to the notion of totality. (To be sure, it points far beyond the 
confines of the present chapter to account for Kant’s complex view of freedom – the central 
term of his practical philosophy. Suffice it to note that amongst other things freedom 
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designates an independence from natural determination, signalling instead the rational 
institution of the moral law.) In any case, Kant claims that what appears to us initially as an 
experience of overwhelming natural power provokes, in turn, in our minds an idea of freedom 
to which our will remains inadequate. This is analogous to the impossible demand for 
sensibly determining totality issued by our faculty of reason in the case of the mathematically 
sublime (e.g. the Pyramids). As we have seen, in that case the challenge causes us to realise 
reason’s superiority over the merely sensible precisely at the limit of our aesthetic 
comprehension. Similarly, in the case of the dynamically sublime, the very emergence of the 
idea of freedom – occasioned by phenomena that impinge on our will – recalls the fact that 
our faculty of reason is super-sensible, i.e. that it is unfettered by natural determinations, 
however powerful they may be. Hence, Kant writes: “we gladly call” storms, raging oceans, 
etc. “sublime” – although only improperly so, as we have seen – “because they elevate the 
strength of our soul above its usual level, and allow us to discover within ourselves a capacity 
for resistance of quite another kind”, namely: resistance to the un-freedom of nature through 
recourse to our faculty of reason.80 In this regard, Kant claims that nature’s forces in fact have 
“no dominion over us”.81 More importantly, however, Kant views the dynamically sublime as 
the revelation of our moral nature; as that which – through transcending our sensible selves – 
seeks to become adequate to the idea of freedom. Reason’s demand for the self-transcendence 
of the will thus relates directly to Kant’s central philosophical ambition: attaining the freedom 
to obey the moral law. 
 
It hardly bears emphasising that the account of Kant’s ‘Analytic of the Sublime’ proffered 
above is – at best – a schematic (not to say tendentious) gloss. Nevertheless, I take it that it is 
sufficient to attempt a reading of the passage cited at the outset, wherein Kant makes 
reference to the Jewish ban on images. As will be recalled, Kant writes: ‘Perhaps there is no 
more sublime passage in the Jewish Book of the Law than the commandment: Thou shalt not 
make unto thyself any graven image, nor any likeness either of that which is in heaven, or on 
the earth, or yet under the earth etc.’ In these lines Kant invokes the image ban in order to 
underwrite his portrayal of the sublime as being unintuitable. As Achim Geisenhanslüke 
helpfully elucidates, “the true reason for the imagelessness of the sublime” lies in the fact that 
“through the confrontation with a super-sensible power, the faculty of sensible presentation – 
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the imagination – reaches a limit”.82 As he continues, “the limit of sensibility, which the 
sublime shows up by suspending the power of the imagination, becomes the guarantor for the 
infinite realm of reason” – a realm with which “Kant had associated the ideas of freedom, 
immortality and God” in the Critique of Practical Reason (1788).83 As the experience of a 
certain limit, the sublime thus confronts man with his own finitude – not only as a “negative 
pleasure”,84 as Kant emphasises – but as a negative form of presentation (Darstellung). As 
Geisenhanslüke explains: “[w]hat appears in the sublime, the ideas of reason – freedom, 
immortality and God – eludes sensible form and yet, as something de facto unrepresentable, it 
is indirectly revealed as imageless.”85 
 But how does this bear on Adorno? Certainly, if Kant’s reference to the image ban is 
taken to mean simply an indirect way for presenting that which eludes sensible determination, 
then it would seem to chime with Adorno’s usage (albeit only on a very general level). After 
all, as we have seen, Adorno frequently cites the Bilderverbot to mean a ban on positively 
schematising Utopia – a ‘place’ that permits only negative determination. However, even if 
we concede that there is such a general commonality (and, as will become apparent, things are 
not so simple), this does not yet explain why Adorno should choose to invoke the image ban 
specifically in his discussion of natural beauty. As we will find, this is in part to do with the 
way in which he plays off Kant and Hegel against one another in Aesthetic Theory. But before 
we turn to an account of how the beauty of nature is subordinated to the beauty of art in 
Hegel’s work, it remains to disentangle Adorno’s reliance on the third Critique from another 
prominent episode in the history of 20th century Kant-reception, namely: Jean François 
Lyotard’s reflections on the sublime. 
 
ii.) Lyotard: 
 
As we have noted at the outset, during the 1980s the French philosopher Jean-François 
Lyotard spearheaded a renewed interest in Kant’s notion of the sublime. In the present context 
this is significant for the following reasons: a.) Lyotard relies specifically on Kant’s citation 
of the image ban in order to bestow a certain ethical task upon contemporary art – to bear 
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witness to the unrepresentable other of thought;86 b.) Lyotard draws on Adorno’s much 
maligned dictum, that “[t]o write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric”, in order to bolster his 
position.87 He thus seeks to transform the putative “impossibility” of representing particular 
events – e.g. Auschwitz – into the grounds for “an art of the unrepresentable”. 88 
(Interestingly, Lyotard’s enthusiastic reception of Adorno in his later writings comes off the 
back of an outright hostility towards his work during the 1970s.)89 Whatever the cause of 
Lyotard’s change of heart may be,90 his late interest in both Kant and Adorno had an enduring 
influence on the debate about what can and what cannot, in fact, be responsibly represented 
by art.91 Without wishing to review these questions in their wider context, I take it that there 
are a number of difficulties associated with Lyotard’s attempt to read Kant with Adorno. 
These difficulties are worth calling to mind before we turn to a discussion of Aesthetic 
Theory, inasmuch as they point to the differences between Lyotard and Adorno’s respective 
efforts to derive an orientation for the arts from the Kantian image ban. 
 
a.) Let us look first at Lyotard’s reading of Kant. In his well-known essay ‘Newman: The 
Instant’ (1985), Lyotard proffers an interpretation of the passage from the third Critique, 
which we have treated above. As he writes: 
 
[o]ne cannot (…) represent the power of infinite might or absolute magnitude within space and 
time because they are pure ideas. But one can allude to them, or ‘evoke’ them by means of what 
he [Kant] baptises a ‘negative presentation’. As an example of this paradox of a representation 
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which represents nothing, Kant cites the Mosaic law which forbids the making of graven 
images.92 
 
Indeed, this resonates with our findings so far. However, Lyotard puts a surprising spin on 
Kant’s argument. As he assures us, the Kantian image ban in fact prefigures an artistic 
manoeuvre, namely: “the minimalist and abstractionist solutions” that 20th century avant-
garde painters (above all, Barnett Newman) will employ “to try to escape the figurative 
prison”, which they are said to have inherited from tradition.93 Lyotard’s verdict follows from 
his earlier claim that “for the last century, the arts have not had the beautiful as their main 
concern, but something which has to do with the sublime”.94 Whether or not this portrayal of 
the motivations behind ‘minimalist and abstractionist’ currents in post-war painting is, in fact, 
art-historically sustainable cannot be decided here. Rather, we must limit ourselves to the 
following proviso: Lyotard appears to wilfully disregard the fact that for Kant works of art 
emphatically cannot be considered sublime.95 The third Critique is clear on this point: even 
when the sublime is experienced in the face of man-made structures – art – it strictly 
designates a feeling in us, not an objective quality of, say, St Peter’s or the Pyramids (to stick 
with Kant’s examples). This is what sets Kant apart from rationalist aestheticians like Wolff. 
The point is that in the experience of sublimity “we emerge from aesthetics proper and enter 
the realm of morality; we are led from the feeling of imagination’s impotence to the feeling of 
humankind’s destination in the supersensuous Kingdom – the province of Reason and 
Freedom – that would impose its rule over the power of Nature.”96 Of course we must 
presume that Lyotard is aware of all this. Accordingly it might seem “pointless to argue that” 
he “has misread Kant”, as Jacques Rancière contends; rather, it warrants asking “why he reads 
Kant the way he does.”97 
Answering this question hinges on the uncertain status of the ‘something’ at the heart of 
Lyotard’s estimation that ‘for the last century, the arts have not had the beautiful as their main 
concern, but something which has to do with the sublime’. Without specifying what ‘arts’ he 
has in mind here, besides Newman’s paintings, Lyotard begins to fill out this lacuna by 
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revisiting Kant’s prioritisation of form over sensible content in the rendering of judgements of 
taste. On Lyotard’s reading, Kant’s notion of ‘form’ is to do with the ‘forming’ of “data” into 
mental representations – a task performed by the imagination.98 This is taken to mean “the 
most fundamental case of what (…) constitutes the property common to every mind: its 
capacity (…) to synthesise data, gather up the manifold (…) in general”,99 i.e. its capacity for 
judgement. In the specific case of aesthetic judgements, this means the universal capacity of 
‘every mind’ to derive pleasure from the recognition that – qua form – a given representation 
conforms, at least in principle, to our cognitive faculties (even if no concept is at hand to 
determine it). As Lyotard argues, the particular content of this ‘data’ is then “presented as 
what is par excellence diverse, unstable and evanescent”.100 This characterisation raises an 
important question for Lyotard, which shifts his emphasis from the beautiful to the sublime. 
He asks: “where does matter stand if”, in the case of the sublime, “the forms are no longer 
there to make matter” – which Lyotard foregrounds – “presentable?”101 In other words, what 
is the status (indeed, the ‘presentability’) of the ‘matter’ that occasions our experience of the 
sublime, if it is seen as a mere catalyst for establishing the priority of reason over our capacity 
for sensible presentation? (After all, as we have seen, the Kantian sublime concerns precisely 
that which is formless.) Lyotard’s response to this question takes the form of an indictment: 
the sublime “signifies that the mind is lacking in nature, that nature is lacking for it”, i.e. that 
‘matter’ falls by the wayside in the Kantian picture. It signals that Kant’s sublime is, in fact, 
“nothing other than the sacrificial announcement of the ethical in the aesthetic field. 
Sacrificial in that it requires that (…) nature” – matter – “must be sacrificed in the interests of 
practical reason”.102 Kant’s attempt to affirm the primacy of practical reason in the ‘Analytic 
of the Sublime’ is thus portrayed as entailing “some specific problems for the ethical 
evaluation of the sublime sentiment” itself.103 Hence, Lyotard’s misgivings might be summed 
up in two ways: on the one hand, he argues that “[n]ature” – matter – “is ‘used’, ‘exploited’ 
by the mind according to a purposiveness that is not nature’s”;104 on the other hand, he 
worries whether this “slippage (…) leaves room for an aesthetic” at all.105 Given these 
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reservations, Lyotard sets out to devise an aesthetic of the sublime, whose ethical commitment 
is to ‘matter’, albeit in a highly unusual sense. How so? 
First of all, Lyotard focuses his efforts on “matter in the arts”, rather than nature.106 
Without elaborating on his reasoning, he states: “the aim for the arts, especially of painting 
and music, can only be that of approaching matter. Which means approaching presence 
without recourse to the means of presentation.”107 This invites two terminological questions: 
firstly, what does Lyotard mean by ‘presentation’ (the Kantian Darstellung), and secondly 
what does he mean by ‘presence’? With regards to the former, it seems that Lyotard means 
that which can be submitted to the law of the concept – “the matter of data”.108 (As he argues, 
we can determine colours and sounds conceptually, i.e. “in terms of vibrations, by specifying 
pitch, duration and frequency”.)109 With regards to the latter, by contrast, he appears to mean 
that which defies conceptual determination, namely: “timbre and nuance”.110 As he explains, 
“[n]uance and timbre are scarcely perceptible differences between sounds or colours which 
are otherwise identical in terms of the determination of their physical parameters. This 
difference can be due (…) to the way they are obtained: for example, the same note coming 
from a violin, a piano or a flute, the same colour in pastel, oil or watercolour.”111 ‘Timbre and 
nuance’ are thus placed on the side of ‘presence’, rather than ‘presentation’, because we 
register them as being distinct in spite of their identical ‘physical parameters’. They are 
‘present’, not in the sense of a “here-and-now”, which could be chronologically (and, hence, 
conceptually) determined, but rather only to the extent that they proclaim “that there is” 
something.112 Registering this ‘presence’, however, demands that we suspend the “active 
powers of the mind”.113 That is to say, ‘presence’ (the sense ‘that there is’ something) can 
only be experienced “if we suspend that activity of comparing and grasping, the aggressivity, 
the ‘hands-on’ (…) and the negotiation that are the regime of mind”.114 Only through such 
“ascesis” would it be possible “to become open to the invasion of nuances, passible to 
timbre.”115 Hence, the ‘aim of the arts’ is to ‘become open’ to that aspect of ‘matter’, which 
defies conceptual presentation: the elusive ‘presence’ associated with nuance and timbre. The 
“fundamental task” of art, in other words, is “that of bearing (…) witness” to the 
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“inexpressible” ‘presence’ that proclaims ‘that there is’ something, namely: “matter in its 
alterity”.116 The point, finally, is that, according to Lyotard, the experience of this “singular, 
incomparable” quality of art causes a “passion” in the mind: the sense of an “obscure debt”.117 
But whose ‘debt’? And to whom? 
 Rancière provides a compelling response to this question: “in Lyotard the tone or the 
nuance seems to play the same role as the pyramid or the stormy ocean in Kant. They induce 
a (…) break in the mind’s capacity to take hold of its object”.118 However, instead of 
affirming the autonomy of our reason in the face of natural forces, the “aistheton” – ‘matter in 
its alterity’ – “acts as a shock that induces in the mind the sensation of its radical 
dependence”: its heteronomy.119 This is the locus of the ‘debt’ that Lyotard invokes. It means 
that “[t]he soul comes into its existence dependent on the sensuous, thus violated, humiliated. 
The aesthetic condition is enslavement” – obligation – “to the aistheton without which it is 
anaesthesia.”120 There is no aesthetic without a debt to the other. Lyotard thus reverses Kant’s 
terms. Instead of affirming the primacy and autonomy of the moral law, he emphasises the 
“enslavement to the law of alterity.”121 As Rancière puts it: “[t]he law of ethics is here 
identified rigorously with a ‘debt’ to an other. It is the law of heteronomy, the enslavement to 
the mere, mute alterity of ʻthe Thingʼ – the power inside the mind and prior to the mind that 
the mind ever tries to overcome, and never succeeds.”122 
Let us see, then, how this view affects Lyotard’s considerations regarding the role of art 
in the face of historical calamity. 
 
b.) It is at this juncture that Adorno’s pronouncement regarding poetry after Auschwitz comes 
to bear on Lyotard’s idiosyncratic reading of Kant. The hypothesis that art’s task is to attend 
to the call of unrepresentable other – derived from the interpretation of Newman – is applied 
to the question of how art can ‘bear witness’ to the appalling singularity of Auschwitz. As we 
are told, this attempt “involves not so much recounting the event” – poetically or otherwise – 
“as witnessing to a there was” that underlies it.123 This ‘there was’ “exceeds thought, not only 
through its (…) surplus” vis-à-vis the effort to ‘recount’ it (Auschwitz is more than can be 
contained in survivor testimony); rather, “the peculiarity of the there was” exceeds the scope 
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of thought tout court – it is, in a word, unrepresentable.124 Lyotard thus maps his thoughts on 
sublime art onto the question of poetry after Auschwitz. After all, as we have seen, his 
emphasis on ‘nuance and timbre’ serves precisely to articulate a ‘presence’ that eludes the 
‘active powers of the mind’ by bearing witness to the obscure sense ‘that there is’ something. 
By the same token, art after Auschwitz bears witness to an undetermined ‘there was’. (The 
shift from present to past tense is striking here.) This view is underpinned by two further 
presuppositions. Firstly, in his book Heidegger and ‘the jews’ (1988), Lyotard associates the 
alleged debt to an unrepresentable other – cited above – with a particular historical figure, 
namely that of “‘the jews’”. 125  (As we will find, this resonates closely with Hegel’s 
association of the sublime with symbolic art and Judaism – a problematic and, by all 
accounts, unintentional coincidence for the Hegel-critic Lyotard.) Although we cannot 
presently concern ourselves with the peculiar re-imagining of Jewish history which allows for 
this tenuous association, it is worth emphasising that Lyotard thus credits ‘the jews’ 
themselves with bearing witness to the same alleged ‘enslavement to the law of alterity’, 
which he otherwise locates in art. Rancière aptly summarises this point: for Lyotard, 
“[s]ublime art is what resists the imperialism of thought forgetful” – anaesthetic – “of the 
other, just as the Jewish people is the one that remembers the forgetting.”126 This analogy is 
important because – secondly – the extermination of the Jewish people is taken to be the 
“end-point of the process of a dialectical reason concerned to cancel from its core any alterity, 
to exclude it and, when it is a people, to exterminate it.”127 It is thus incumbent upon art to 
interrupt this process, to testify “not to the naked horror of the camps but to the original terror 
of the mind which the terror of the camps wishes to erase.”128 Accordingly, for Lyotard, art 
“bears witness not by representing heaps of bodies, but through the orange-coloured flash of 
lightning that traverses the monochrome of a canvas by Barnett Newman” or, indeed, through 
“any other procedure whereby painting” (or cinema) “carries out an exploration of its 
materials when they are diverted from the task of representation.”129 
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 It cannot be our task here to further elaborate Lyotard’s far-reaching thought. Suffice it 
to note that the ‘orange-coloured flash of lightning’, which traverses Newman’s canvas, can 
hardly be called a ‘nuance’. By introducing the metaphor of lightning, Lyotard inadvertently 
restores representation. Herein lies a wider problem with respect to thinking the sublime 
artistically: how is one to avoid representing the sublime, and hence succumbing to a 
contradiction? Without pursuing these questions any further, we conclude our digression by 
citing a weighty objection to this cross reading of Kant and Adorno: 
 
Lyotard’s schema does quite the opposite of what it claims to do. It argues for some original 
unthinkable phenomenon resistant to any dialectical assimilation. But it itself becomes the 
principle of a complete rationalization. In effect it makes possible to identify the existence of a 
people with an original determination of thought and to identify the professed unthinkability of 
the extermination with a tendency constitutive of western reason. Lyotard radicalises Adorno’s 
dialectic of reason by rooting it in the laws of the unconscious and transforming the 
‘impossibility’ of art after Auschwitz into an art of the unrepresentable.130 
 
Following the direction of this plaint we can say pre-emptively that the key difference 
between Lyotard and Adorno appears to be this: whereas Lyotard’s concern is essentially 
ethical – to institute art as the custodian of the other, which can only ever say ‘there was’ – 
Adorno’s concern is fundamentally critical – to uncover the complicity of art and barbarism 
in the present through a rigorous interrogation, whilst acknowledging that there are no other 
means for holding fast to the “promise of happiness” contained in art.131 Accordingly, we will 
find that Adorno’s aesthetics hinge, not least, on his attempt to revive the seemingly 
outmoded notion of natural beauty (rather than sublimity), whose utopian orientation survives 
only negatively under the aegis of the image ban. For Adorno, art does not simply say ‘there 
was’; rather, it attests to the fact that “art must be and wants to be Utopia (…); yet at the same 
time art may not be Utopia in order not to betray it by providing semblance and 
consolation.”132 But before we can finally grapple with this paradoxical idea, it remains to ask 
how it is that – after Kant – the category of natural beauty (and its putative utopian promise) 
falls into such disrepute. 
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iii.) Hegel: 
 
Having thus established Lyotard’s singular reading of Kant as a foil for our subsequent 
discussion of Adorno, we now return to the contextual question posed at the start: in what 
sense do Hegel’s aesthetic writings (in addition to Kant’s) inform Adorno’s effort to 
rehabilitate the concept of natural beauty under the sign of the image ban? After all, the 
Kantian themes of beauty and sublimity – as well as numerous references to the ban on 
images – re-emerge at prominent junctures in Hegel’s works, albeit in marked contrast to their 
formulation in the third Critique. Inasmuch as we have intimated that Adorno plays off 
Hegel’s aesthetics against Kant’s in the passages on natural beauty – a claim that we have yet 
to verify – it remains to sketch the contours of the former in order to gain a clearer sense of 
what is at stake in this polemic. 
Principally, the questions of beauty and sublimity are treated by Hegel in two sets of 
texts: firstly, in a highly condensed statement towards the end of the final part of his 
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1817/1827/1830); 133  and secondly, in the 
collected transcripts of his extensive lecture series on aesthetics, particularly the edition 
published by his erstwhile student Heinrich Gustav Hotho (1835/1842).134 Whilst it exceeds 
the scope of our investigation to account for the alleged shortcomings of Hotho’s edition, it 
bears emphasising that – for better or worse – Adorno bases his reading largely on this text.135 
Accordingly, we will limit ourselves to two comparatively modest questions: a.) Why, in 
contrast to Kant, does Hegel prioritise the beauty of art over the beauty of nature?; b.) What is 
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the relationship between sublimity and the image ban in Hegel’s Aesthetics? 
 
a.) In order to answer the question as to why Hegel prioritises the beauty of art over the 
beauty of nature we must take a step back and ask how these terms figure in the wider 
architectonic of his aesthetics. To this end it is worth calling to mind that Hegel’s lectures aim 
to give a dialectical account of beauty’s historical development from its earliest instantiation 
in nature to its most sophisticated expression in art. All the while, the measure of this process 
is art’s supposedly unique ability to give sensory expression to the central theme of Hegel’s 
thought: the ‘idea’.136 
In order to grasp what is at stake here, we must start by accounting for the general 
dynamic that governs the opening volume of Hegel’s lectures. In Part I, Chapter II – on ‘The 
Beauty of Nature’ – Hegel gives the following definition: “[t]he beautiful is the idea as the 
immediate unity of the concept with its reality, the idea, however, only in so far as this its 
unity is present in sensuous and real appearance.”137 Hegel thus aligns ‘the beautiful’ with ‘the 
idea’, i.e. with the full actualisation of a particular ‘concept’ in a ‘sensuous and real 
appearance’. As he argues, “the first existence of the idea is nature”, that is, “beauty begins as 
the beauty of nature.”138 To the extent that Hegel’s account ‘begins’ with the beauty of nature, 
however, it is positioned from the outset in view of its sublation into a higher, more 
thoroughly reflected stage. In other words, natural beauty is figured as part of a larger 
movement within which the idea becomes aesthetically actualised. Accordingly, “natural 
beauty not only suggests that there is an additional kind of beauty” (art) “but also, since ‘first’ 
means abstract, formal, limited, a beauty in which the idea finds a sensible appearance that is 
more appropriate” to its concept at this “stage of its self-development.”139 
Nevertheless, the concept of natural beauty also undergoes an internal transformation. 
The beauty of inorganic nature, for instance, is judged to be inferior to the beauty of organic 
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nature, which – in turn – is seen as lesser than the beauty of animal life, etc. This progression 
follows the same dialectical logic that governs Hegel’s work throughout: starting with what is 
immediately at hand, observing consciousness discovers that what it initially deems to be 
beautiful is – in fact – deficient insofar as it turns out to be incommensurable with a more 
emphatic concept of beauty. Concept and appearance do not coincide. Instead, they contradict 
each other. However, by continually mediating between these contradictory terms, 
consciousness gradually discovers ever-more adequate sensory expressions of the idea (most 
notably, in the form of classical Greek sculpture).140 Dialectics, thus understood as the 
reflexive movement of consciousness through an exhaustive series of partial articulations, 
procures a series of aesthetic forms whose totality is conceived of as the comprehensive 
history of beauty – a history that reaches its highest articulation in certain kinds of art, 
wherein the beauty of nature is finally fulfilled.141 
Bearing in mind this cursory account of the general dynamic that leads Hegel from the 
beauty of nature to the beauty of art, there are two points in need of further elaboration: 
firstly, in what sense is nature in fact beautiful, however momentarily, given that we have pre-
empted its eventual supersession? And secondly, in what sense exactly is its beauty deficient? 
As will become apparent, both questions hinge on Hegel’s discussion of ‘life’ (Leben). 
 
• ‘The Idea as Life’: 
 
In the opening sections of Part I, Chapter II, ‘life’ is presented as the first instantiation of the 
idea. Although elsewhere Hegel discusses this term at length,142 I take it that – in this 
particular context – life means, above all, a proto-evolutionary account of how biological 
processes develop towards the fulfilment of their concept. In other words, Hegel views life as 
a dialectical process of self-actualisation: “the power of life consists (…) in positing 
contradiction in itself, enduring it, and overcoming it.”143 The beauty of life, in turn, depends 
on how successfully “the harmony and unity” of these moments is “expressed in a sensuous 
or imaginative form.”144 What is at stake here is nothing less than the relationship between the 
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spiritual and physical dimensions of life. Hegel discusses these in terms of the interplay 
between body and soul.145 In Hegel’s view, the soul – indeed,  “the Concept itself” – strives 
towards physical articulation in the body.146 Insofar as they are adequate to one another, 
nature appears beautiful. As Hegel continues, it is “at this point” – the first ‘stage’ of the 
idea’s self-development – that “we have (…) before us as the beauty of nature” an “inherently 
ensouled harmony within the conceptually appropriate objectivity of natural productions.”147 
Judging how successfully body and soul harmonise within a given life form allows Hegel to 
distinguish between higher and lower kinds of beauty in nature. The details of these 
distinctions need not concern us here. Suffice it to note that animal life is presented as 
superior to vegetation and inorganic matter partly on account of its “animation”,148 which is 
associated with self-determination and – hence – freedom. What interests us here is twofold. 
On the one hand, Hegel appears to view the soul as the agent of the creature’s self-
determination (the unifying principle of life), whereas – on the other hand – he concludes that 
“the soul” (and therefore the idea) “as such cannot make itself recognizable” in nature.149 As 
he argues: “when we look at natural forms that” appear to “accord with the Concept” of life, 
“such correspondence (…) is” – in fact – merely “foreshadowed” but never truly actualised.150 
The beauty of nature thus appears deficient. “The perception of nature as beautiful goes no 
further than this foreshadowing of the concept” because the immediate “apprehension of 
nature remains purely indeterminate and abstract.”151 How so? 
 
• ‘Deficiency of Natural Beauty’: 
 
In order to grasp why, unlike Kant, Hegel thinks that the immediate apprehension of beauty in 
nature remains indeterminate and abstract we must consider a specific example. In the article 
cited above, Gasché points to a revealing passage in the lectures, which succinctly captures 
Hegel’s reservations: 
 
The living thing still lacks freedom, owing to its inability to bring itself into appearance as an 
individual point, i.e. as a subject (…). The real seat of the activities of organic life remains 
veiled from our vision; we see only the external outlines of the animal’s shape, and this again is 
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covered throughout by feathers, scales, hair, pelt, prickles or shells. Such covering does belong 
to the animal kingdom, but in animals it has forms drawn from the kingdom of plants. Here at 
once lies the chief deficiency in the beauty of animal life. What is visible to us in the organism 
is not the soul; what is turned outward and appears everywhere is not inner life, but forms 
drawn from a lower stage than that of life proper. The animal is living only within its covering, 
i.e. this ‘insideness’ is not itself real in the form of an inner consciousness and therefore this life 
is not visible over all the animal. Because the inside remains just an inside, the outside too 
appears only as an outside and not completely penetrated in every part by the soul.152 
 
There are numerous points worth noting here. First of all, the passage highlights a central 
concern of Hegel’s philosophy that we have hardly touched upon thus far, namely: ‘freedom’. 
Without presuming to do justice to this central theme in Hegel’s thought in the form of an 
aside, I take it that in the context of his aesthetics Hegel means ‘freedom’ as a self-
determined, animated, i.e. ensouled expression of life, i.e. freedom from outside 
determination. However, as he argues, ‘the living thing’ – whose process of self-actualisation 
is explored throughout Part I, Chapter II of the lectures – ‘still lacks freedom’, even at this 
relatively advanced stage of its development (animal life), ‘owing to its inability to bring 
itself into appearance’ as a ‘subject’. Although Hegel’s use of the term ‘subject’ is 
enormously varied, in this particular instance it seems to mean the act of “self-differentiation 
and self-specification (…) of the concept” of life.153 Accordingly, the beauty of ‘animal life’ is 
deficient vis-à-vis ‘life proper’ for at least two reasons: firstly, because it is unable ‘to bring 
itself into appearance’ as a harmonious and hence beautiful unity of diverse moments (i.e. it is 
not self-determining and, hence, un-free); secondly, because ‘what is visible to us’ when we 
encounter an organism – its ‘appearance’ – ‘is not the soul’. Accordingly, ‘the real seat of the 
activities of organic life’ remains covered over, ‘veiled from our vision’. All we can see are 
the ‘external outlines of the animal’s shape’, not its ‘inner life’. As Gasché observes, “[n]ature 
itself” thus turns out to be a “medium in which life cannot unfold its full potential”.154 This is 
why Hegel argues that ‘the soul as such’ cannot make itself recognizable in nature. Although 
life in nature is beautiful in an immediate sense, upon reflection it appears ‘only as an outside’ 
because it is not ‘completely penetrated in every part by the soul’. Insofar as body and soul do 
not coincide here, such nature is not truly beautiful. In other words, the apparent immediacy 
of the idea’s actuality qua natural life means that it is beautiful only for others and not for 
itself. There is something incidental about natural beauty. It cannot be beautiful for itself 
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because it is not the “active agent of its own shining forth”, as Gasché puts it.155 Its beauty is 
not self-produced and consequently it lacks any relation to itself. Therefore, it is only 
beautiful for the consciousness that apprehends it. The chief deficiency of natural beauty (qua 
animal life) is hence presented as its inability to shine through the externality of its covering – 
‘feathers, scales, hair, pelt, prickles or shells’. Inasmuch as it cannot break through this 
covering, the beauty of nature remains abstract and indeterminate, i.e. deficient. 
 
Having sketched the outlines of Hegel’s views concerning natural beauty with a view to one 
specific passage, we are led to the following preliminary conclusion: as Hegel reminds us, the 
topic proper of his lectures on aesthetics is the beauty of art, not the beauty of nature. As he 
argues, art is “the one reality adequate to the idea of beauty.”156 The treatment of nature – the 
primary existence of beauty – is thus only a preamble (albeit an important one): a first ‘stage’ 
in the processual unfolding of the idea, whose adequate sensory articulation occurs in art 
alone. In the present context, this is significant because Hegel thus reverses the priority of 
nature over art established by Kant in the third Critique, a manoeuvre that will prove central 
for Adorno. In contrast to Kant, “the intimate connection of beauty with life leads Hegel to 
find beauty first in animate nature, in order then to judge it deficient and to replace it with a 
higher beauty of man-made art”:157 a product of spirit for spirit, so to speak. In this regard, we 
must view the Hotho lectures in toto as charting a comprehensive history of the aesthetic from 
the idea’s most rudimentary articulation in nature to its most accomplished manifestation in 
art. Though it cannot be our task here to map out the whole of Hegel’s far-flung art-historical 
project, we can nonetheless pre-empt that art too undergoes a complex processual 
development. It is of particular interest then that – following the denigration of natural beauty 
– Hegel’s account comes to include some passages on Jewish art, which treat the ban on 
making graven images of God (and the correspondent priority of the word) in terms of the 
sublime.158 
 
b.) Let us turn, then, to the second question raised above: what is the relationship between 
sublimity and the image ban in Hegel’s Aesthetics? In order to answer this question we must 
call to mind two passages. As Hegel writes: 
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[A]rt has above all to make the Divine the centre of its representations. But the Divine, 
explicitly regarded as unity and universality, is essentially only present to thinking and, as in 
itself imageless, is not susceptible of being imaged and shaped by imagination; for which 
reason, after all, the Jews and Mahometans are forbidden to sketch a picture of God in order to 
bring him nearer to the vision which looks around in the sensuous field. For visual art, which 
always requires the most concrete vitality of form, there is therefore no room here, and the lyric 
alone, in rising towards God, can strike the note of praise of his power and his glory.159 
 
We will attempt a detailed reading of these lines, below. For now it suffices to note that Hegel 
anticipates, here, the subsequent identification of Jewish (and, indeed, Islamic) art with 
sublimity, rather than beauty: “sublimity in its first original character we find especially in the 
outlook of the Jews and in their sacred poetry. For visual art cannot appear here, where it is 
impossible to sketch any adequate picture of God; only the poetry of ideas, expressed in 
words, can.”160 Form and content, beauty and sublimity, poetry and the visual arts – these are 
the coordinates of Hegel’s discussion. But in order to grasp the significance of these nodal 
points (and, thus, of the lines cited above), we must first account for how they figure in the 
general outline of Part II of Hegel’s Aesthetics: ‘The Development of the Ideal into the 
Particular Forms of Art’. 
 
• ‘The Particular Forms of Art – The Symbolic’: 
 
The second part of Hegel’s Aesthetics charts the history of art in terms of its dialectical 
development through three particular stages: the ‘symbolic’, the ‘classical’, and the 
‘romantic’. 161  Each of these stages is associated with a specific historical epoch and, 
moreover, with a string of cultures and civilisations whose particular means of relating the 
form and content of art are explored using a variety of examples.162 Of these stages the 
symbolic is of particular interest to us as it is here that Hegel lays out his views on Jewish art. 
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In order to account for the particular place of Jewish art in Hegel’s schema, however, we must 
first gain a clearer sense of what motivates his tri-partite division. 
We begin, then, by observing that if Hegel’s Aesthetics trace the processual unfolding of 
the idea qua sensory expression in art – i.e. the harmonious coincidence of form and content – 
then the symbolic stage marks the earliest, most partial point of this development. As Stephen 
Houlgate explains, “[i]n symbolic art a particular content” – the idea – “seeks adequate 
expression in an aesthetic mode but cannot achieve it.”163 There are two reasons for this 
alleged discordance. Firstly, insofar as Hegel views symbolic art as proper to a particular 
moment in the self-development of consciousness (manifest in certain cultures), and insofar 
as these cultures do not yet fully grasp themselves as free exponents of the human spirit, it 
follows that the content of their art – the idea – remains equally deficient. Without wishing to 
comment on the questionable anthropology informing Hegel’s view, this means – for instance 
– that the cult objects of various “nature-religions”164 can be called art to the extent that they 
seek to give material form to the idea; however, they ultimately fail as art because they cannot 
express this content adequately, since they have only a vague and indeterminate conception 
thereof. Secondly, insofar as the consciousness under consideration is – in fact – credited with 
some degree of maturity (as in Hegel’s assessment of Judaism),165 it is unable to express the 
idea artistically. As David James notes, this is because its “inner thought” and its capacity for 
sensory expression have “become independent of each other”.166 Either way, instead of 
coming to a complete identification in the work of art, form and content produce a merely 
“abstract harmony” (albeit at various levels of accomplishment).167 The point in each case is 
that symbolic art – the standing-in of a form for a particular content – falls short of the 
concept of art as the self-produced, sensuous shining forth of the idea in material form. 
Having thus given some indication of why Hegel deems that symbolic art to not be truly 
beautiful, it remains to establish how he comes to associate Jewish art in particular with the 
sublime. 
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• ‘Judaism and Sublimity’: 
 
In a digression on Kant’s ‘Analytic of the Sublime’, nested in the section on symbolic art, 
Hegel gives the following definition of sublimity: “[t]he sublime in general is the attempt to 
express the infinite” – the self-determined, unconditioned, absolute idea – “without finding in 
the sphere of phenomena an object which proves adequate for this representation.”168 The 
analogy with symbolic art is clear: both mark the frustrated effort to materially express an 
infinite content. In contrast to Kant, however, Hegel does not foreground the sublime feeling 
stirred by this impasse in us. Rather, he emphasises the futility of the efforts by the visual arts 
to materially express such content, which – due to its sheer indeterminacy – is 
incommensurable with any physical form. Hegel thus reads Kant in such a way as to suggest 
that sublimity is not so much an affectively experienced limit-case of the imagination, as an 
impossible attempt to sensibly present the ideas of reason by finite means. At the lowest 
levels of symbolic art, Hegel characterises these efforts as being “unconscious” of their own 
ineffectiveness. Zoroastrianism, for instance, is supposed to lack the maturity to recognise the 
shortcomings of its tendency to identify light with divinity part and parcel. By contrast, 
Judaism is singled out as the genuine, i.e. self-conscious form of the sublime because it 
renders explicit the relation between form and content that constitutes the essence of symbolic 
art, namely: total discordance. Crucially for Hegel the marker of this schism is the ban on 
images itself. As James observes, “Judaism’s complete separation of the spiritual content 
from the sensory form in which it is presented is possible because this content is known 
independently of that which can be intuited by means of the senses”.169 Judaism does not 
locate the divine in natural phenomena, nor does it put art objects in its stead; rather, the 
image ban marks Judaism’s consciousness of the fact that the infinite content of art is 
essentially different from its finite articulation. “Consequently, although we find in holy 
scripture and sacred poetry (i.e. the Psalms) a host of (…) images of God’s greatness and 
glory, (…) the Jewish people were aware, or so Hegel claims, that these images could never 
adequately express the idea of the infinite or unconditioned which formed the true content of 
their religion.”170 In this regard, Hegel perceives the Jewish conception of God as being highly 
advanced; but insofar as it is articulated in lieu of any material expression (besides ‘symbolic’ 
poetry), it remains abstract. How, then, is this reflected in the passages cited above? 
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If, as Hegel argues, ‘art has above all to make the divine the centre of its 
representations’, then symbolic art is characterised by a particular impasse: the infinite 
incommensurability of divine content and material form. Insofar as form and content do not 
harmonise in symbolic art, such art cannot truly be called beautiful. This discordance, in turn, 
is associated with sublimity (rather than beauty) because it is not susceptible to being imaged 
and shaped by the imagination. Given Hegel’s view that the visual arts seek ‘the most 
concrete vitality of form’, expressed – for instance – in the beauty of Greek sculpture, it 
follows that the sublime formlessness of Jewish art may only appear in the form of poetry – as 
imageless language.171 On the one hand, then, Hegel’s citation of the Psalms points forward to 
his ultimate prioritisation of the spiritual over the sensory. After all, at the end of the 
Encyclopaedia religion and philosophy supersede art as the true exponents of absolute spirit. 
On the other hand, however, the Jewish conception of God is deemed to be aesthetically 
deficient precisely because it is immaterial. In this respect, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
Hegel favours the idea of a Christian God made flesh. To the extent that Hegel identifies Kant 
with sublimity, he de facto portrays him as a Jewish thinker – the proponent of a partial truth. 
Although it exceeds the confines of the present chapter to discuss Hegel’s philosophy of 
religion per se,172 we are led to the following preliminary conclusion: although Hegel credits 
Judaism with emancipating itself from the un-freedom of natural determination by displacing 
divine content from the physical realm into the super-sensible, he does not think that this is 
sufficient to make Jewish art truly beautiful. Only where form and content coincide is art a 
genuine expression of the self-determined, unconditioned, absolute idea and hence of beauty, 
freedom and ethical life. Accordingly, in Judaism, “the transition to the realm of freedom is 
not properly made, despite its radical break with nature.”173 
 
*** 
 
It cannot presently be our task to unpack Hegel’s idiosyncratic reflections on Judaism any 
further. Suffice it to note that, in the present context, the salient lesson gleaned from his 
lectures on aesthetics is twofold: firstly, Hegel reverses Kant’s prioritisation of natural beauty 
over the beauty of art – a decisive move for Adorno’s subsequent analysis; secondly, he 
proceeds to outline a large-scale account of art’s historical development, chronicled from the 
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standpoint of beauty. As we have seen, Hegel’s far-flung annals contain some striking 
passages on Jewish art, whose foremost feature is portrayed as the strict abidance by the 
biblical ban on making images of God. Hegel then claims that poetry is the only appropriate 
medium for Jewish art. This is because the Psalms are supposed to be self-consciously 
‘symbolic’ insofar as they acknowledge that the standing-in of an artistic form for a spiritual 
content is infinitely inadequate. After all, as we have intimated, for Hegel art is beautiful only 
where form and content coincide (as in the case of classical sculpture). Since Hegel deems 
that the Psalms cannot do justice to God’s sheer ineffability, he concludes that Jewish art is 
sublime rather than beautiful. His aesthetics thus pose a challenge to Kant, for whom 
sublimity served to affirm precisely those ideas of reason that – in Hegel’s view – remain 
abstract in symbolic art: freedom, immortality, God. These shine forth in the later stages of 
his lectures. We have already seen how this tension lives on in Lyotard’s particular 
contribution to the sublimity debate; it remains to see now how it plays out in Adorno’s 
Aesthetic Theory. 
 
II: Natural Beauty & Bilderverbot 
 
As will be recalled, the previous sections have explored the aesthetic theories of Kant, Hegel 
and Lyotard in light of their common interest in the Old Testament ban on making images of 
God. In each case, this motif was said to designate an ineffable sphere beyond imagination, 
representation and commensurability – a moment in the relationship between thought and 
what is variously figured as the unconditioned, absolute, other. For Adorno, too, the image 
ban was said to signal something beyond the spellbound sphere of existence, namely: the 
prospective reconciliation with “that which surpasses all human immanence”.174 In a word: 
nature. As was suggested, this Utopian impulse is discernible not least in Adorno’s singular 
recovery of the much-maligned notion of natural beauty, which – for its part – depends on the 
specific way that Aesthetic Theory pits certain precepts familiar from the works of Kant and 
Hegel against each other. Broadly speaking, this means the following: on the one hand, 
Adorno invokes Hegel against Kant by arguing that the prioritisation of art over nature is an 
“immeasurable progress”.175 (As he contends, Hegel frees art from the constraint of acting “as 
if it were a mere product of nature”.)176 However, at the same time this progression is taken to 
signal the “intensification of the domination of nature discussed in Dialectic of 
                                                
174 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 73 
175 Ibid, 62 
176 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, 185 [My emphasis] 
 147 
Enlightenment.”177 Accordingly, the priority of art is double-coded with respect to Adorno’s 
philosophy of history: art is at once a product of the ‘domination of nature’ and a privileged 
medium for the critique of this condition – a point to which we will return below. On the 
other hand, Adorno invokes Kant against Hegel by noting that “[w]hat Hegel chalks up as the 
deficiency of natural beauty – the characteristic of escaping from fixed concept – is” in fact 
“the substance of beauty itself”, including the beauty of art.178 This is significant because the 
opposition of art and nature appears here as an aesthetic rearticulation of the opposition 
between the conceptual and the extra-conceptual discussed at length in the opening chapter. 
This tension is further reflected in Adorno’s analysis of the dynamics internal to works of art 
e.g. the tension between expression and construction, mimesis and rationality, etc. By 
confronting Hegel’s prioritisation of art, conceived of as the sensuous shining forth of the 
idea, with the extra-conceptual moment from Kant’s theory of natural beauty, Adorno 
foregrounds what he describes as art’s “cognitive character”:179 the highly equivocal sense in 
which “the most advanced works of any period”180 model a particular relationship between 
nature and culture, subject and object, which we have previously described in meta-
epistemological terms as a “Utopia of cognition”.181 This modelling, however, occurs in the 
realm of semblance (Schein). Accordingly Adorno writes: “[n]ature is beautiful in that it 
appears to say more than it is. To wrest this more” – ‘that which surpasses all human 
immanence’ – “from that more’s contingency, to gain control of its semblance, to determine it 
as semblance as well as to negate it as unreal: This is the idea of art.”182 Adorno’s inquiry thus 
proceeds on several overlapping registers: a philosophy of history that plays out in his 
aesthetics, an aesthetics that bears the weight of his metaphysical concern with transcendence, 
and a metaphysics that is compounded in a quasi-epistemological model which Adorno 
associates with the specific “truth content” of art.183 We will explore these matters in greater 
depth, below. For now it suffices to note that Adorno’s confrontation of Kant and Hegel is 
more than a mere exercise in the history of philosophy. Rather, Aesthetic Theory stages an 
encounter between Adorno’s historical moment and the preceding 200 years of German 
aesthetics in order to reappraise the dialectic between the beauty of art and the beauty of 
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nature under the specific conditions of capitalist modernity. (After all, Aesthetic Theory opens 
with the verdict that, under such conditions, “nothing concerning art is self-evident anymore, 
not its inner life, not its relation to the world, not even its right to exist.”)184 In the context of 
the present chapter, this raises the following question: if the aesthetic dimension of the image 
ban can be grasped neither as a limit case of the imagination (Kant), nor as a discordance 
between divine content and artistic form (Hegel), nor – indeed – as an imperative to 
artistically attest to the forgetting of thought’s irreducible other (Lyotard), then what exactly 
is the significance of this figure for Adorno’s account of natural beauty? Responding to this 
question requires that we situate its terms in the wider context of Adorno’s thought. 
Accordingly we will proceed by asking: i.) What motivates Adorno’s return to the seemingly 
outmoded concept of natural beauty in the first place?; ii.) How does Adorno conceive of the 
relation between art, nature and beauty in capitalist modernity?; iii.) Why does Adorno 
associate natural beauty with the image ban? 
 
i.) In order to answer the question as to what motivates Adorno’s singular recovery of the 
concept of natural beauty, we must begin by locating these efforts in the wider context of his 
thought. To this end it is worth calling to mind the following lines from Aesthetic Theory. As 
Adorno writes: 
 
Since Schelling, whose aesthetics is entitled the Philosophy of Art, aesthetic interest has centred 
on artworks. Natural beauty, which was still the occasion of the most penetrating insights in the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment, is now scarcely even a topic of theory. The reason for this is 
not that natural beauty was dialectically transcended, both negated and maintained on a higher 
plane, as Hegel’s theory had propounded, but, rather, that it was repressed.185 
 
Indeed, as we have seen, the emergence of idealist aesthetics has lastingly displaced Kant’s 
prioritisation of natural beauty over the beauty of art.186 Although Adorno also unequivocally 
foregrounds art, he rejects the claim (advanced by Hegel in particular) that the beauty of art 
has ‘dialectically transcended’ that of nature, both negating it and maintaining it ‘on a higher 
plane’. Instead of attaining a greater degree of articulation in the beauty of art, Adorno argues 
that the beauty of nature falls prey to “the hubris of a spirit that has exalted itself as an 
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absolute”.187 Natural beauty is, in a word, ‘repressed’. The Freudian provenance of Adorno’s 
phrasing betrays the general direction of his plaint. After all, as we have seen, one of the 
central tenets of psychoanalysis teaches that what is repressed must return elsewhere in a 
distorted form. 188  Adorno thus brings one of the principal claims from Dialectic of 
Enlightenment to bear upon his outwardly innocuous diagnosis concerning the supposed 
repression of natural beauty, namely: that man’s efforts to free himself from the 
overwhelming forces of nature tend to relapse into their opposite. As he argues, this dynamic 
is discernible in the works of Kant, Schiller, Hegel et al: “[n]atural beauty vanished from 
aesthetics as a result of the burgeoning domination of the concept of freedom and human 
dignity, which was inaugurated by Kant and then rigorously transplanted into aesthetics by 
Schiller and Hegel.”189 To be sure, the notions of ‘freedom’ and ‘dignity’ at issue here chiefly 
mean man’s autonomy from natural determination, i.e. “freedom from the realm of 
causality.”190 This is the sense in which Gasché notes that, in Adorno’s view, the fully-fledged 
“terror that idealist aesthetics exercises by degrading natural beauty” (i.e. “by depriving 
freedom from everything that is other than the subject”) is part and parcel with the dialectic of 
reason.191 To be sure, Adorno’s notion of ‘freedom’ also has an aesthetic aspect that is 
conceptualised in terms of artistic autonomy;192 however, in the present context it suffices to 
note that his concern with natural beauty is primarily motivated by a commitment to that 
which resists the purview of man’s physical and intellectual domination over nature. The 
stakes are high. As Adorno wagers, “[t]he reorientation of aesthetic theory towards natural 
beauty” aims at nothing less than the “vindication of what capitalism has oppressed: animal, 
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landscape, woman.”193 Indeed, as J.M. Bernstein emphasises, Adorno views capitalism as the 
epitome of reason’s sacrificial logic of exchange: “technological domination, which is at one 
with capital in demanding the fungibility of all individuals, is, most literally, mastery over 
nature (within and without).”194 That is to say, “[b]ecause Adorno regards art as a counter 
movement to rationalised domination, he is sensitive to the traditional claims for natural 
beauty.”195 Far from designating a simple opposition of ‘good’ nature vs. ‘bad’ art or, indeed, 
‘good’ art vs. ‘bad’ capitalism, however, Aesthetic Theory seeks to dialectically short-circuit 
these antitheses. How so? 
 
ii.) Having thus given some indication of what motivates Adorno’s return to the theme of 
natural beauty to begin with, it remains to note the following: as we have intimated, Adorno’s 
estimation that ‘nothing concerning art is self-evident anymore’ leads him to conclude that the 
traditional connections between art, nature and beauty (laid out by Kant, Hegel, etc.) are no 
longer binding in their established forms. The question then arises as to how Aesthetic Theory 
aims to recast these relationships. Let us demarcate this question further: as we have already 
seen, Adorno does not share Hegel’s view that the beauty of nature is sublated into the beauty 
of art. By the same token, he does not conceive of artworks as mere stand-ins for all that is 
supposed to be affective and irrational in nature. Nor, for that matter, does he think of ‘nature’ 
as a mere repository of authenticity – an original substratum, so to speak. Adorno follows 
Lukács on this point: “a pure nature (…) that has not passed through social processes of 
mediation does not exist.”196 He argues as follows: 
 
Wholly artifactual, the artwork seems to be the opposite of what is not made, nature. As pure 
antitheses, however, each refers to the other: nature to the experience of a mediated and 
objectified world, the artwork to nature as the mediated plenipotentiary of immediacy. 
Therefore reflection on natural beauty is irrevocably requisite to the theory of art.197 
 
Art and nature are entwined. The dialectic of art ‘as the mediated plenipotentiary of 
immediacy’ and nature as the mediated world of convention dissolves their putative 
antithesis. “Like the experience of art”, Adorno claims, “the aesthetic experience of nature is 
                                                
193 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 63 
194 J.M. Bernstein, The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno (University Park: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), 217 
195 Ibid 
196 Theodor W. Adorno, Ästhetik (1958/59), ed. Eberhard Ortland (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2009), 125 
[My translation] 
197 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 62 
 151 
that of images”, i.e. of thoroughly mediated re-presentations.198 This is because the notion of a 
‘pure nature’ – an original presentation, so to speak – is seen as an illusion that is retroactively 
projected from the standpoint of culture. “[N]ature”, in the emphatic sense, “does not yet 
exist”.199 Adorno illustrates this point with an implicit nod to Georg Simmel’s conception of 
Kulturlandschaft:200 “[t]he phenomenon of landscape” – an instance of ‘beautiful’ nature – “is 
the result of a process of societal modernisation that includes the division of labour and the 
social division in labour and leisure time. It is only in leisure that we experience the landscape 
aesthetically, but this experience presupposes human mastery of nature.”201 Nature, in short, is 
only experienced aesthetically as a function of its domination – hence its melancholia. Its 
beauty ensues from its repression. The effort to artistically effect reconciliation between man 
and ‘that which surpasses all human immanence’, then, does not constitute a return to nature 
conceived of as a storehouse of immediacy. Rather, artworks “hold fast to the idea of 
reconciliation with nature by” – paradoxically – “making themselves completely a second 
nature”,202 i.e. by self-consciously laying bare the very artificiality that lies concealed in a 
phenomenon like landscape. (As we will find, Adorno cites works by Rudolph Borchardt and 
Jean-Baptiste-Camille Corot to illustrate this point.) His view of the relationship between art 
and nature might thus provisionally be summarised as follows: although the ever-progressing 
domination of nature has irrevocably cemented the priority of art, art nonetheless ‘stands in’ 
for nature precisely where it bares itself as wholly artificial. As Adorno puts it: “[a]rt stands in 
for nature through its abolition in effigy”.203 
Strikingly, Adorno’s dialectical dissolution of the art-nature dyad recalls his early 
lecture on “The Idea of Natural History” (1932). Herein the traditional opposition of nature 
and history (later re-coded as that of nature and art) gives way to the chiasmus that all nature 
is historical and all history is natural. Adorno thus invites us “to comprehend historical being 
in its most extreme historical determinacy, where it is most historical, as natural being, or if it 
were possible to comprehend nature as an historical being where it seems to rest most deeply 
in itself as nature.”204 On the one hand, this means that nature is rendered historical by dint of 
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being transient (a point that harks back to Benjamin’s account of Baroque allegory in his ill-
fated Habilitationsschrift on the Origin of the German Mourning-Play, 1928); on the other 
hand, it means that history is rendered natural by dint of being conventional (an allusion to the 
concept of ‘second nature’ from Lukács’ Theory of the Novel, 1916). Adorno’s question, in 
turn, is how to “interpret” the “alienated, reified, dead world” of second nature so as to break 
its spell.205 In the present context this translates as: how are we to ‘interpret’ the aesthetic 
experience of nature (whose proper place is in art) if the beauty of nature is a function of its 
domination? In other words, how can works of art, the ‘mediated plenipotentiaries’ of nature, 
hope to “step outside of themselves” – ‘into the open’, as Adorno writes elsewhere – if such a 
beyond (nature qua nature) ‘does not yet exist’?206 
 
• The Promise of Natural Beauty: 
 
There are three aspects of Aesthetic Theory that are helpful in formulating a possible response 
to the question posed above. They concern: a.) Adorno’s notion of a promise of natural 
beauty; b.) His conviction that this promise is fulfilled through remembrance; c.) His 
particular view of the language in which this promise is supposed to be articulated. Clarifying 
these terms will give us a sense of how Adorno conceives of the relationship between art, 
nature and beauty in capitalist modernity, allowing us to finally revisit the passage concerning 
the aesthetic dimension of the image ban quoted at the outset of the present chapter. 
 
a.) Firstly, then, Adorno argues that art throws into relief what the aesthetic experience of 
nature “promises”,207 namely: the aforementioned reconciliation with ‘that which surpasses all 
human immanence’. In this respect art is seen as paradoxically prefiguring “Utopia as the 
harmony between man and nature”, as Alfred Schmidt puts it.208 As Adorno argues, art “wants 
to keep nature’s promise”,209 the unassailable promesse du bonheur once strikingly summoned 
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by Stendhal;210 however, it can do so only obliquely – “by breaking that promise” – lest it 
foreclose on the Utopia it presages.211 (After all, as we have seen, Adorno insists emphatically 
that “one may not cast a picture of Utopia in a positive manner”; “one can only talk about 
Utopia in a negative way”.)212 Instead of pleasing without interest, as it were, the promise of 
natural beauty “rubs on a wound”.213 It signals an indeterminate “longing for what beauty 
promises but never unveils”.214 The experience of natural beauty, in other words, is eminently 
negative. Pace Kant and Hegel, its watchword is dissonance, not harmony. Dissonance – “the 
technical term for (…) what aesthetics (…) calls ugly” – registers the discord between man 
and nature in capitalist modernity, just as suffering registers the non-identity between subject 
and object in Negative Dialectics.215 Accordingly, the ‘promise’ of natural beauty – ‘the 
harmony between man and nature’ – appears ex negativo in those modern works of art that 
most obstinately refuse to yield to the dictate of harmony. 
 
b.) The second point worth noting here is that, in Adorno’s view, ‘the reorientation of 
aesthetic theory towards natural beauty’ is a labour of recovery: an “attempt to do justice to 
that which falls victim to the ever-progressing (…) domination of nature”.216 Such justice, 
Adorno assures us, is carried out “symbolically”;217 its instrument is “remembrance”.218 But 
Adorno’s quasi-Proustian appeal to memory is ambiguous. On the one hand, he writes that 
“humanity becomes aware in art of what rationality has erased from memory”,219 i.e. all that is 
affective, somatic, and irrational. In this regard, Adorno appears to come close to Lyotard for 
whom art is precisely ‘what resists the imperialism of thought forgetful of the other’. But 
unlike Lyotard, Adorno does not locate art’s task primarily in the ethical imperative to bear 
witness to this forgetting. Insofar as he deems that ‘art must be and wants to be Utopia’, his 
notion of ‘remembrance’ is paradoxically both retrospective and prospective. To be sure, art 
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“recollects a world without domination”; however, as he contends, such a world “probably 
never existed.”220 Simon Jarvis puts this in the following terms: 
 
Adorno, in effect, is speculatively rewriting the oldest maxim of aesthetics. Art imitates nature: 
but nothing like ‘nature’ exists as yet: art imitates what does not yet exist. For Adorno it can be 
said that all authentic art is a mimesis of Utopia – yet this mimesis can be carried out only 
negatively. Art cannot provide an explicit image of Utopia. The possible ‘nature’ which does 
not yet exist can only be imitated by the determinate negation of the falsely naturalised culture 
which does exist.221 
 
The ‘vindication of what capitalism has oppressed’, then, lies not so much in bearing witness 
to the forgetting of an immemorial other, as in the conviction that even past injustices can be 
redeemed through criticism of the present – a criticism carried out for the sake of the future 
whose contours remain uncertain. To this extent, Adorno’s thought evinces undeniably 
messianic traits. 
 
c.) Finally, the third point worth noting here is to do with what was previously signposted as 
art’s ‘cognitive character’. In a striking passage from a lecture dated 02 December 1958, 
Adorno writes that what “becomes audible in works of art is the voice of the victim”, i.e. the 
voice of nature.222 Although the metaphor of the voice sits somewhat uneasily alongside 
Adorno’s assertion that nature appears in the form of images, it is nonetheless significant to 
the extent that it designates what he describes as art’s “language-like” character:223 its 
“logicality”.224 Artworks speak. They seek to express “what has become opaque to humans in 
the language of nature”.225 But insofar as nature ‘does not yet exist’, that which becomes 
audible in works of art cannot be grasped as a simple summoning-forth of the ‘voice of the 
victim’, as though it resounded – however diffusely – through the recesses of memory. 
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Rather, as above, such remembrance means paradoxically projecting forward the utopian 
model of a “nonconceptual, nonrigidified significative language” in terms of which something 
like nature may yet become conceivable.226 As Adorno stipulates, such a language – the 
language of art – would be “incommensurable with all communicative language”;227 it would 
be, in a word, “mute”.228 We are thus faced with two contrasting conceptions of language: one 
‘communicative’, i.e. propositional, declarative and conceptual, the other artistic, i.e. 
‘nonconceptual’, non-significational and ‘mute’. Adorno’s paradoxical claim thus appears to 
be that the muteness of art is “the single medium through which nature speaks”.229 Such a 
‘medium’, in turn, is not supposed to subject what it names to the operations of a language 
that violently subsumes difference under larger conceptual rubrics.230 In this respect the two 
divergent modes of language, in fact, designate two divergent modes of thought: one 
connected with the ills of conceptual cognition, which Adorno associates with the domination 
of nature (what he calls ‘identity-thinking’);231 the other connected with the metaphysical 
“gesture of stepping out into the open” – into a realm where nature and culture could 
conceivably be reconciled.232 Bracketing the former for a moment, Adorno frames the latter 
by use of a syntactical analogy: the work of art becomes “like language in the development of 
the connection of its elements, a wordless syntax”.233 Adorno puts this in Kantian terms: 
insofar as works of art are quasi-syntactical, they bear a structural likeness to certain forms of 
judgement. As Bernstein explains: 
 
[A]rtworks are synthetic wholes; they synthesise a manifold. (…) This unifying endeavour is 
the work of reason in art, art’s logicality and conceptuality, and hence the sense in which 
artworks are judgement-like. Nonetheless, artworks are not judgements and this is in part 
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because their syntheses occur through the medium of artistic ‘form’ rather than through 
concepts, propositions and syllogisms. (…) For Adorno everything turns on form’s proximity to 
conceptuality in terms of its synthesising function, and its distance from conceptuality, in its 
restraint, its not subsuming the elements of a work in it or under it, and hence its not providing 
for conceptual determinacy or closure.234 
 
Art, in other words, is like the philosophical language of judgement insofar as it ‘synthesises a 
manifold’ of materials qua form; however, it is unlike the philosophical language of 
judgement insofar as its syntheses do not subsume their compositional materials into a 
conceptual armature that curtails their irreducible particularity. Formally accomplished works 
of art ‘speak’ in terms of “judgementless judgements”,235 which model a relationship between 
their elements that might be described as the “state of differentiation without domination” 
invoked in the opening chapter of the present study: 236 a utopian constellation whose 
particular arrangement stages the reconciliation between nature and culture that transcends the 
strictures of capitalist modernity, albeit only as self-conscious semblance.237 
 What remains unclear, however, is how Adorno negotiates the relationship between 
these two divergent cognitive-linguistic registers. If ‘what becomes audible in works of art is’ 
indeed ‘the voice of the victim’ and if this ‘victim’ is in fact nature; if in turn art is the 
‘medium through which nature speaks’ (even though nothing like nature exists as yet) and the 
language of art is ‘mute’; and if – finally – this muteness intimates a form of ‘wordless 
syntax’ that ‘symbolically’ (as self-conscious semblance) models a prospective reconciliation 
between nature and culture, then the following question arises: how can Adorno summon 
forth such a Utopia without transgressing the ban on positively schematising it? Adorno’s 
response to this question follows from his estimation that ‘nature is beautiful in that it appears 
to say more than it is.’ As he writes: 
 
Artworks become artworks in the production of this more; they produce their own 
transcendence, rather than being its arena, and thereby they once again become separated from 
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transcendence. The actual arena of transcendence in artworks is the nexus of their elements. By 
straining toward, as well as adapting to, this nexus, they go beyond the appearance that they are, 
though this transcendence may be unreal. (…) Their transcendence is their eloquence, their 
script, but it is a script without meaning or, more precisely, a script with broken or veiled 
meaning.238 
 
Notwithstanding the increasingly dense cluster of metaphors through which Adorno frames 
art’s enigmatic emanations – image, voice, script – his argument follows a familiar pattern: 
artworks hold true to the promise of natural beauty where they break this promise; they do 
justice to what is oppressed in nature by standing-in for it in effigy; they render-audible the 
voice of nature by falling silent, etc. The relationship between the two cognitive-linguistic 
models under discussion here is no exception. Insofar as the ‘actual arena of transcendence in 
artworks is the nexus of their elements’, and insofar as these elements are resolutely of this 
world, the ‘more’ that artworks intimate does not require them to be removed – “even though 
by a hair’s breadth” – from the scope of existence.239 ‘Transcendence’, in other words, is 
intimated negatively. Its ‘arena’ is aesthetic immanence. The relationship between art, nature 
and beauty, which we set out to explore, is thus exposed as unrelentingly negative. 
 
iii.) With all the requisite tools in place, we can now finally revisit the passage cited at the 
outset of this chapter, where Adorno speaks of the ‘aesthetic dimension’ of the image ban. As 
will be recalled, Adorno writes the following: 
 
The Old Testament ban on images has an aesthetic as well as a theological dimension. That one 
should make no image, which means no image of anything whatsoever, expresses at the same 
time that it is impossible to make such an image. Through its duplication in art, what appears in 
nature is robbed of its being-in-itself, in which the experience of nature is fulfilled. Art holds 
true to appearing nature only where it makes landscape present in the expression of its own 
negativity. Borchardt’s ‘Verse bei Betrachtung von Landschaft-Zeichnungen geschrieben’ 
[‘Verses Written Whilst Contemplating Landscape Drawings’] expressed this inimitably and 
shockingly. Where painting and nature seem happily reconciled – as in Corot – this 
reconciliation is keyed to the momentary: An everlasting fragrance is a paradox. 
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As we have seen, Adorno’s assertion that ‘the Old Testament ban on images has an aesthetic 
… dimension’ is borne out by the fact that this motif appears repeatedly throughout the 
history of German aesthetics, not least in the works of Kant and Hegel. Against this backdrop, 
the commandment that one ‘should’ not make an image ‘of anything whatsoever’ (least of all 
God) might appear as a variant of an old aesthetic question: by what means can ‘anything’ be 
adequately represented? But Adorno’s phrasing is more emphatic. It points beyond a concern 
with mere representational commensurability. ‘That one should make no image … of 
anything whatsoever, expresses at the same time that it is impossible to make such an image.’ 
(What is lost in Robert Hullot-Kentor’s otherwise excellent translation is Adorno’s use of the 
subjunctive form: “Daß man sich kein Bild … machen soll, sagt zugleich, kein solches Bild 
sei möglich.”240 Hullot-Kentor’s omission obscures the fact that this passage is reported 
speech. What is unclear, however, is whose voice Adorno is adopting here – Moses? Kant?) 
Leaving this question in suspense, we note that Adorno proceeds to narrow his focus. The 
alleged impossibility of making any image ‘whatsoever’ is measured against the specific 
sense in which art depicts nature. As Adorno writes: ‘through its duplication in art what 
appears in nature is robbed of its being-in-itself’. At first glance this verdict appears to chime 
with Adorno’s earlier assertion that nature itself appears in the form of ‘images’, i.e. that art’s 
‘duplication’ of nature amounts to little more than a mere tautology. However, upon closer 
examination this view is complicated by Adorno’s claim that ‘nature, to whose imago art is 
devoted, does not yet in any way exist’. Adorno thus appears to present us with two 
contrasting views of the mimetic relation between art and nature: one based on duplication, 
the other on a kind of projection.241 How so? 
 With regards to the former, it is striking that Adorno emphasises ‘what appears in 
nature’. This appearance – “[w]as an Natur erscheint” – is of particular interest inasmuch as 
‘appearing’ (erscheinen) contains the very notion of Schein (semblance) that Adorno 
associates with art’s paradoxical claim to transcendence – its projection of a nature that 
‘probably never existed’.242 The ‘experience of nature’ – its fulfilment, no less – hinges on the 
indeterminate ‘what’ at the heart of this formulation. ‘What’ appears in (or, rather, of) nature 
is ‘robbed’ of its ‘being-in-itself’ through duplication, which signals closure rather than 
openness. With regards to the latter, in turn, Adorno argues that ‘art holds true to appearing 
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nature only where it makes landscape present in the expression of its own negativity’.243 He 
provides the context for this line by citing Borchardt’s ‘Verses’244 and Corot’s landscape 
paintings. His conceit appears to be that Borchardt and Corot’s respective renditions of 
‘landscape’ (be they poetic, graphic or painterly) ‘hold true’ to that which appears in nature – 
its promise, its voice, its script – through an expression of their own ‘negativity’: melancholic 
muteness. This is curious because, as we have seen, Adorno appears to follow Simmel’s 
characterisation of ‘landscape’ as a cultural construct: Kulturlandschaft. What does it mean, 
then, for art to ‘make landscape present in the expression of its own negativity’? Adorno gives 
some indication hereof in the following lines: “perhaps the most profound force of resistance 
stored in the cultural landscape is the expression of history that is compelling, aesthetically, 
because it is etched by the real suffering of the past.”245 Landscape is thus placed under the 
banner of Adorno’s idea of ‘natural-history’: “[t]he cultural landscape, which resembles a ruin 
even when the houses still stand, embodies a wailful lament that has since fallen mute.”246 
That is to say, art’s immanent organisation of forms – its ‘wordless syntax’ – gives a voice to 
nature’s mute lament by appearing to say ‘more than it is’, even if the impression of this 
‘more’ is both fleeting and illusory. The ‘profound force of resistance’ that allows Adorno to 
associate the image ban with natural beauty (rather than sublimity), in turn, is memorably 
described in a lecture, dated 18 November 1958. Herein Adorno writes: 
 
In this feeling of resistance against mere existence lies the Utopia that this existence doesn’t 
have the last word. And this imageless image of Utopia, this expression of a Utopia that does 
not pronounce itself, but which rather appears only through the sense that something is stronger 
(…) than the world as it is: this (…) is one of the categories of which I should like to think that 
it is characteristic for the beautiful in general.247 
 
Accordingly, ‘the profound force of resistance’ that Adorno ascribes to certain artistic 
renditions of landscape lies in their particular ability to negatively intimate an ‘imageless 
image of Utopia’ as something beautiful. To be sure, the sense that there is ‘something 
stronger … than the world as it is’ recalls a central tenet of the Kantian sublime – the 
affirmation of man’s super-sensible reason vis-à-vis the overwhelming force of nature. 
However, Adorno’s point here is precisely not to affirm the sovereign reign of reason over 
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nature, but rather to challenge it. To encounter Corot’s painting of a ‘natural’ scene; to 
experience this scene as beautiful in the highly qualified sense described above; to heed the 
self-conscious artificiality of this beauty as an expression of ‘negativity’; to sense that this 
‘negativity’ – the landscape’s ‘wailful lament’ – awakens a ‘feeling of resistance’ against the 
ills of enlightenment reason: this and nothing less is what Adorno hopes to accomplish by 
tying the image ban to beauty, rather than sublimity. The ‘imageless image of Utopia’, which 
is ‘characteristic for the beautiful’, thus appears as the nodal point of his philosophy: an 
inversely theological materialism whose workings are borne out in art. 
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Reprise: 
‘Zum Ende’ 
 
“Und einmal waren wir auch, von der den Dingen und der Kreatur gewidmeten Aufmerksamkeit her, 
in die Nähe eines Offenen und Freien gelangt. Und zuletzt in die Nähe der Utopie.”1 
Paul Celan 
 
It is notable that a renewed iconoclastic zeal has caused some recent commentators to 
proclaim the dawn of a new barbarism.2 At first glance this verdict appears to contradict the 
numerous civilisational meta-narratives that equate the Mosaic interdiction against idol 
worship and its iconoclastic enforcement with reason as such, i.e. with the triumph of a 
metaphysical-philosophical understanding of the absolute over and above the fateful-mythical 
model that is supposed to undergird iconophilic paganism.3 Indisputably such readings – e.g. 
Cohen’s Religion of Reason Out of the Sources of Judaism – contrast with broadly Christian 
narratives, such as the one proffered in Hegel’s lectures on aesthetics.4 After all, as we have 
seen, although the ban on picturing the absolute is supposed to designate a crucial stage in the 
unfolding of what Hegel describes as the idea, it is only through incarnation – the 
embodiment of God in Christ – that the abstractness for which he criticises Judaism is 
ultimately overcome.5 In both cases, though, what interests us is less to do with the image ban 
in its capacity as a divine decree, and more with its function as a trope in the annals of 
“Western metaphysics” – a point first noted at the outset of the present study.6 Accordingly, I 
have sought to emphasise the sense in which diverse thinkers such as Kant, Hegel and Freud – 
to name only a few – associate the monotheistic proscription against image making with the 
burgeoning of abstraction. For Adorno, this peculiar commonality forces a difficult question: 
how are we to understand the relation between reason and un-reason under the aspect of 
iconoclasm? To be sure, this question cannot go unqualified. For one thing, it appears to 
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Kaplan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 50-58 
5 See pp. 141-146 of the present study. 
6 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol. 1: The Will to Power as Art, trans. D.F. Krell (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1981), 10 
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presuppose a unified view of reason in the singular, which is either vigorously reaffirmed or 
violently undermined by the outlawing of images. On the one hand, Moses’ destruction of the 
golden calf is supposed to designate the overcoming of myth – a point laid out in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment; on the other hand, the recent ruination of ancient temples in Iraq and Syria is 
presumed to mark myth’s barbarous return. Adorno, for his part, describes this vacillation as 
endemic to reason itself – an admittedly problematic, Euro-centric portrayal.7 He suggests the 
following: if reason and un-reason are indissolubly entwined, then their putative polarity is 
ultimately unsustainable. In other words, if the image ban is in fact a marker of enlightenment 
rationality, then it follows that it is equally the harbinger of cultural calamity. Adorno is clear 
on this point: the form of disembodied reason that this figure supposedly inaugurates finds its 
most gruesome expression in the Nazi death machinery; at the same time, though, it is only 
such reason that can effect its own course correction. Certainly one way to short-circuit the 
false opposition between iconoclasm’s supposed barbarism and its alleged rationality would 
be to unearth the countless conflicting counter-narratives that undermine the monolithic view 
of the enlightenment.8 In this case, no one image of the absolute would be possible. However, 
Adorno rather attempts to dissipate this deceptive dualism from the inside out. In this regard, 
the image ban is both emblematic of and antidotal to the historical dynamic that it supposedly 
initiates. It figures, on the one hand, as the turning point of an enlightenment narrative that 
privileges mind over matter, and, on the other, as the foremost cipher of reason’s capacity to 
undo its own ills. 
Over the course of the preceding pages, I have sought to substantiate this claim by 
organising Adorno’s thinking around the topos of imagelessness. Somewhat ironically, I have 
argued that his recurrent references to the Mosaic interdiction against image making have 
served to illustrate, elucidate and – finally – align some of his principal concerns. Foremost 
amongst them is Adorno’s concept of an ‘imageless’ materialism (explored at length in 
Chapter One): his effort to grasp the pained particularity of material existence under the rule 
of universal fungibility. For Adorno, I have claimed, making an image of “any thing that is in 
                                                
7 To clarify: Adorno is not endorsing the exclusive association of reason with Abrahamic monotheism. After all, 
other ‘stages’ in the dialectic of enlightenment equally evince forms of rationality that are proper to their specific 
historical moment – not all of them European. Rather, he appears to be suggesting that authors such as Cohen 
read the institution of the image ban as the vindication of a moral universalism conceived of along broadly 
Kantian lines. In this regard the universality of the one, true moral law – the telos of the one, true reason – is 
projected back onto a determinate source: the Hebrew bible with its one, true God. Although Adorno’s explicit 
statements concerning Cohen are scant, I take it that he is concerned to critically interrogate precisely such an 
association. Cf. J.M. Bernstein, “A Short Genealogy of Modern Universalism: How Pure Reason Overtook 
Empirical Knowing”, Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
151-164 
8 For a recent critique of the Euro-centric portrayal of reason, see: Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment: 
Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650-1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 
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heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth” is akin to 
subordinating the specific under the general, i.e. under larger conceptual rubrics. 9 
Accordingly, I have sought to emphasise how he extends the reach of this analogy to support 
his claim that substitutability – the principle of exchange – is the “always-already” 
operational movens of history:10 the violent eradication of everything that does not conform to 
the “law of identity”.11 But if making an image of ‘any thing’ means curtailing its inimitable 
peculiarity (subordinating quality to quantity); and if by analogy to think is to deal in mere 
mental representations – interchangeable copies, simulacra, eikones – then Adorno’s 
‘imageless’ mode of materialist cognition must be seen principally as an attempt to think 
thought against itself: to gesture towards a realm where the relation between subject and 
object, man and matter, nature and culture might yet be radically recast. 
This has meant – secondly – that whilst Adorno must demand a mode of grasping the 
particular “as it would present itself to the intellectus archetypus”,12 he must concede that 
even the bare formulation of this demand transgresses the very law that is supposed to ensure 
its possibility. I have sought to expose this tension by circumscribing the contours of 
Adorno’s ‘inverse theology’ (Chapter Two): the paradoxical attempt to think the possibility of 
a radically different future beyond instrumentality, intentionality and means-ends relations by 
strategically marshalling the obsolete vernacular of transcendence in order to launch an 
immanent attack on reality under the rule of a capitalist cult religion. To be sure, such an 
effort appears to presuppose an ineffable “standpoint” from whence such a demand might be 
issued.13 However, as I have aimed to show, Adorno’s focus is resolutely of this world. It 
means “[l]ife as it is lived in the village at the foot of the hill on which” Kafka’s “castle is 
built”.14 Although “we do not know what the correct thing would be, we know exactly (…) 
                                                
9 Exodus, 20: 4-5 
10 Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture”, in Off the Beaten Track, trans. Julian Young & Kenneth 
Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 59. I consciously cite Adorno’s supposed antipode 
Heidegger at this juncture. Adorno’s incessant disavowal of Heidegger occasionally leads him to inadvertently 
approximate his position. The figure of the ‘always-already’, for instance, seems to me to capture precisely the 
historical precepts of Dialectic of Enlightenment – the immemorial split between subject and object (the 
primordial division of mental and manual labour), which determines the subsequent course of the techno-
scientific domination of nature. 
11 Theodor W. Adorno, Against Epistemology – A Metacritique: Studies in Husserl and the Phenomenological 
Antinomies, trans. Willis Domingo (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1982), 39 
12 Theodor W. Adorno, “Notes on Kafka”, in Prisms, trans. Samuel & Shierry Weber (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1981), 268 
13 Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life, trans. Edmund Jephcott (London: 
Verso, 1974), 247 
14 Walter Benjamin, The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin 1910-1940, eds. Theodor W. Adorno & Gershom 
Scholem, trans. Manfred R. Jacobson & Evelyn M. Jacobson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 453 
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what the false thing is”.15 In other words, if Utopia is to be attained then it can only follow 
from a determinate negation of the present, which – for its part – “always points (…) to what 
should be”.16 
Thirdly, I have argued, these two central nodes receive their full articulation in 
Adorno’s ‘negative aesthetics’ (Chapter Three): his effort to intimate an “imageless image of 
Utopia” as the self-consciousness of artistic semblance.17 Accordingly, I have claimed, 
Adorno portrays autonomous works of art as staging, enacting and performing the operations 
of his ‘imageless’ materialism, albeit only at the level of Schein – an intimation of something 
beyond the spellbound sphere of existence. The argumentative pattern should be familiar by 
now: artworks hold fast to the promise of a reconciliation between subject and object only 
where they break this promise; they do justice to that which is repressed through ‘the law of 
identity’ by standing-in for it in effigy; they respect the right of the image by abstaining from 
positively picturing it, etc. In this peculiar oscillation, I have claimed, lies a “feeling of 
resistance against mere existence”, which is associated with Adorno’s singular re-imagination 
of natural beauty.18  Such a ‘feeling’, however, cannot be furnished with any positive 
determinations. It too is subject to the ban on images. 
 
*** 
 
One could conceivably repeat the argument outlined above ad libitum with a view to 
Adorno’s nascent ethics, say, or his vexed relation to politics: to push against the boundaries 
of an established discourse by exaggerating its time-honoured topoi in the hope that – by 
doing so – our thinking may over-reach itself and open up a space in which its terms might 
yet be radically reconfigured. (Benjamin’s mode of thinking in constellations is decisive 
here.)19 In each case, Adorno’s recourse to the image ban aims to hold open the possibility 
                                                
15 Theodor W. Adorno & Ernst Bloch, “Something’s Missing: A Discussion between Ernst Bloch and Theodor 
W. Adorno on the Contradictions of Utopian Longing (1964)”, in The Utopian Function of Art and Literature, 
trans. Jack Zipes & Frank Mecklenburg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), 11 [Translation altered] 
16 Ibid 
17 Theodor W. Adorno, Ästhetik (1958/59), ed. Eberhard Ortland (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2009), 52 [My 
translation] 
18 Ibid 
19 A fascinating document of Adorno’s immeasurable debt to the mode of non-hierarchical, constellational 
thinking outlined in the Benjamin’s Origin of the German Mourning-Play can be found in the notes 
accompanying Adorno’s Privatissimum on Benjamin’s book from the summer of 1932. Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, 
“Protokolle vom Seminar über Benjamins Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, Sommersemester 1932”, in 
Frankfurter Adorno Blätter. Bd. IV, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Munich: Edition Text + Kritik), 52–77 
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that Utopia – variously conceived of as a “state of differentiation without domination”,20 as 
the “harmony between man and nature”, 21  as “undeluded happiness, including bodily 
pleasure”22 – may yet be attained despite the verdict that its actualisation is presently “blocked 
off” by historical conditions.23 This much, I hope, has become clear. But what if, in its 
capacity as a philosophical-historical marker (a motif, a trope), the image ban itself were to 
petrify into an image? In this case, would Adorno not be in breach of his own injunction? And 
would such a transgression not ultimately compromise the two aspects of his thinking that I 
have sought to foreground: i.) His effort to do justice to particularity; ii.) His effort to 
safeguard the openness of the future? Let us conclude by considering this twofold difficulty. 
 
i.) As I have sought to demonstrate, Adorno’s effort to do justice to particularity proceeds by 
reappraising the multifarious philosophical traditions that he deems to have fallen short of this 
task.24 After all, the methodological self-consciousness of Negative Dialectics is modelled on 
that of the young Marx: “the ruthless criticism of all that exists”, not least of all philosophy 
itself.25 For only if philosophy is duly criticised can it be truly overcome. But if Adorno seeks 
to push the contradictions that he purports to locate in, say, Jaspers or Heidegger to the point 
of collapsing, so that the terms of their inquiries might be re-formed from out of the rubble 
left by his critique – hence iconoclasm – then his modus operandi occasionally suffers from 
the lack of nuance with which he treats the texts in question. For example: when Adorno 
reproaches the proponents of ‘representational thinking’ for their belief in having direct 
access to mind independent matter, his effort to cast into relief an ‘imageless’ mode of 
materialist cognition by criticising the tenets of their naïve realism is undermined by the off-
handedness of his approach. To be sure, Adorno’s rebukes against Engels and Lenin are not 
unwarranted; but if his aim is to expose the dogmatic undergirding of (in this case) ‘Marxist’ 
materialism – to demonstrate how such an intellectual modality might inadvertently reproduce 
                                                
20 Adorno, “On Subject and Object”, in Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, ed. Henry W. Pickford 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 247 
21 Alfred Schmidt, “Der Begriff des Materialismus bei Adorno”, in Adorno Konferenz 1983, eds. Ludwig v. 
Friedenburg & Jürgen Habermas (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984), 25 [My translation] 
22 Simon Jarvis, “Adorno, Marx, Materialism”, in The Cambridge Companion to Adorno, ed. Tom Huhn 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 80 
23 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton (London: Routledge, 1973), 57 
24 For reasons of brevity, I have foregrounded only some instances of Adorno’s meta-critical readings of figures 
from the history of philosophy, e.g. Kierkegaard, whose bourgeois individualism he attempts to play off against 
itself. However, similar claims might be made about his reading of, say, Husserl or Nietzsche. The point in each 
case is that, whatever the professed intentions of the thinkers in question, in Adorno’s view they tend to 
unwittingly relapse into ‘idealism’: the illusion of thought’s self-sufficiency, the tendency to subsume particulars 
under universals. 
25 Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, Marx & Engels Collected Works, Vol. 3: 1843-1844 (London: Lawrence & 
Wishart, 1975), 142 
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the repressive apparatuses that it professes to displace, e.g. by reducing the specificity of 
matter to an intellectual principle – then his undifferentiated treatment of their admittedly 
problematic tracts is not just glib: it is precisely reductive. In this respect, Adorno appears to 
be caught in a performative contradiction – an accidental formalism. His insistence on 
imagelessness purports to mean that ‘what should be’ emerges from the determinate negation 
of what is, “without capriciousness or violence”.26 Yet, the manner in which he approaches 
the failings of the present risks duplicating the very violence that it aims to overcome. Adorno 
sometimes acts as though the negative dialectic has won in advance. Hence the professed 
attention to detail with which he claims to complicate the bigger picture falls by the wayside. 
 
ii.) To the extent that Adorno’s effort to think particularity is supposed to emerge from the 
determinate negation of the present, his ‘Utopia of cognition’ is projected forward in time.27 It 
concerns a future beyond the perpetual return of the oldest in the guise of the new; a future in 
which a state of “peace” might yet be achieved between subject and object, man and matter, 
nature and culture, etc.28 However, as Adorno is aware, “writing recipes for the soup kitchens 
of the future” ineluctably proceeds in terms of the present situation.29 To break this cycle, new 
terms must be intimated that do not simply duplicate the extant ones. This is supposed to 
proceed through a labour of interpretation, a micrology of the false condition, which – in turn 
– yields the “mirror writing” of its opposite.30 But if the possibility of the future, whose 
positive portrayal is prohibited, hinges on the determinate negation of the present, then 
Adorno’s appeal to Utopia turns entirely on how determinate this negation really is. The 
trouble is that his self-avowed un-working of the grand historical arc, which he traces “from 
the slingshot to the megaton bomb” – a narrative whose central marker is supposed to be the 
image ban itself – purports to proceed through paying particular attention to the minutiae that 
disrupt the progressive view of history.31 But, in fact, Adorno identifies a whole host of 
diverse elements. The tendency of thought to subsume particulars under universals is 
repeatedly equated with the making of images; the quid pro quo of ancient sacrificial rites is 
continually likened to the operations of capitalist exchange; the dreadful logic of the Nazi 
extermination camps is perpetually related back to an immemorial split between subject and 
                                                
26 Adorno, Minima Moralia, 247 [Translation altered] 
27 Ibid 
28 Adorno, “On Subject and Object”, 247 
29 Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, Marx & Engels Collected Works, Vol. 35: Capital, Vol. 1 (London: Lawrence 
& Wishart, 1996), 17 [Translation altered]. As we have seen, Adorno’s refusal to paint pictures of Utopia has 
prompted critics, such as Habermas, to charge that he is opening up the future to the arbitrary projections of the 
present, thus foregoing any hope of change. 
30 Adorono, Minima Moralia, 247 [Translation altered]. See pp. 46-50 of the present study. 
31 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 320 
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object, which – for its part – is portrayed as the primordial division between mental and 
manual labour. But if animistic sacrifice is nourished by the same logic as capitalist exchange 
and Nazi genocide; if consequently ‘identity thinking’ means the always-already definitive 
mytho-logical drive to domination; and if even the terms used to criticise this condition (e.g. 
the image ban) are co-originary with such an identitarian regime, then surely Adorno’s effort 
to immanently overturn what he calls negative universal history – a task that is ostensibly 
carried out for the sake of particularity and openness – ultimately perpetuates the very lack of 
differentiation that it sets out to overcome. What remains of the proper name Auschwitz, say, 
when the dead are only as interchangeable as x, y or z under the yoke of conceptual thought? 
 
In light of these difficulties, the question posed above concerning the relation between reason 
and un-reason under the aspect of iconoclasm comes into sharper focus. In the case of 
Adorno, it hinges on a tension between two competing impulses: on the one hand, he 
professes to heed Benjamin’s micro-logical commitment to a view of truth conceived of as the 
“ruffle on a dress”.32 Such truth is on the side of an emphatic concept of reason that has never 
before existed – a ‘Utopia of cognition’. On the other hand, he outlines a macro-logical world 
history of un-truth: a negatively Hegelian account of reason’s failure to live up to its concept, 
which is – in turn – equated with the history of domination as such. But in attempting to strike 
a balance between these two positions, Adorno is forced to paint a picture of the world with 
brushstrokes that are so broad that they efface even his demand for difference. In this regard, 
it might be objected that he ultimately falls short of his own injunction to abide by the image 
ban. Accordingly there is something appropriately elliptical, if ultimately unsatisfactory, 
about Adorno’s recourse to imagelessness. It evokes the very image that it sets out to banish, 
namely: that of the vicious circle. 
  
                                                
32 Walter Benjamin, “Convolute B: Fashion”, in The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin 
McLaughlin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 69 
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